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This thesis provides a theorisation of counterrevolution and revolution as continuous, 
interrelated, and evolving processes involving contentions over access to resources. Since, as 
this thesis argues, revolution and counterrevolution are contentions over access to resources, 
to understand both requires that we examine, not rising levels of anger or dissent, but 
structures of resource access. Moreover, since the contentions which define revolution and 
counterrevolution are best understood as continuous and inter-related processes, the events 
which are conventionally defined as ‘revolution’ and ‘counterrevolution’ are treated, in this 
thesis, as episodes of intensification within continuous processes. Finally, because of their 
inter-related continuity, both revolution and counterrevolution are seen as continuously 
evolving: neither phenomenon is static nor separable, either from each other or from its past 
experiences; as processes, both continue through learning from and building on previous 
contentions.  
To test these hypotheses, the thesis surveys the dominant counterrevolutionary and 
revolutionary contentions over a period of time within a given polity, using a combination of 
methods derived from political economy, elite studies, and historical sociology. It applies 
these methods to an examination of counterrevolution and revolution in contemporary Egypt, 
starting with the formation of the modern Egyptian polity in the 19th century and ending in 
the aftermath of the revolutionary outbursts of 2011.  
Drawing on primary and secondary sources on Egypt’s political history, state formation, 
social and economic development, labour politics, gender politics, and political and economic 
elite, the thesis locates counterrevolution in Egypt within a long history of continuous and 
evolving contentions by different political actors and ideologies seeking to exclude the mass 
of the population from access to strategic resources and the rewards of development. 
Similarly, it shows that the revolutionary demands of the Arab Spring, ‘Bread, Freedom, 
Social Justice’ are not merely the product of a revolutionary moment, but the culmination of a 
history of contentions for more inclusive access to resources. Through the case of Egypt, the 
thesis seeks to reveal the academic potentials of developing an understanding of ‘revolution’ 
and ‘counterrevolution’ as more than the events to which these terms conventionally refer, 
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WHY COUNTERREVOLUTION MATTERS 
 
1. Introduction 
The popular uprisings that unfolded in the Arab world in 2011 threw into question arguments 
advanced by influential and widely-cited theories of revolution, as well as those concerning 
what the Orientalist literature refers to as ‘Arab Exceptionalism’ – the absence of revolutions 
against authoritarianism in the Middle East and the incompatibility of Arab culture with 
democracy.1 However, like much of the history of revolutions, the high expectations raised 
by the heroic non-violent mobilisation of millions of citizens of Arab countries demanding 
social justice and a more inclusive system were, for the time being, disappointed; and the 
outcomes of these mobilisations produced confusion, even among prominent Middle East 
scholars. Some have sought to resolve this confusion by critically exploring the nature of the 
outcomes and situating it in broader and comparative historical context.2 Others have resorted 
to culturalist and Orientalist explanations, or, at best, to the liberal dichotomies of static 
authoritarianism or dynamic democratisation.3  
Why is there such ambiguity about the nature and outcomes of the Arab uprisings? A 
brief look into the history of revolutions and scholarly explanations of this history reveals that 
academic ambiguity about revolutionary outcomes extend beyond the Arab world and the 
peculiarities of the so-called ‘Arab Spring’. Scholars generally tend to characterise outcomes 
similar to those of the Arab Spring as ‘counterrevolutionary’, and to conceive of 
counterrevolution as something that operates outside of the revolutionary process and that  
                                                           
1 ‘Arab exceptionalism’ is the notion that the survival of authoritarian regimes in the Arab World is 
attributable to peculiar cultural and religious values that; make the peoples of the region either incapable or 
unwilling to mobilise in pursuit of democratic change. This ahistoric, culturalist argument has been elaborated, 
most notably, by Bernard Lewis (2003), Samuel Huntington (1993), and Garnham & Tessler (1995), among 
others. 
2 See, for instance, Lynch (2014, 2016), Matthiessen (2016), Phillips (2015), Shahin (2014), Marfleet 
(2016), and De Smet (2016), among others. 
3 Less than a year after the Tunisian Revolution, Bradley argued, in After the Arab Spring: How 
Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts (2012), that the revolts were over and that Islamists had ‘hijacked’ 
what was, in his opinion, a timid and immature uprising by liberal youth. For a wider discussion on Orientalist 
explanations, see Shihade (2012). 
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emerges in reaction to it.4 Therefore, the answer to the question posed here requires not just a 
deconstruction of systematic prejudice towards the Middle East, but a wider inquiry into 
theories of revolution and the ways in which they explain, or fail to explain, the empirical 
outcomes of revolutions. 
 Despite significant advances in the study of revolution, our understanding of the 
outcomes of revolution remains limited. The problem, this thesis argues, is two-fold. Firstly, 
most studies of revolution deal with revolution as a bounded event, manifested in sudden 
rupture in the system, or ‘volcanic’ outbursts. Secondly, this thesis notes an absence in 
theories of revolution of a conceptualisation of counterrevolution, and a thin literature on the 
concept itself. It is those two limitations that prevent developing a sound understanding of the 
outcomes of revolution, and which makes them so often appear ambiguous. This thesis 
argues that we can gain a better understanding of revolution and its outcomes by studying the 
extension of this phenomenon beyond the momentary events, and giving more serious 
consideration to counterrevolution, in relation to revolution. The aim of this study, therefore, 
is to provide the theoretical foundations for this relational approach, and, by applying it to a 
case study, demonstrate the academic potentials of such approach.  
This thesis hopes to show how a relational theorisation of counterrevolution and 
revolution can illuminate a generalisable explanation of what seems to be, based on 
established theories, ambiguous or disappointing final outcomes of revolution. 
The following section considers the dominant theoretical approaches to understanding 
revolution and its outcomes, and how and to what extent they allude to counterrevolution, if 
at all.  The following sections consider, first, the most prominent theories of revolution and 
their explanation of outcomes and, second, how studies of counterrevolution approach the 
topic. What this consideration will reveal is that counterrevolution is under-theorised, both in 
theories of revolution and in studies of counterrevolution, and that this shortcoming limits our 
understanding and explanations of outcomes of revolution. 
 
                                                           
4 See, for instance, John’s “Independent Algeria from Ben Bella to Boumédienne: I. The Counter-
Revolution and Its Consequences” (1968), where counterrevolution is implicitly defined as a return to the old 
regime, thus understanding counterrevolution as completely separate from revolution. In another approach, 
Moonis Ahmad (1984) refers to opposition groups formed after the revolution by Nicaraguans outside the 
country as counterrevolutionary, thus separating theoretically and geographically revolution and 
counterrevolution, and reducing counterrevolution to a mere reaction. 
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2.  Contemporary Schools of Thought on Revolution and Counterrevolution 
The literature on revolution explains the unsuccessful outcomes of revolutions in various 
ways. Most of the literature on revolution treats its defeat as an event – for instance, a 
military coup or the return of the old guard – which operates outside the revolution and 
occurs as a response to it (e.g., De Smet 2014, Elazar 20300, Fairbank 1949). Some theories 
acknowledge that revolutions encounter internal resistance – structural obstacles (e.g., Gurr 
1970, Skocpol 1988), or pre-emptive actions (e.g. Brinton 1938) – that lead to ‘unsuccessful’ 
outcomes. Most prominent schools of thought conceive of revolution and counterrevolution 
as having fixed binary opposition involving, for example, a struggle between ‘the state’ and 
‘the masses’ (as in psychological theories). The use of this binarism produces fundamental 
confusion about the nature of the outcomes of revolutionary activity. Typically, it defines a 
revolutionary party and, when relevant, a counterrevolutionary party. The outcome, then, is 
always clear: the triumph of the revolutionary party represents a successful outcome, and the 
triumph of the counterrevolutionary party represents a disappointing outcome. However, the 
empirical particularities and nuances of revolutionary processes are more complex than this 
fixated revolution-counterrevolution binary, and their outcomes are often less than clear. 
Some theories do not employ this binary; and the more nuanced theorisations they offer 
succeed, to some extent, in mitigating the problem of how to explain ambiguous outcomes 
(e.g. Gramsci 2011 [1971], Tilly 1973b).5  
 This section traces the development of theories of revolution. It will show that 
scholars gradually broke away from fixed binary explanations, began to acknowledge the 
contingencies and complexities of revolutionary politics, and eventually sought to invoke the 
question of counterrevolution as a way to better understand revolution and its outcomes. 
However, the following survey of key theories in the field will reaffirm that 
counterrevolution remains a concept overshadowed by the centrality of revolution, and most 
empirical studies which employ the term do so without prior developing of the concept.  
 This section divides theories of revolution into four schools. These schools do not 
encompass all theories of revolution; but, as the most prominent schools, they are indicative 
of how studies of revolution address the question of outcomes, counterrevolution, and the 
                                                           
5 These alternative theories are explored further in Chapter 2, providing a useful starting point for this 
thesis’s theoretical framework.  
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relation between revolution and counterrevolution.  
 
2.1  Marxist Theories 
In general, Marxist theories explain revolution through a binary conception of class struggle 
based on a historical trajectory of class succession, while identifying a set of pre-determined 
revolutionary and counterrevolutionary classes in each phase of this historical succession. 
This historical view of revolution concludes with the inevitable and defining victory of the 
working class over the bourgeoisie. Towards that end, neo-Marxist theorists developed over 
time this classical view to reflect the empirical complexity of class struggle and, particularly, 
the significance of counterrevolution. 
Classical Marxism sees history as shaped by a succession of modes of production and 
the ever-changing relations of production among social classes. Engels and Marx argued that 
the history of societies is the history of class struggle: oppressor and oppressed stand in 
constant opposition to one another, an opposition carried on in an uninterrupted, now hidden, 
now open fight that each time ends either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, 
or in the common ruin of the contending classes (Engels and Marx 1969 [1848]: 14). This 
understanding of historical transformation in terms of a ruling and revolutionary class binary 
governs Marxist theorisations of revolution and its outcomes.  
In The Communist Manifesto (1848), Engels and Marx set out the grounds for their 
belief in the inevitability of class struggle under capitalism between the working class and the 
ruling bourgeois class, the eventual revolution and triumph of the working class, and the shift 
to a new mode of production. They argued that this process would require working class 
unity, organisation, and mobilisation against the ruling capitalist class, and that this would be 
made possible by the increasing class consciousness of workers as a result of the structural 
contradictions of the capitalist system.6  
                                                           
6 Marxism provides a critical analysis of the contradictions of capitalist structures of production, 
including the process whereby workers are employed by capitalists to produce valuable commodities that belong 
to the capitalists, while receiving, in the form of wages, a fraction of the value of what their labour produced. 
Labour processes under capitalism continuously ‘alienate’ labourers from their own creative powers, so that the 
objects of their labour become alien to them and eventually rule over them (see, for instance, Marx’s Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in which he discusses at length the concept of ‘estranged labour’). The 
profit of the capitalists constantly enslaves the worker in wage contracts. Some of the profit is invested in 
developing means of production in the pursuit of greater profit margins. This continuous process of perfecting 
technological means by capitalist enterprises increasingly displaces and replaces human labour. Thus the 
increased productivity in a capitalist system aggravates the exploitation of the working class. 
 5 
However, Engels and Marx did not develop the concept of counterrevolution. Their 
writings on the revolutions of 1848, the rise of Louis Bonaparte in 1851 (Marx 2005 [1852]), 
and the Paris Commune of 1871 (Marx 2001 [1871]) suggest that they saw counterrevolution 
as an integral and possibly inevitable dimension in the process of revolution.  In these 
writings, the term ‘counterrevolution’ is used to refer to the forces of absolutism which 
supported the monarchy in France and Germany. As Lewis Brownstein (1981) points out, for 
Marx and Engels, those forces were the counterrevolution; however, once the bourgeoisie 
won, they became the counterrevolution, or more accurately, the counterrevolutionaries, and 
the use of the term to refer to the forces of absolutism drops out of their writings as well as all 
subsequent Marxist writings (1981: 177).  
Vladimir Lenin – another leading Marxist figure, engages more thoroughly and 
explicitly with the concept. Lenin grappled with undeniable and significant threat of 
counterrevolution in the struggle with capitalist forces. His emphasis on the importance of the 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ was grounded on his concern with the constant danger of 
bourgeois restoration. The bourgeoisie, he argued, was deeply entrenched in society and 
failure to uproot it would place the revolution under constant threat. This suggests that there 
is a contingent relationship between revolution and counterrevolution that influences the 
ways in which society is transformed following a revolution: thus, with the victory of the 
socialist revolution, the nature of the socio-political transformation that follows is shaped, not 
by an unencumbered socialist reorganisation of structures, but, also, by the continuing 
counterrevolutionary rebounds against revolution (Lenin 1975: 552-53). 
However, for both, Marx and Lenin – and all the other classical Marxists, ‘real’ 
revolution is strictly a phenomenon of working class triumph. All other power struggles and 
transformations are significant only to the extent that they prepare the way for the inevitable 
working class revolution; and reference to counterrevolution is made to serve these claims. 
Therefore, for Engels and Marx, the outcome of the French Revolution – the triumph of the 
bourgeois class – was counterrevolutionary, though necessary, transitional phase within the 
capitalist mode of production in France. This triumph replaced the dominant feudal class with 
a class of professionals and businessmen who would then set up the political and economic 
conditions for working class unity and for the revolution to extend the benefits of modern 
industrial technology to the masses.  
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 Yet the failure of western socialist parties in the early twentieth century to mobilise 
workers against nationalism forced Marxist scholars to reconsider these assumptions. It 
revealed that class struggle was much more complex than Marx had assumed. This 
shortcoming revealed that a theorisation which treats different classes as bearers of either 
revolution or of counterrevolution was too simplistic. Classical Marxism was unable to 
explain the absence of working class revolutions in Western societies that had experienced 
the economic transformations and structural failures that Marxist theory considers to be their 
prerequisites. It also was unable to explain the rise of right-wing organisations from within 
the socialist ranks, luring in the process large segments of Europe’s working classes. 
 Marxist theorists sought to resolve this anomaly by moving away from the 
determinism of classical Marxism, and focussing instead on the nuances of and obstacles to a 
working class revolution. New intellectual traditions of critical theory (e.g. Gramsci 1971, 
Marcuse 1972, Adorno and Horkheimer 1972, Lucaks 1971), psychoanalysis (e.g. Fromm 
1961, 1962), and existentialism (e.g. Sartre 1976) were developed to address and account for 
the complexity of class struggle and revolution. These advances in Marxist theory also 
encouraged more attention to counterrevolution in relation to revolution, though usually 
without referring to it as such. As the following survey will show, Marxist scholars provided 
illustrative concepts that explain counterrevolution. 
Herbert Marcuse (1992) and, following him, scholars associated with the Frankfurt 
School, studied ‘preventive mechanisms’ which, in modern capitalist societies, blocked the 
rise of revolutionary movements. Other responses in Marxist theory to anomalous empirical 
outcomes were explorations of the revolutionary process that did not base themselves on 
binaries of political actors and, in particular, deterministic notions relating to working class 
politics.  
For instance, Barrington Moore Jr. conceived of revolution in more general terms: as 
a process, often reflected in class divisions and alliances, which disrupts existing roles, rights 
and balances of power among power groups within a state (1966: 26). Rather than assuming a 
binary opposition involving struggle either between predetermined classes (as in classical 
Marxian theory) or between ‘the state’ and ‘the masses’ (as in the psychological theories to 
be discussed, below), Moore conceived of revolution as involving contentious politics within 
a political space that does not unify the ‘masses’ and so consists of more than just a united 
front fighting for regime change (1966: 33).   
 7 
Antonio Gramsci employs the term ‘passive revolution’ to describe the creative 
politics that ensures the survival of the capitalist system, from reforms to co-optation, which 
not necessarily follow revolution, but, more often, pre-empts revolutionary episodes (2011: 
129). This concept can be seen as an epistemological escape from the question of 
revolutionary outcomes: the lack of revolution, the failure of revolution, or the disappointing 
results of a revolution. ‘Passive revolution’ describes a process in which the bourgeois class 
adapts to changes within the capitalist system and mode of production.  His examination of 
the bourgeois societies of nineteenth-century Italy and France shows that, while capitalist 
institutions and structures changed in those societies, the revolutionary possibilities that 
opened up as a result of these changes did not produce the outcomes which Marxists expected 
for the working class. Gramsci does not refer to the ‘possibilities’ which emerged as 
‘counterrevolutionary’. Instead,  he used the term ‘revolution’ – while attaching the 
descriptive adjective ‘passive’ to it – to refer to changes in the system that impeded socialist 
prospects and reproduced the capitalist order (2010: 129).7   
The concept of passive revolution is particularly relevant and important for this study 
of revolution and counterrevolution because, firstly, it provides an understanding of 
counterrevolution as a continuous process, considering its ‘reproductive’ nature that impedes 
revolutionary prospects, and, secondly, it assumes that counterrevolution is not simply a 
reaction that disappoints revolution. The importance of Gramscian concepts to revolution and 
counterrevolution studies is elaborated further in the theoretical section of this chapter. 
The evolution of Marxist thought from Marx to Gramsci broadened the scope of study 
and contributed to untangling the complexity of revolution as a concept and as a process. 
However, in general, Marxist theory retained the notion of the inevitability of working class 
triumph as an outcome of revolutionary processes under capitalism, and its central binary in 
understanding how, when, and where revolutionary working classes would ultimately revolt 
and take power from the capitalist class. Although Gramsci and other new Marxists 
accredited the slow and non-linear process ‘towards revolution’, many Marxists fail to 
acknowledge the nuances of the process, and, instead, assume that revolution and 
                                                           
7 Gramsci’s definition of ‘civil society’ differed from traditional Marxian definitions of civil society as 
abstracted from the capitalist state. Gramsci argued that civil society stands ‘between the economic structure and 
the state with its legislation and coercion’ (Gramsci 1971: 209). For Gramsci, civil society is a set of institutions 
through which society organises and represents itself as an actor that is autonomous from the state. 
Representative institutions within the economic sphere, such as employers’ associations and trade unions, are 
among the institutions indicative of a Gramscian concept of civil society. Civil society also includes churches, 
parties, professional associations, and educational and cultural bodies.  
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counterrevolution are two separate phenomena that cannot exist at the same time. This 
distorted Marxist assessments of concurrent revolutionary episodes like that of the Arab 
Spring. Because, much like many revolutionary episodes, the Arab Spring did not draw 
clearly defined class binaries, many Marxists discredited the episode, and reduced it to anti-
imperialist conspiratorial explanations.8 
 
2.2 Psychological Theories of Revolution 
The emergence of anatomy as a new ‘truth’, and the rise of Darwinian ideas in the 1920s and 
1930s revolutionised understandings of human social relations.  In a fundamental departure 
from Marxist materialism, these new understandings of human evolution and interaction 
inspired theories of revolution based on human nature and psychology. Social scientists 
sought to understand the ambiguities of political struggle and transformation through the use 
of metaphors of how the human body reacts to disruptions, illnesses, or psychological 
difficulties. This trend was represented, most prominently, by two schools of thought: the 
anatomical school, and the frustration-aggression school.  
 
2.2.1    The Anatomical School  
Rather than grounding its conception of revolution on class binaries, the anatomical school is 
based on the binary of disease and cure: according to this conception, revolution represents a 
disease within the ‘body politic’ whose eruption provokes a curative response.  Crane 
Brinton’s Anatomy of a Revolution is the foundational text of this school. In this book, 
Brinton conceptualised revolution as ‘a kind of fever’ or ‘an illness in the body politic’, and 
sought to develop a model of revolution in which the phases of revolution were conceived of 
as analogous to stages in the body’s healing.   
 Brinton argues that in social systems, as in the human organism, ‘a kind of natural 
healing force, a vis medicatrix naturae, tends almost automatically to balance one kind of 
change with another restorative change’ (Brinton 1938: 28). Just as ‘illness’ in the ‘body 
politic’ inevitably triggers resistance from the immune system, so revolution ‘naturally’ and 
intrinsically entails a reactive, sometimes pre-emptive, response. Brinton, and following him 
                                                           




other theorists associated with this school of thought, generally treated revolution as a linear 
process which unfolded through a sequence of predictable stages, similar to the stages of 
illness and healing in the body. Within this general framework, it seemed possible to 
determine both a set of chronological stages of the ‘disease’, and the possibilities and 
probabilities – outcomes – of its ‘healing’.  
 But theorists who employ the analogy of the ‘body politic’ and reduce the potentials 
unleashed by revolutionary processes to reactions of ‘bodily resistance’, tend to downplay the 
role and scope of counterrevolution and, by restricting their focus on contentious politics to 
those contained within the boundaries of the state, neglect international and transnational 
factors that impact revolutionary processes and outcomes. This ignores a-spatial dimensions 
of revolution and reduces its outcomes, usually characterised as a ‘counterrevolution’, to a 
reaction of the ‘body’ itself, i.e. the state.  
 Through use of the notions of ‘illness’ and ‘healing’, the anatomical school brought to 
the study of revolution a conception of revolution as a linear process and of counterrevolution 
as separate reactionary outcome. But, eventually, scholars came to the realisation that the 
‘body politic’ – the central state and its institutions – does not consist of organs with static 
functions and powers, but instead reacts to ‘illness’ in various ways. This realisation gave rise 
to a related school of thought on revolution: the frustration-aggression school. In common 
with the Anatomical school, frustration-aggression theory sets out a notion of revolution as 
proceeding in linear fashion through a sequence of stages. But it sees this process as 
generated by imbalances in the relationship between the state and the masses. 
 
 2.2.2 Frustration-Aggression School  
The ‘frustration-aggression’ school (sometimes referred to as expectation-achievement 
school) describes revolution not as a mere ‘illness’ in the body politic, but as the result of a 
psycho-social chasm generated by an imbalance between state institutions and society.  
Notable exponents of this perspective are James Davies (1971) and Ted Gurr (1970). Davies 
and Gurr claim that 1) when people’s expectations for better living conditions are not met, 
frustration accumulates and resentment becomes collective; and 2) these feelings of 
resentment inevitably catalyse mass aggression against the central authority that people 
believe is responsible for their frustration. 
 10 
 The theoretical contribution that this school of thought makes is in its emphasis on the 
psychology of the ‘masses’. This emphasis on ‘people’s understanding’ of their social 
conditions is similar to the Marxist tradition which acknowledges the significance of 
‘revolutionary consciousness’ and cultural hegemony in revolutions of the ‘masses’. 
However, Davies and Gurr do not share the Marxian focus on economic and structural factors 
as sources of revolution: rather, it is people’s understanding of those changes that lead to 
revolution. Gurr contends that frustration accumulates with mass recognition of relative 
deprivation, defined as ‘the perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value 
capabilities’ (1970: 37). This frustration leads, in turn, to aggression. However, even if we 
can empirically demonstrate that frustration accumulates, there is little historical evidence for 
the claim that it inevitably leads to aggression. If anything, collective frustration, more often 
than not, leads not to aggression, but to apathy (Synder and Tilly: 1974).   
As for counterrevolution, Gurr touches upon its relationship with revolution in his 
discussion of the ‘social conditions’ that shape the motive and will to rebel (1970: 208). 
These ‘social conditions’, which he defines as the ‘structuralisation of means of control’, 
makes the appeal to violence uncommon (1970: 209). This implies that disappointing or 
ambiguous outcomes of revolution are due to more than the immediate application of 
coercion or the hijacking of a revolt, and that these outcomes do not, themselves, represent 
the counterrevolution. Rather, disappointing outcomes are linked to a ‘structuralisation’ 
process that the state engages in – sometimes pre-emptively – to contain or deter the 
possibility of collective violence. This important understanding implies that anti- or counter-
revolutionary activities are not events that simply come in reaction to a prior event of 
revolution, but that both, revolution and counterrevolution, are already present in Gurr’s body 
politic.  However, Gurr does not conceive of this structuralisation as a counterrevolutionary 
process: while he invokes this ‘anti-rebellion’ structuralisation by the state to account for the 
outcomes of revolution, he does not link it, or acknowledge it as relevant, to 
counterrevolution.9  This reduces the ‘structuralisation of means of control’ to an obstacle 
                                                           
9 Chalmers Johnson’s employment of the term ‘power deflation’ is similar to Gurr’s notion of the 
‘structuralisation of means of control’. Johnson uses this term to describe how the institutional outcomes of a 
revolution depend upon ‘the deployment and maintenance of force by occupants of the formal authority 
statuses’ (Johnson 1966: 112). See also, Neil Smelser’s Theory of collective behaviour (1962), which argues that 
social tension explained through sometimes clashing identities and ideologies pushes society towards violence 
against the state when the state fails to undermine those tensions through inclusive politics.  
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which requires no further consideration; and leaves unanswered questions concerning the 
revolutionary process and the contingent dynamics that produce ambiguous outcomes. 
In common with versions of the theories discussed earlier, this school treats the state 
and the masses as separate and homogenous political bodies reacting to each other. The 
holistic episteme of ‘the state’ and ‘the masses’ obscures complex forms of mobilisation and 
assembly, as for instance found in Europe during and after World War Two.  
In conclusion, psychological theories employ the fixed binary of ‘the state’ and ‘the 
masses’ to discuss the stages of revolution, be it the illness and curative response with the 
body politic, or the aggression of the masses and coercive response by the state. The 
anatomical school offers a ‘clinical’ framework which ‘diagnoses’ revolution and details its 
‘cure’; while the frustration-aggression school describes the relative deprivation of the 
masses and its consequences in relation to the state. While admitting structuralised challenges 
to revolution that can be pre-emptive, these theories scratch the surface of counterrevolution 
only insofar as it brings their theorisation of revolution closer to empirical complexities. But 
in the 1970s and 1980s, revolutionary movements across the world were increasingly 
influenced by the political economy and clashing ideologies of the Cold War. In that context, 
the transnational and international aspects of revolution were increasingly salient. This 
observable aspect of revolutions in Cold War era exposed further shortcomings in studies of 
revolution which, apart from some Marxist analysis, ignored the significance of transnational 
and international dimensions of revolutionary processes. 
 
2.3    International Structural School 
This gap in the study of revolution was addressed by Theda Skocpol in her influential 
comparative study, States and Social Revolutions (1979). Skocpol rejects the over-emphasis 
of purposive or voluntarist elements found in the theoretical approaches discussed earlier. 
She argues that theories of revolution pay insufficient attention to the objective, structural 
conditions underlying what she refers to as ‘social revolutions’ and, in particular, ‘potentially 
autonomous state’ and ‘world-historical international structures’ (Skocpol 1979: 33). She 
argues that the political factors that trigger revolution are not limited to those found within a 
single polity, but include geopolitical factors in the state’s relations with neighbouring states 
and the rest of the world. In her study of France, Russia, and China, Skocpol seeks to 
demonstrate that repressive state organisations had to be weakened by forces beyond its 
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borders before mass revolutionary action emerged. In all three of these predominantly 
agrarian monarchical states, the state was weakened as the result of military pressure by 
economically more developed states. Skocpol delves into the particular geopolitical factors 
which contributed to both, the collapse of the ancien regimes in these countries and the 
establishment of the revolutionary structures and institutions that replaced them.   
 Her account focuses, first, on a crisis of the state that arises due to pressures from the 
regional and international environment, and then on the structural ‘patterns of class 
dominance’ that determine which group has the resources to successfully exploit the crisis in 
order to reorganise, influence policies, or seize more power. These overlapping pressures on 
state structures bring about its collapse. Skocpol concludes that the three cases are similar in 
that the revolutions  re-enforced the bureaucratisation and centralisation of the state; but that 
the ‘essentially mass-mobilising and authoritarian outcomes and accomplishments’ of the 
three revolutions differed largely due to the international geopolitical dynamics in which the 
contentions brought forth by the revolution played themselves out (1988: 151). These 
geopolitical dynamics are related to and peculiar to the political actors involved in 
revolutionary processes, the alliances they make with external actors, and the resources they 
allocate in the process. 
In a significant contribution to our understanding of counterrevolution, Skopcol 
argues that the struggle of revolutionary processes with repressive state structures not only 
precedes the revolution, as frustration-aggression theories suggest, but those repressive 
structures also play a part in or at least influence the revolution itself, as well as taking more 
aggressive forms following the revolution. Centralised, repressive structures are understood 
as timelessly reproduced; and, according to Skocpol, revolutionary processes usually sanction 
the emergence of more repressive structures. If we are to understand repressive structures as 
counterrevolutionary, then processes which reproduce these structures are also what we 
should understand by the term ‘counterrevolution’. If the process of reproducing those 
structures is, as Skocpol implicitly assumes, perpetual, then counterrevolution is understood 
in this context neither as a reaction to revolution, nor as a pre-emptive structuralisation of 
means of coercion. Instead, it is a perpetual process that extends beyond the temporal domain 
of revolutionary outcomes.  
Despite the theoretical advances she achieved in States and Social Revolution, 
Skocpol was forced to revisit the framework she had developed in light of the outcomes of 
 13 
the Iranian Revolution in 1979. The regime of the Shah was supported, not challenged, by 
international and regional powers. Its transnational and international relations brought little if 
any pressure on its state structures. Thus, the objective structural conditions that Skocpol had 
argued were prerequisites of revolutionary upheavals were absent in the Iranian case. In an 
article, ’Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution’ (1982), Skocpol steps 
outside her earlier framework by claiming that the pressures that led to revolution came from 
within. The modernisation strategy pursued by the Shah in 1960s and 1970s, which included 
land, educational, welfare and legal reforms, was the structural transformation on which 
clerics and other groups in Iran built their revolutionary contentions. Skocpol also 
acknowledges the role played by clerics, intellectuals, urban classes, and cultural forces in the 
revolution, and discusses how the counter-hegemonic preaching  of the exiled Ayatollah 
Khomeini came to predominate among religious students in Qum, and spread throughout 
Iran, mainly urban areas, via existing networks linking mullas and tithe-paying lay people 
(1982: 274). 
In her explanation of Shi’a mobilisation in resistance to the Shah’s regime, Skocpol 
invokes a simplistic and culturalist explanation of its outcomes. She argues that ‘legitimate 
authority in the Shi’a community has long been shared between political and religious 
leaders’, implying that the relationship between Shi’ism and the state has been static when, as 
is the case with all religions, it has been dynamically changing (ibid: 273). More worrying is 
her overemphasis on theological particularities which leads her to conclude that Iranians’ 
religious belief in the martyrdom of Imam Husayn (grandson of the Prophet Muhammad) in 
the face of repression inspired fearless mass demonstrations where ‘Iranian crowds were 
willing to face the army again and again – accepting casualties much more persistently than 
European crowds have historically done’ (ibid: 275).  
It is noteworthy, however, that Skocpol does not characterise pro-Khomeini Islamist 
actors as counterrevolutionary – a label commonly applied to these actors by Western 
scholars when discussing Iran. In fact, the term only appears once in Skocpol’s explanation of 
the Iranian Revolution, and without any analytic significance. Despite the overly culturalist 
explanation of the outcomes of the Iranian Revolution, Skocpol’s theoretical contribution 
remains significant, particularly in highlighting the relationship between repressive 
counterrevolutionary state structures and revolutionary processes, while taking into account, 
as well, regional and international structures and their intersection with local crises. She also 
challenges theorisations based on static political binaries by providing an analysis of state 
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structures as potentially autonomous, and rejecting holistic and voluntarist interpretations of 
the politics of the masses.  
 
2.4  Power Relations Theories 
The following literature situates the concept of revolution in a broader terrain of power and 
power relations. In other words, it de-exceptionalises and de-romanticises revolution, and, 
instead, surveys our understanding of it – epistemologically – and its empirical 
manifestations – phenomenologically – as a process related to power. This involves questions 
about how power informs, or influences, the epistemology of revolution and 
counterrevolution. 
Charles Tilly, for instance, discusses how the concept of revolution is defined in 
several ways not only because the empirical is complex, but also because the definition lends 
itself, in western political discourse, to particular moral standpoints on what is good and bad 
(1978: 7-1). Every theory of revolution involves some choices on what is and what isn’t a 
revolution: coups, terrorism, slow industrial change, change from above, etc. (Tilly 1978: 7-
1). 
 As we’ve seen in previous theories, the ‘good’ revolutionaries are often 
predetermined and the ‘bad’ state, or class, is also predetermined. Interestingly, Tilly does not 
contradict this conviction either, when he clearly states that his own method of inquiry ‘is 
generally hostile to the collective action of governments and favorable to the collective action 
of ordinary people’ (1978: 1-11). Tilly surveys the violent and non-violent politics of 
collective action: the ways in which people ‘act together in pursuit of shared interests’ (1978: 
1-7).  
In the process, he acknowledges the inherent difficulties of studying collective action 
– such as revolution – because ‘collective action is about power and politics; it inevitably 
raises questions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, hope and hopelessness; the very 
setting of the problem is likely to include judgements about who has the right to act, and what 
good it does’ (1978: 1-8).  
In order to clear a good deal of conceptual ground, Tilly draws a simple distinction 
between a ‘revolutionary situation’ – the presence of more than one political bloc effectively 
exercising control over a significant part of the state apparatus – and a ‘revolutionary 
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outcome’ – the displacement of one alliance of power holders by another (1978: 7-3).10 For a 
political setting to become revolutionary, a single, sovereign polity becomes the object of 
competing mutually exclusive claims by multiple blocs. However, a revolutionary situation 
can occur without necessarily resulting in revolutionary outcomes. For instance, an existing 
coalition that controls the government can beat down an alliance of challengers after a period 
of revolutionary situation: a period of effective, competing, and mutually exclusive claims on 
government. Also, it is ‘at least logically possible’ for a revolutionary outcome to occur 
without a revolutionary situation, through gradual addition or subtraction from the ruling 
alliance (1978: 7-8).  
The study of Tilly’s revolutionary situations and outcomes requires a time-sensitive 
approach. Tilly explains that methods to study revolution depend on the timescale adopted. A 
focus on short-term politics of revolution ought to delve into tactics and balance of power 
(ibid). A medium-term study, which is the focus of Tilly’s work, ought to consider effective 
alliances of mobilised contenders of power. As for long-term perspectives, the question ought 
to be related to the major constellations of interests, organisation and reorganisation of 
production, and the main structural conditions for transfer of power (1978: 7-9). Within those 
time-perspectives, Tilly suggests that studying a revolutionary situation and outcome in a 
particular timeframe depends on the following variables: 1) whether the revolutionary 
situation witnesses an irrevocable split in a single, sovereign polity and 2) whether the 
revolutionary outcome saw the complete displacement of the existing members of polity 
(1978: 7-10). 
Usually, at a given time, the revolutionary situation arrives at something between 
irrevocable split in a single polity and no multiple polity at all. Similarly, at a given time, the 
revolutionary outcome often sees something between the complete elimination of the ruling 
bloc and the maintenance or restoration of the status quo (ibid.). Based on those variables, 
Tilly argues that ‘politics as usual’ is when the revolutionary situation sees no split and the 
revolutionary outcomes sees no elimination or addition of members of polity. In other words, 
within Tilly’s theorisation, revolution is the intensification of politics. When power blocs 
have mutually exclusive claims on government, the political setting becomes revolutionary. 
                                                           
10 Tilly borrows Trotsky’s concept of dual power to define the revolutionary setting. Trotsky defined 
dual power as the inevitable pre-revolutionary situation in which ‘the class which is called to realise the new 
social system, although not yet master of the country, has actually concentrated in its hands a significant share 
of state power, while the official apparatus of the government is still in the hands of the old lords’ (Trotsky 
1965: 224). 
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In that sense, Tilly’s theorisation situates revolution in the context of power relations, and 
explains the phenomenon within the broader realm of politics.  
 In a similar approach, Rod Aya rejects what he calls ‘volcano models’ – i.e., 
approaches that treat revolution as a culmination of repression and discontent that erupts in a 
momentary outburst –  and argues that there are three dimensions that must be the focus of 
the study of revolution: revolutionary intentions, revolutionary outcomes, and revolutionary 
situations/settings (1990: 4). Echoing Tilly, Aya accentuates that revolutionary situations ‘do 
not always owe their activity to revolutionary intentions or necessarily lead to revolutionary 
outcomes’ (ibid: 5). Thus, a theory of revolution needs to ‘[sensitise] one to the causes and 
effects of contingent steps in a cumulative sequence’, rather than to ‘[trample] them down 
under a forced march of historical inevitability’ (ibid: 18).  
Approaches that focus on power politics and relations can free the concept of 
revolution from two traditional theoretical limitations in theories of revolution: 1) moral 
assumptions that necessitate a particular historical trajectory, as is the case with most Marxist 
approaches, and 2) romanticised appeals to mass resentment and collective violence, as 
characterised in psychological-scientific and aggression-frustration theories. Freeing the 
concept from the first limitation brings us closer to understanding ambiguous outcomes, 
because it largely jettisons the predictive element in the study of revolution. Freeing the 
concept of revolution from the second limitation allows for conceptualisations that move 
beyond rigid binaries.      
This section discussed prominent theories of revolution, how these theories conceive 
of the complex empirical outcomes, and how they deal with the concept of counterrevolution, 
if at all. Marxist theories generally argue that the revolution is a rapid and violent collapse of 
the capitalist system under the force of a unified, organised, and mobilised working class. 
Ultimately, the general outcome of a Marxist revolution is the rule of the proletarian class. 
Anatomical and psychological theories associate the concept of revolution with the ‘body 
politic’ and generally rely on descriptive anatomical-psychological metaphors to explain the 
process of revolution. International Structural theories broaden the scope of study to focus in 
particular on geopolitical and international elements. Those theories distance themselves 
from voluntarist understandings of revolution, and instead give greater consideration to 
objective structural changes in the study of revolution. Finally, this section engaged with 
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theories that conceptualise revolution as an intensified form of politics, where several power 
blocs contest over a single sovereign polity. 
Those advances in theories of revolution allude to the complexities of empirical 
outcomes and to the forces that impede, co-opt, or prevent revolutionary victories. However, 
within those methods of inquiry, the concept of counterrevolution generally remains to be 
seen as marginal to a comprehensive understanding of revolution. The following section 
engages with the little available literature on counterrevolution, drawing a pattern of 
theoretical shortcomings that, as this thesis argues, contributes to the general confusion in 
observing every other outcome of revolution. 
 
3.  Studies of Counterrevolution 
The general absence of a conceptualisation of counterrevolution in studies of revolution is 
also a characteristic of most studies in which counterrevolution appears to be the main subject 
of inquiry. With the exception of few works that engage with the concept itself, most studies 
on counterrevolution present the ‘counterrevolutionary’ as the ‘counterrevolution’. In other 
words, most literature deal with counterrevolutionary groups or events in order to explain 
revolutionary failure, without prior conceptualisation of counterrevolution.11 This is typically 
a symptom of studies of post-colonial politics, which describe dictatorships, 
conservative/reactionary groups (e.g., sectarian/ethnic/religious parties), or events (e.g. CIA-
led assassinations) as ‘counterrevolutionary’ or simply ‘the counterrevolution’.  So, for 
instance, the term is applied to anti-colonial guerrilla movements that have turned into 
autocratic organisations in post-independence state-building processes as, for example, the 
forces supported and armed by Apartheid South Africa (Fauvet 1984: 120), and the right-
wing forces in Mozambique (Winter 1981, Reid-Daly 1982). The term is also used to 
describe CIA-led coups d’etat and assassinations of revolutionary anti-colonial leaders in 
Africa and Latin America (see, e.g. Skinner 1988). The term ‘counterrevolutionary’ is 
applied, as well, to neo-colonial arrangements between indigenous elites and former colonial 
powers in post-independence political systems (see, e.g. Knight 1990, Ahmar 1984, Hughes 
                                                           
11 See, e.g. Elazar 2000, Fairbank 1949, Bush 2002, and, more recently on the Arab Spring topic, 
Bishara (2013), Hatem (2013), Selim (2015), Falk (2016), and Riphagen and Woltering (2018), among others. 
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1978, Magdoff 1974, John 1968) as, for instance, the bargains between local elites and 
colonial powers that led to the establishment of African states.12 
 In all these cases, scholars tend to focus their analysis on a specific, predetermined 
counterrevolutionary group or event, thus obviating the need, it appears, to conceptualise 
counterrevolution. Consequently, while the actor that is the focus of the study is characterised 
as ‘counterrevolutionary’, there is no consideration of what it is that constitutes a 
‘counterrevolution’.   
 Having said that, there are few exceptions to this shortcoming. Those contributions 
generally share the assumption that revolution and counterrevolution are not only related in 
some way, but neither can exist without the other. Nick Bisley, for instance, presents a 
conceptual framework for ‘international counter-revolution’, which highlights the role of 
international forces in maintaining ‘international order’ at the expense of ‘social revolutions’ 
(Bisley 2004: 49). Bisley’s underlying assumption is that revolutions are not strictly domestic 
events, and that they are often rapid and violent contests over how the state and society 
should be constituted (ibid.: 53). According to Bisley, this rapid contestation faces an 
international system with its own set of actors whose views on how to constitute state and 
society in said territory compete with those of revolution. Therefore, Bisley concludes that 
counter-revolution and revolution are essentially part of the same phenomenon: ‘the struggle 
between competing views of social organisation which result in open conflict over state 
power’ (ibid.: 54). 
The counterrevolutionary part manifests itself in four different ways: 1) deployment 
of military force on the sovereign territory of another state, 2) support of domestic proxy 
actors through the supply of arms, logistics, training and finance, 3) harassment – such as 
small-scale border incursions, and other nuisance activity, and, finally, 4) use of international 
institutions, diplomatic channels and other means to deprive ‘revolutionary state’of ‘normal 
interactions’ with the international system (ibid.: 52-53). Bisley suggests that, if we are to 
acknowledge that those different ways are counterrevolution, then the concept should be not 
be reduced to a mere reaction to revolution. Instead, it should be investigated as part of ‘a 
broader political process deriving from internationalised social conflict’ (ibid.: 54). 
                                                           
12 Paul Fauvet argues that neo-colonial parties have dominated politics in independent Mozambique 
whereby ‘a nationalist façade and mouth of nationalistic rhetoric’ were ‘duly created and thrived under colonial 
sponsorship’ (1984: 110). For Fauvet, this is the counterrevolution in Mozambique (ibid.). 
 19 
A similarly explicit engagement with the concept of counterrevolution can be found in 
the work of Arno Mayer, who rejects the idea that revolution, ‘as a phenomenon and a 
process’, is separable from counterrevolution. Mayer argues that counterrevolution and 
revolution are to each other ‘as reaction is bound to action’, making for a ‘historical motion, 
which is at once dialectical and driven by necessity’ (Mayer 2000: 45).  
To highlight this point, Mayer takes the case of counterrevolution in the Vendée, west 
of France, in opposition to the French Revolution. He argues that the ‘anti-revolutionary’ 
resistance in Vendée is inherent to revolution (Mayer 2000: 323). Indeed, the Vendée 
insurrection led to a civil war. But, the civil war itself, Mayer argues, is not mutually 
exclusive to revolution. The Vendée’s unfolding is a typical case of counterrevolution (ibid.). 
Instead of vilifying counterrevolution and romanticising revolution, Mayer draws a vivid 
view of a ‘collision of two fanaticisms’ (ibid.: 324). One was rooted in ‘a faith of the old’ – 
representing traditional Catholic relations and structures, and the other was rooted in ‘a 
yearning for liberty turned to the future’ (ibid.). And the outcome of this ‘collision’ did not 
‘end’ either. The Vendeans’ principal demand for the ‘maintenance of the supremacy of 
religion and its elite’ in their own realm was met, while the ‘revolutionary’ republican state 
was consolidated (ibid.: 325). 
Charles Tilly digs deeper into the counterrevolution in the Vendée, while 
acknowledging the relational nature of revolution and counterrevolution. His concern was to 
understand what led the groups involved to endorse one side of the conflict over the other, 
focusing on inconsistencies, divisions, and contentions within the groups involved, and their 
diverse and changing motives and interests (Tilly 1959: 187).  
 For instance, he shows that rural textile workers were hurt by the industrial crisis 
caused by the French Revolutionary economic reform laws that centralised power in the 
hands of merchants and landowners; and so joined the counterrevolutionary camp. The fact 
that this camp was primarily led by the clerical elite against the revolutionary state, Tilly 
argues, does not mean that the textile workers were supporting the old order of clerical rule. 
Instead, their counterrevolutionary stance was chiefly motivated by their opposition to the 
revolutionary merchants (1957: 188). But Tilly argues that what this case shows is that 
identifying a group’s motives and ideology does not provide a sufficient explanation of its 
counterrevolutionary stance (1973: 32). Motives, identities, and ideologies are not sufficient 
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to trigger counterrevolutionary action. It is the availability of resources, he argues, that is 
pivotal in determining this (1973: 28).  
 Tilly’s emphasis on resources opens up questions about the political economy of 
counterrevolution. In the case of the Vendée, textile workers might not have mobilised under 
the banner of a clerical-led counterrevolution if they had had sufficient resources to mobilise 
and pursue their interests in other ways – i.e. through a non-binary opposition to the French 
Revolution. The monopolisation of resources by the French elite – mainly the clerics and the 
bourgeoisie – involved a pragmatic polarisation of political possibilities where the ability of 
interest groups and grassroots organisations to mobilise outside the elite-sponsored binary 
was largely restricted.  
This affirms that mobilisation, which is a requisite to both counterrevolution and 
revolution, is dependent on the ability of an interest group or coalition of groups to secure a 
variety of resources including, among others, loyalties, knowledge, wealth, capital, and 
communication tools (1973: 38). The binary of the ruling elite and the underprivileged 
masses ignores or obscures this. As his analysis of the Vendée shows, explanations of 
revolution and counterrevolution that focus on the role of groups with identifiable and 
uniform interests downplay the contentious nature of politics and its intensification in 
revolutionary settings, and precludes consideration of the contingencies that shape the 
motives and interests of groups and individuals (Tilly 1963: 35, 1964: 40-56).  
Tilly’s nuanced sociological analysis of possibilities and motives in revolutionary 
settings situates both, revolution and counterrevolution, in the context of a perpetual yet 
changing power struggle that intensifies in certain historical moments. His critical 
engagement with previous theories of revolution, with the inevitably ‘delicate’ nature of 
studies of revolution, and his extensive study of counterrevolution in the Vendee, culminates 
in a theorisation of revolution which allows for further exploration of both concepts. As he 
points out, the most useful studies of revolution are not the ones that claim to explain 
everything and deny the inevitable limitations of such inquiries, but instead lay ground for 
further observation and broader theoretical possibilities (1973: 6).  
 This section has shown that most approaches to understanding revolution have 
continuously failed to adequately explain its diverse and often ambiguous outcomes. 
‘Counterrevolutionary’ forces are often invoked to explain these outcomes; but, generally, 
scholars tend not to theorise ‘counterrevolution’, or even offer an explicit conceptualisation 
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of what they mean by the term. Most mainstream studies of counterrevolution tend to do the 
same. As discussed in the previous section on theories of revolution and this section on 
studies of revolution, few exceptions in the literature on counterrevolution grapple with the 
phenomenon itself, not as an event outside history, but as a process related to revolution. 
Building on those works, this thesis will explore the utility of studying  processes of 
revolution and counterrevolution in relation to one another. It seeks to show how such an 
approach can provide a better understanding of what is often considered to be disappointing 
or ambiguous outcomes of revolution. However, as the following section illustrates, this 
thesis takes the relational approach a step further, arguing that counterrevolution and 
revolution rarely, if ever, rapid events.   
 
4. The Argument and Theoretical Framework  
This thesis argues that neither revolution nor counterrevolution can be fully understood in 
isolation from one another. A sound understanding of either requires an understanding of how 
each is influenced and influences the other, and extends beyond the events to which we apply 
the term ‘revolution’ and ‘counterrevolution’.  
This thesis maintains that both, counterrevolution and revolution, involve contentions 
over access to resources. This implies that understanding both requires that we examine, not 
rising levels of anger or dissent, but structures of resource access and exclusion. Collective 
psychological variables are a feature of revolution and counterrevolution, but they do not 
explain either.  
Additionally, those contentions over resource access are continuous, despite changes 
in local and international circumstances. As long as a sovereign state exists, both 
counterrevolution and revolution continue in some form of contention. In that sense, even 
when either seems absent, it continues in unnoticed, dispersed contentions which are often 
‘micro-political’.13  
Indeed, both processes witness larger episodes of intensification, which makes both 
‘present’. The occurrence of such episodes is dependent on contingent arrangements of ever-
changing economic, political, and social structures, as well as geopolitical and ideational 
                                                           
13 The continuation of counterrevolution and revolution in absentia will be further theorised in Chapter 
2. But, for now, it is worth noting that the significance of micro-politics in the study of revolution is best and 
most recently addressed by Bayat in what he calls the ‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’ in ‘non-movements’ 
(2013: 45), and in Brownlee’s and Ghiabi’s ‘hidden actions’ in the ‘local ecologies of protest’ (2016). 
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factors. Those episodic occurrences, at particular places and times, produce what ‘revolution’ 
and ‘counterrevolution’ are commonly reduced to: ‘volcanic’ and ‘televised’ events.  
Alternatively, this thesis contends that counterrevolution and revolution continue after 
those episodes, regardless of the ‘outcomes’, because both processes are evolving and inter-
related. Their ‘survival’ is guaranteed through the evolution of their political contenders, who 
build on the knowledge and expertise acquired from past contentions and other contenders, 
and shape their contentions in consideration of the other process. In conclusion, the thesis 
defines both concepts as continuous, evolving, and inter-related processes involving 
contentions over access to resources. Before expanding further on this definition, this chapter 
will briefly lay out the theoretical framework of this study, illustrated at length in Chapter 2. 
The following section sets out key concepts which will be useful in the study, and 
conceptualises the political setting in which those inter-related processes unfold. 
 
4.1  Conceptualising the Political Setting 
Tilly’s polity model provides the conceptual starting point to the study of the political setting 
of counterrevolution and revolution in this thesis. According to Tilly’s model, the political 
setting includes a regime which consists of a central government and its relations to the 
population falling under its claimed jurisdictions (Tilly 1978: 4-41). The setting is shaped by 
‘claim making interactions and contentions’ among a number of political actors, defined 
according to their position and role vis-à-vis the state: polity members, polity challengers, 
and outside actors (McAdam et al 2001: 12). 14 Polity members are ‘constituted political 
actors enjoying routine access to government agents and resources’. Polity challengers are 
‘constituted political actors lacking the routine access’ to government agents and resources. 
Outside actors include transnational and foreign groups, as well as other governments.  
The political setting is a fluid arena where political contenders are prone to change in 
‘position’. In addition, their movements, identities, resources, and interests are continuously 
changing. Even on a micro-political level, an individual will often play multiple roles and 
occupy multiple positions.15 This micro and macro-political fluidity in the political setting is 
                                                           
14 Tilly defines the state as consisting of a set of institutions that are ‘formally coordinated, centralised, 
differentiated from other organisations and territorially exclusive’ (1973: 35). 
15 This echoes Felix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze’s phrase, ‘everything is political, but every politics is 
simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics’ (2004 [1980]: 235). 
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dependent on the larger framework of interconnected local, regional, and international 
political economy where the accumulation and allocation of resources required for the 
mobilisation of polity members, challengers, and outside actors can be systematically 
observed.  
Although thesis borrows from this illustrative model to map out contentions of 
revolution and counterrevolution, it does not adopt the model as is. From an international 
counterrevolutionary perspective, Tilly’s polity model does not sufficiently elucidate how 
routine and exclusive access to the resources of a particular polity is often not confined by the 
borders/jurisdiction of said polity, but, instead, operate simultaneously in an international 
system. Many actors who Tilly would refer to as ‘external’ to the setting are themselves not 
confined nor restricted to the jurisprudence of said polity. And, therefore, the theorisation in 
Chapter 2 of counterrevolution and revolution will blur the lines between local and external 
actors, showing how the privileged member position (or lack thereof – hence challenger) is 
not only a position vis-à-vis the local polity, separate from ‘external actors’ and their 
contentions. For that purpose, this thesis will adopt Tilly’s illustrative model and its terms. 
However, it uses the term ‘international actors’ instead of ‘external actors’, reflecting a more 
accurate representation of these actors’ relation with the local polity. 
To unravel this, the theorisation that Chapter 2 will link the setting to international 
political economy, since the structures of the polity are largely an adaptation of the relation of 
each contender with production and capital – of which neither is strictly local. Political 
contenders compete over resources that are a prerequisite for political mobilisation, and thus 
their relation to capital is key not only to understand their interests, but also to assess their 
available forms of contentions.  
Figure 1.1, below, is a schematic representation of Tilly’s polity model which this 
thesis will build on as mentioned above. 
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(Figure 1.1) The Political Setting (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 2001: 11) 
 
This conception of the political setting in which counterrevolution and revolution take 
place neither ‘psychologises’ revolution nor explains it with reference to deterministic 
structural givens. We can say that psycho-social and structural variables identified in 
previous theories of revolution do play a role in shaping and reshaping alliances of 
challengers and members of polity according to shifting interests and interest confederacies, 
but they do not explain the structures or patterns of these alliances and interests.  
Based on this conceptualisation of the political setting, we can now offer definitions 
of the terms ‘revolution’ and ‘counterrevolution’, here defined separately for analytic 
purposes and as a preliminary to their theorisation as dialectically related.  
Revolution is a process of continuous political and social contention in which the 
mobilisation of changing alliances of polity challengers (often in coalitions or overlapping 
interests with polity members and/or international actors) advance demands (ie. contend) for 
a more inclusionary polity.  Counterrevolution is a process of continuous political and 
social contention in which changing alliances of polity members (often in coalitions and/or 
overlapping interests with, polity challengers and/or international actors) seek either to 
maintain an exclusionary polity or contend for one that is more exclusionary. Rather than 
invoking outcomes as a defining factor, these definitions reaffirm the continuity and changing 
alliances which advance exclusionary and inclusionary claims via-a-vis a central authority. 
Where a more inclusionary structural change is successfully institutionalised, 
counterrevolutionary processes remain; and where exclusionary structures are 
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institutionalised, revolutionary processes continue to operate. Modern counterrevolution and 
revolution are, therefore, contentions centred around capitalism and modern statehood.  
The following section addresses the significance of Gramscian concepts for this 
thesis, and the ways in which Gramscian ideas guides the overall theorisation. 
 
 4.2   Passive Revolution and Counterrevolution 
This chapter has already suggested that Gramsci’s concept of ‘passive revolution’ is the 
closest articulation out there for counterrevolution. Its theoretical utility for many scholars 
from different disciplines proves how important it is to further develop our understanding of 
the complex politics behind exclusion. Moreover, his concept of ‘hegemony’ allows us to 
study the conditioning power of state institutions and the local, regional, and international 
relations of class forces that underpin it, without adopting the rigid social divisions of 
traditional Marxism (Germain and Kerry 1998: 5). This thesis will also make use of the neo-
Gramscian school to examine the international political economy (IPE) which subjugates 
state sovereignty to transnational financial and production systems, such as the World Bank 
and the IMF, and thus plays a crucial role in formulating neoliberal exclusionary structures.  
IPE study widens our understanding of the resource structures of the single polity, 
connecting key contenders to regional and international institutions which facilitate the 
systematic allocation of capital in parallel with international power relations and politics. 
Within those economic structures, revolutionary and counterrevolutionary ‘products’ are 
sponsored, and the costly mobilisation of the multiple contenders at a particular juncture can 
be traced back, in a neo-Gramscian perspective, to transnational and international economic 
structures. 
Chapter 2 will elaborate more on how those different concepts and theories, 
particularly that of Tilly and Gramsci, inspire an extensive theorisation of counterrevolution 
and revolution. The following section discusses briefly how this thesis will apply the 
theoretical framework  presented here to a single case study, while considering the historical 





This thesis focuses on the case of modern Egypt to empirically examine the utility of its 
relational theorisation. The case study begins with the first signs of modern counterrevolution 
in Egypt in 1804 and ends with the intensification of counterrevolution and revolution 
between 2011 and 2013. To cover this long history, it divides the case study into timeframes 
based on the most significant changes that took place in the Egyptian polity. To be able to 
effectively engage with this long history, and demark the most significant changes, this thesis 
adapts a two-dimensional lens: changes in political participation and economic inclusion. The 
first dimension is concerned with political competition and the space for meaning 
participation in polity institutions. This is often represented in changes to electoral law and 
the constitution. The second variable has to do with the economic resource structures of the 
state. For instance, a significant change in economic inclusion is represented in economic 
policies which alter the distribution and allocation of resources.. 
 Based on those two dimensions, this thesis divides the case study into four main 
timeframes: liberal oligarchy (1804-1952), populist authoritarianism (1952-1970), post-
populist authoritarianism (1970-2011), and episode of intensification (2011-2013). In the first 
timeframe, modern counterrevolutionary contentions are introduced in Egypt through the 
gradual integration of Egypt’s resource structures into Europe’s capitalist market, the 
privatisation of land, and the commodification of labour. The process heralded the formation 
of a large landowning class which eventually shared political power with the royal family 
and, from 1880s onwards, the British. These significant changes were met with earliest 
manifestations of modern revolutionary contentions – i.e. working class contentions. To 
uncover this, this thesis will survey the gradual emergence of an industrial working class and 
its contentions in increasingly capitalist workplaces.   
 The second timeframe begins with a military coup in 1952 which transforms the 
liberal oligarchy into a military oligarchy. The continuation of counterrevolution in this 
timeframe is studied through surveying the continuation of capitalism, this time led by a 
military junta. It is also manifested in the continuing exclusion of the working class from 
meaningful political participation, and de-intensifying their class contentions through 
important economic concessions. As for revolution, this timeframe sees continuing class 
contentions in intensive and passive forms. The second timeframe ends and the third begins 
with the humiliating defeat of the military leadership in 1967 war and the subsequent death of 
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its strongman, late president Gamal Abdel Nasser, in 1970. After Nasser, counterrevolution is 
shown to have continued through foreign capital injection into the Egyptian economy and a 
slow restructuring of resources in tandem with global neoliberalisation. During this 
timeframe, the state-owned resources were gradually handed over to the private sector, and 
the little access that the working class had to these resources was subsequently repealed. The 
fourth timeframe did not see significant changes in economic inclusion, but it did witness an 
unprecedentedly effective revolutionary intensification, met with a counterrevolutionary 
intensification. In this timeframe, this thesis hopes to show how the events to which both 
concepts are often reduced to are closely connected to past contentions that resemble the 
same phenomena. It will also highlight the continuation of both phenomena even after de-
intensification.  
For each timeframe, this thesis examines the continuous presence of revolution and 
counterrevolution despite – and through – those significant changes. The continuous 
contentions are compared to the changes that the polity see in each timeframe, showing how 
they relate to one another. This method also hopes to convey how counterrevolution and 
revolution evolve in each timeframe and from one timeframe to another, surveying the 
changing alliances among contenders and their positions vis-à-vis the polity. To emphasise 
this ‘passive’ continuation, the thesis will draw a privileged network in Egypt which connects 
privileged individuals and families across those timeframes. This network is testimony to the 
continuity of exclusive access to resources despite changes in state structures. Chapter 3 
provides a more detailed explanation of these two dimensions, and how they will be used in 
the case study. 
 
6. The Organisation of the Study 
Chapter 2 presents a more extensive demonstration of the theorisation of counterrevolution 
and revolution. It borrows from Tilly and Gramsci to set out an explanation of the three 
hypotheses mentioned in this chapter. Chapter 3 lays out the method of examining each 
hypothesis, and elaborates more on the case study, time-framing, data required and its 
sources. It also discusses research limitations and other ethical and security considerations. 
Chapter 4 begins the case study, covering the first timeframe: the liberal oligarchy (1804-
1952). It demarks the key contenders at the turn of the century and concludes with post-
WWII intensification, which, then Chapter 5 picks up from, covering the continuation of 
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counterrevolution and revolution between 1952 and 1970. Chapter 6 builds on the two 
previous chapters, to redraw the polity map for Egypt after the military defeat in 1967 and the 
infitah policy of Sadat began to alter resource structures. It then follows the evolution of the 
working class, and the hybrid revolutionary contenders – NGOs, labour groups, students, 
liberals, Nasserists, socialists, and middle class professionals – that characterised revolution 
in Egypt at the turn of the century 2000s. Chapter 7 concludes the case study, with a more 
detailed exploration of how this web of revolutionary contenders seized the moment in 2011, 
and how they were promptly met with counterrevolution, producing the most recent episode 
of intensification, 2011-2013. Finally, Chapter 8, concludes this thesis by summarising the 
key findings, putting those findings in a more global context, addressing the general 




















THEORISING COUNTERREVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION: 
CONTINUOUS, EVOLVING, AND INTER-RELATED 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter will develop a theorisation of counterrevolution and revolution as continuous, 
inter-related, and evolving forms of contention over resources. This theorisation differs from 
mainstream theories of revolution discussed in Chapter 1, particularly in their tendency to 
reduce counterrevolution to outcomes of revolution, if addressed at all.  
While theories of ‘revolution’ were developed over time as the emergence of new 
cases of revolution contested their validity, this has not been the case for ‘counterrevolution’. 
The concept of ‘counterrevolution’ remains under-developed, and is largely used 
descriptively to characterise the outcomes of ‘revolution’.16 A recent illustration of this was 
provided in the previous chapter, which surveyed the recurring use of ‘counterrevolution’ to 
describe the outcomes of ‘revolutions’.17  
As was noted in Chapter 1, the characterisation of a given event or actor as 
‘counterrevolutionary’ is generally based on strictly moral and ideological assumptions, 
instead of developed conceptualisation. The same can be said about revolution, which, as we 
have seen in Chapter 1, is often theorised as an unnatural, violent, and rapid affair in an 
otherwise stable and non-violent state order. 
Cedric Robinson rigorously deconstructs these assumptions, which limit the scope of 
investigation into revolution and counterrevolution. Although his inquiry is not directly 
                                                           
16 Throughout this chapter, the use of the terms ‘revolution’ and ‘counterrevolution’, in quotations, is 
meant to suggest that the statement is referring to the common arguments in the field, in contrast with the 
definitions of revolution and counterrevolution presented in this thesis. 
17 The emergence of the term ‘Arab Spring’ and its popular use is discussed in Chapter 1. The origin of 
the term ‘Arab Winter’ is unknown. But, like that of the ‘Arab Spring’, it spread among scholars and media 
alike and became a commonplace, almost uncontested, term to describe the resurgence of authoritarianism and 
Islamic extremism in the aftermath of the events of 2011. See, e.g. The Economist, ‘The Arab Winter’ (2016), 
Mihaylov (2017), the early prophecy of Daniel Byman (2011), ‘After the Hope of the Arab Spring, the Chill of 
an Arab Winter’, Philip Gourevitch’s similarly impatient account in the ‘The Arab Winter’ (2011); and Sood 
(2014), among many others. 
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addressing the concept of revolution per se, Robinson’s deconstruction of the epistemology 
of Western liberal order (and its political concepts) in Western scholarship helps de-
exceptionalise collective and violent phenomena – both central to the theorisation of 
revolution presented in this thesis. Robinson suggests that Rosseau, Thomas Harrington, and 
liberal companions – as he describes them – pre-suppose and normalise the persistence of 
class inequality, when they treat the construction of liberal democratic institutions as a non-
violent order and, conceptually, ‘subvert[ed] the primitive visions of participatory democracy 
into representative democracy’(Robinson 1980: 18). In other words, the meaning of 
democracy has been reduced to the orderly phenomenon of ruling through an elected 
government. For the liberal West, democratic institutions ‘ended revolution’ and 
democratisation, so to speak, because it translated the ‘people’s choice’ into polity and 
policy. According to Robinson, the ‘man’ in their theory is the bourgeoisie, who was able, in 
the ‘order’ of the liberal democratic state, to preserve his privileges (ibid.: 20).  
This emphasis on recognising the ‘order’ as an end limits scholarly questions on 
revolution. It bodes well with mainstream theories of revolution which compartmentalise 
collective action and manifestations of violence in an unimaginative and normative manner 
that ‘hegemonises’ the liberal order. 
Similarly polemical questions are raised by James Scott, who eloquently disputes 
scholarly obsession with the survival of ‘the state’. Scott contends that scholars have 
historically ‘deplored collapse’ of ‘typically oppressive states’ into smaller, decentralised 
fragments – which we can think of as a possible outcome of revolution – because the central 
state involves centralisation of data and raw materials, which, in turn, facilitates the 
production of knowledge, particularly on matters of history and ancient civilisations (Scott 
2017: 209). This culminated in a mainstream history which is exclusively the history of 
empires and states, while ‘obscure periods’ that involves weakening or fragmentation of 
states are described as the ‘Dark age’ in Greece, the ‘First Intermediate Period’ in Egypt, and 
the decline of Uruk under the Akkadian Empire (ibid.). What if, Scott asks, those ‘vacant 
periods’ of weak or fragmented polities represent ‘a bolt of freedom’ for subjects of states 
and, somehow, an improvement in their access to resources? (ibid.). The abandonment of the 
state can be emancipatory, especially when it reduces the subject’s obligation to serve 
imperial or elite interests (ibid.: 211). 
 31 
The inherent prejudice in favour of the state – broadly seen as the triumph of 
civilisation – normalises its oppressive and exclusionary structures, and undermines the 
viable alternatives that can come out of revolutionary transformations in resource structures; 
especially in the form of de-centralisation of those structures. By unravelling 
counterrevolution embedded in the structures of states, and de-exceptionalising revolution, 
this thesis joins Scott’s pursuit to ‘normalise collapse’ of state order (ibid.: 210). Whilst this 
might seem ahistorical, Scott’s historical investigation into empires and states shows how the 
centralisation, de-centralisation, and reaggregation of states have been rather common, and is 
indicative of continuous revolutionary and counterrevolutionary contentions over distribution 
of resources.   
Indeed, studies of revolution unavoidably involve moral judgements and prejudice. 
This is reflected in romanticising state order – critiqued by Scott and Robinson, or in the 
different tolerance levels that scholars exhibit for different forms, targets, and victims of 
violence in revolution (Tilly 1978: 3). Rather than ignoring this normative element in the 
study of revolution, Tilly explicitly ‘took the side of ordinary people’ over governments 
(ibid.: 7). The democratic ethics is not inherited by states. Instead, it is present in the 
contentions of ordinary people to continuously re-imagine more inclusive resource structures. 
This study of revolution and counterrevolution takes a similar stance. It treats 
‘revolution’ as arising from calls of ordinary people for greater inclusion in the polity, and 
‘counterrevolution’ as arising from efforts to maintain or acquire positions of exclusive 
privilege at the top. Normatively, then, revolutionary struggle is linked to the collective 
ambition of organising society and its resources on more inclusive and democratic terms. 
While this position overlaps with Tilly’s, it leaves room for questioning the role ‘ordinary 
people’ play in counterrevolutionary mobilisation. This question arises throughout history, 
with the recurring and ironic appeal of counterrevolution among those who are most excluded 
and underprivileged. The following section accentuates the argument of this thesis based on 
the assumptions mentioned above. 
 
1.1 Theoretical Argument  
This thesis argues that counterrevolution and revolution are contentions over access to 
resources. This implies that understanding both requires that we examine, not rising levels of 
anger or dissent, but structures of resource access and exclusion. So long as a state exists, 
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those contentions which define revolution and counterrevolution are continuous, and the 
events which ‘counterrevolution’ and ‘revolution’ usually refer to are treated as episodes of 
intensification within continuous (passive and intensive) processes rather than, as with most 
mainstream theories, reducible to their intensive ‘volcanic outbursts’.  
Additionally, because of their continuity, both counterrevolution and revolution are 
inter-related and evolving. Neither phenomenon is static or separable either from the other or 
from its past experiences. They are inter-related insofar as their contentions are centred 
around the same issue – resources, and they are evolving through learning from each other’s 
contentions over resources, as well as from their own experiences. This does not necessarily 
mean that they are consistently becoming more powerful and effective. But their ability to 
survive each other’s contentions and continue even in passive forms is an evolutionary 
characteristic. 
Previous theories have tended to define ‘revolution’ in ways that apply to the 
‘revolutions’ of their time and the ideas associated with them, while the definitions we have 
of ‘counterrevolution’ are mostly fragmentary and descriptive, and based on normative 
assumptions about the outcomes of ‘revolution’ – on whether they are good or bad, 
disappointing or promising, violent or non-violent.  
Instead, the arguments above are not only relevant to recent cases and their outcomes 
– i.e. the ‘Arab Spring’ and ‘Winter’, but to a broader history of both. Based on those 
arguments, this thesis defines revolution as a process of continuous political and social 
contention in which the mobilisation of changing alliances of polity challengers (often in 
coalitions or overlapping interests with polity members and/or international actors) advance 
demands (ie. contend) for a more inclusionary polity.  
The term contention refers to the activity of advancing demands bearing on access to 
resources. This demand-bearing activity manifests itself in actions such as condemning, 
opposing, resisting, demanding, beseeching, supporting, rewarding, attacking, expelling, 
defacing, cursing, protesting, drawing, cheering, throwing flowers, singing songs, silent 
gesturing, and carrying heroes on the shoulders, among innumerable others (Tilly 2008: 5).  
For a contention to take place, there must be a prior mobilisation, understood as a 
process of securing a variety of political, social, and economic resources. In other words, to 
start a petition, you must have funds to print and circulate petition, access to communication 
tools and potential signatories, and have the necessary writing and language skills, as well as 
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relevant information. The process of acquiring funds, gaining access to media and potential 
signatories, accumulating relevant information and utilising writing skills is mobilisation. In 
that sense, ‘resources’ refer in this thesis not only to economic resources, but also includes, 
among others, arms, knowledge, communication tools, social networks, loyalties, legislative 
rights, religious authority, legal and cultural privileges (Tilly 1973a: 38).  
A polity consists of government institutions that centralise and concentrate the 
resources of a defined territory (the ‘state’), and the individuals or groups that have routine 
access to these resources. These individuals or groups are polity members, while groups that 
have no authority over how resources are allocated and, consequently, are systemically 
excluded from accessing resources are polity challengers. Both members and challengers can 
be referred to as ‘contenders’, because both resort to contentions to maintain or advance their 
positions vis-à-vis the polity.  
Historically, mobilisation for more inclusion – i.e. revolution – has been, more often 
than not, passive or ineffective due to the limited resources available for revolutionary actors. 
However, all of these efforts belong to a cumulative process which involves the testing – and 
consequently increased knowledge – of counterrevolution and its tactics, as well as building 
networks and loyalties among revolutionary contenders, accumulating resources, and 
evolving revolutionary narratives and organisations. In that sense, the historical process 
which defines revolution manifests itself most vividly in the evolution of peasant associations 
into cross-industry solidarity, syndicalism and other modern workers’ organisations. This 
process is not an isolated cumulative experience of revolutionary politics but, more so, a 
process of learning of and from developments in polity structures and counterrevolutionary 
politics.  
Counterrevolution is defined in similar terms; a process of continuous political and 
social contention in which changing alliances of polity members (often in coalitions and/or 
overlapping interests with, polity challengers and/or international actors) seek either to 
maintain an exclusionary polity or contend for one that is more exclusionary. 
Counterrevolution is reproduced through contenders maintaining or seeking more exclusive 
access to, or more concentrated ownership of, one or a combination of strategic resources in a 
given polity.  
In this definition, it is important to differentiate between contentions demanding 
inclusion strictly for the mobilised contenders and contentions demanding an inclusionary 
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polity that extends beyond the narrow interests of the contenders of the here and now. In 
other words, in any case of counterrevolution and revolution, it is important to make a 
distinction between the pursuit of membership (or more privileged membership) in a polity, 
and the pursuit of a polity which includes more members. The latter politics belong to a 
revolutionary process or, put simply, revolution; while the former describes a rather common 
scenario of counterrevolutionary politics: a power struggle advocating one 
counterrevolutionary arrangement over the other. The plurality of counterrevolution is often 
manifested in conservative contenders’ power struggle with reactionary forces. Although, in 
many instances, their struggle takes form within the structures of the state, it sometimes 
becomes violent, as we shall see in the case study.  
More often than not, counterrevolutionary contenders will be more effective than 
revolutionary contenders. This is because most polity members, who by default have more 
resources, tend to side with counterrevolutionaries in order to preserve their routine access to 
strategic resources. In that sense, the history of revolution and counterrevolution is dominated 
by counterrevolution, which maintains or expands exclusionary polity structures, while 
revolution, which is often passive, tends to be unable to fully reverse or change it except, 
potentially, in episodes of intensification. 
 Having routine access to state resources, polity members are likely to be better able 
to secure the resources needed for counterrevolutionary mobilisation, as they have access to 
the state’s notorious monopoly of violence, among other strategic resources. Furthermore, 
polity members are fewer than the masses who make up the challengers. Therefore, they are 
more prone to realising and acting upon their common counterrevolutionary interests and, by 
default, are more organised within the structures of the polity, while the masses are 
numerous, and are required to articulate their own forms of organisation (forming polity 
challengers) and realise their common revolutionary interests despite their differences. 
Despite the prevalence of this counterrevolutionary advantage, polity members 
sometimes take part in revolutionary alliances when they lose, or perceive a threat to their 
position, and subsequently see it as in their long-term interest to contend for a more 
inclusionary polity (Tilly 1973b: 62). 
The following sections will explain how this de-facto advantage allows 
counterrevolutionaries to ‘dominate history’, and to reproduce and justify exclusionary 
polities. The following section discusses in greater detail the ‘polity’, demonstrating how and 
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why the modern state itself is a manifestation of this domination. It will then map out the 
setting wherein revolution and counterrevolution can be unravelled and theorised.  
 
2. The Setting of Counterrevolution and Revolution 
Having defined counterrevolution and revolution as forms of contention over resources, it is 
necessary to understand the structures which govern access to resources. In general, the 
resources over which revolution and counterrevolution contend are regulated (or de-
regulated), managed, accessed, and/or distributed by the polity. But the sovereignty of the 
local government is compromised by transnational and international structures of resources, 
which disrupt and intervene in the contentions of the local polity.  
 Therefore, the mobilisation of local contenders does not rely on strictly local 
resources. Local resources are never wholly local; thus, contentions over them engages the 
support of transnational and international actors. This section selectively borrows from 
Tilly’s polity model illustration in Chapter 1, in order to elaborate the international elements 
which influence the local setting of revolution and counterrevolution. 
Tilly’s polity model offers concepts useful for theorising the setting in which 
revolution and counterrevolution take place. By allowing us to map the structures of resource 
access and ownership in a defined territory, it enables us to envisage the often passive 
contentions and respective positions of different contenders in a given polity at a particular 
time. A group’s routine access to strategic and concentrated resources defines its position vis-
à-vis the government which, by virtue of its role, is located at the centre of the polity. Figure 
2.1, below, provides a schematic representation of the polity at any given time. 
(Figure 2.1)  The Polity Model (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 2001: 11) 
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The inner circle consists of the polity: the central government and contenders with 
routine access to it (polity members). The outer circle defines the state’s borders, hence the 
limits of its judicial power. This setting witnesses the continuation of counterrevolution and 
revolution, through contentions among a number of contenders – polity members, polity 
challengers, and international actors – defined according to their position and role vis-à-vis 
the government (McAdam et al 2001: 12). Polity members are those contenders who enjoy 
routine access to government-controlled resources. These might include, among other 
strategic resources, seats/roles in legislative, judicial, executive, and military institutions; 
legal and fiscal privileges such as tax exemption and routine access to public funds; or private 
ownership of strategic capital like land, telecommunication, transport or mainstream media. 
Polity challengers are contenders who lack this routine access; these are, most typically, 
syndicates and unions, as well as organised religious, ethnic, gender or racial groups. Lacking 
routine access, challengers have little if any say in the management and allocation of 
resources – i.e. policy.  
Polity members are positioned in the polity – inside the inner circle – because of their 
routine access to strategic resources, while all other contenders (polity challengers) are 
positioned outside the polity (ibid: 29). When challengers are local actors (subject to the 
government’s jurisprudence, represented in Figure 1 by the outer circle), they are positioned 
inside the borders of the state but outside the polity. Challengers who are not confined by the 
government’s jurisdiction are international actors – foreign governments, international or 
transnational non-state actors, international corporations and financial organisation, or exiled 
challengers. These challengers are placed outside the borders of the state and, consequently, 
beyond the geographic limits of the state’s jurisprudence.  
The extent to which international actors interfere in counterrevolution and revolution 
varies according to contingent factors related to the polity and the context. Their role is more 
substantial in weak states, where ruling elites’ dependency on external support often invites 
external engagement with local contentions. Neo-imperialism characterises this role which 
stronger states play in the continuation of weaker states’ counterrevolution to protect 
international resource structures which favour both the counterrevolutionary elite of the 
weaker state and the transnational actors of stronger states. In that sense, the continuation of a 
counterrevolutionary order in a given polity is increasingly dependent on 
counterrevolutionary state support, especially when their resource structures are 
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interconnected by means of trade, investment, geopolitics, and ideology, among other factors.  
 Thus, counterrevolution has become increasingly globalised, as polities become 
increasingly similar in their resource structures – i.e. through neo-liberalisation, and, 
consequently, capital and strategic resources become increasingly global. Similarly, 
revolutionary contenders in different states experience greater affinity when they challenge 
comparable counterrevolutionary structures, such as post-2008 austerity structures. This 
explains, for instance, why democratic activists in New York’s Wall Street felt organically 
connected with the claims made by activists in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. 
Empirically, polities differ, particularly in the role of the government in managing 
resource access, as well as in cultural particularities which influence forms of mobilisation 
and contentions.18 This is important to consider when examining either comparative cases or 
counterrevolution and revolution in a single polity at a given time. However, as this section 
has shown, Tilly’s simplified model provides concepts that are useful for theorising the 
setting of revolution and counterrevolution. Although the simplified model might appear 
static, it recognises that the positions of contenders are continually changing, that historical 
contingencies influence the ways in which positions of contenders change, and that resources 
are not rigidly regulated or controlled by the government at all times.  
 It is thus fair to say that the setting of counterrevolutionary and revolutionary 
contentions is contingent upon numerous variables which are case and time-specific. This 
thesis shows how the theoretical framework offered by the polity model can be adapted to the 
particularities of any case study. It can be drawn and re-drawn to provide snapshots of a 
given polity at different points in time, accommodate changing polity types, and account for 
the crucial role of transnational and international actors.  
This section has shown where counterrevolution and revolution manifest themselves. 
The next section illustrates how and when counterrevolution and revolution manifest 
themselves.  
                                                           
18 For a thorough discussion of variations in polity structures, see Part Two of Tilly’s ‘Regimes and 
Repertoires’ (2006), where Tilly uses the axes of capacity and democracy. ‘Capacity’ refers to the ability of 
state institutions to effectively regulate the actions and resources available to the population within its borders. 
‘Democracy’, on the other hand, is used to point out the rights and protections which the citizenry enjoys in the 
face of elite power (2006: 12).  
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3. Passive and Intensive Counterrevolution and Revolution 
As has already been noted, conventional theories treat revolutions as violent events that are 
‘outside history’, in the sense that they represent a sudden break or rupture in the body 
politic.19 In contrast, this raises the question for this thesis, then, of how they exist ‘inside 
history’. Chapter 1 argued that, by largely reducing revolution and counterrevolution to 
dramatic moments of outburst, existing theories of revolution have failed to find revolution 
and counterrevolution in history.  This section engages this question. It argues that, in order 
to understand how revolution and counterrevolution extend beyond the events to which they 
are usually reduced to, it is necessary to unravel their passive manifestations in ‘politics as 
usual’; and, drawing mainly on key Gramscian concepts, it endeavours to theorise the 
continuity and inter-relatedness of revolution and counterrevolution in passive and intensive 
forms.  
 
3.1 Passive Counterrevolution and Revolution 
To study revolution and counterrevolution beyond their moments of outburst, it is necessary 
to draw connections between both phenomena and gradual transformations in the polity 
within which they occur. This can be done by showing that changes in polity structures 
resemble passively existing and cumulative revolutionary and counterrevolutionary 
contentions. Revolution and counterrevolution exist, not only on the eve of a military coup or 
an occupation of a central public square, they are present continuously, and in slower and 
more passive contentions. Polity changes in resources allocated for war, education, welfare, 
and among different sectors, communities, and/or regions can be linked to contentions within 
each field. 
  For example, a long period of revolutionary working class mobilisation and 
contention culminates into a minimum wage legislation. Similarly, from a 
counterrevolutionary perspective, the exclusion of an ethnic group from economic activity is 
not only the outcome of a new policy introduced by newly elected prime minister, but the 
culmination of a longer period of mobilisation and contention for the exclusion of said group.  
                                                           
19 The term ‘outside history’ was explicitly used by Michel Foucault to describe the ‘irrationality’ of 
the Iranian Revolution (Foucault 2002: 449). 
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Charles Tilly found that, throughout history, forms of collective action – which are 
contentions – in any given country tend to match political changes in that country (Tilly 
2008: 7). Rather than focussing solely on major and rapid transformations in state structures, 
Tilly examined passive contentions, or ‘transactions, interactions, and social ties’ which are 
‘central to social life’, and which enabled him to understand how forms of collective action 
are related to state transformations (ibid.). We can say that Tilly’s argument on the 
relationship between collective action and state transformation applies to counterrevolution 
and revolution, given that, for this thesis, they may include almost all forms of collective 
action centred around inclusionary and exclusionary demands. In other words, rather than 
seeing counterrevolution and revolution as a disorder in an orderly system, it is possible to 
understand both phenomena as contentious processes that are intrinsically related to polity 
transformations. 
But, during passive times, contentions often take slower and ‘silent’ forms, so to 
speak, and do not come out as full-scale, televised events. Because they are narrow 
contentions for specific inclusionary or exclusionary demands, they often go unnoticed, and 
get little or no consideration in studies of revolution. Alternatively, Antonio Gramsci’s 
concept of ‘war of position’ can be useful to elucidate how, despite their ‘silence’, 
contentions during passive times are part and parcel of counterrevolution and revolution. In 
Gramscian terms, the bourgeois state and the proletariat – or, for this thesis, 
counterrevolutionary polity and revolutionary challengers, not only come to a direct 
confrontation during ‘revolution’, but fight slower, and often unobserved ‘wars of position’ 
which lead to slow transformation in polity structures (Gramsci 1972: 108).  
In that sense, ‘war of position’ refers to passive contentions around resource access, 
which are manifestations of counterrevolution and revolution during passive times. They are 
the contentions of small groups, factory workers for instance, who challenge the ideas of their 
capitalist bosses in their own workplace, by presenting revolutionary demands that empower 
their (subaltern) class (Gramsci 1971: 290). Similarly, for counterrevolution, it is manifested 
in the push for de-regulation and tax reduction for the economic and corporate elite behind 
closed doors, which is often a slow and silent process overshadowed by propaganda and petty 
politics. 
In that sense, passive contentions, or ‘wars of position’, take many forms. Different, 
dispersed, and often uncoordinated contentions advance revolution slowly, from women 
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organisations calling for equal pay to civil rights movements for minorities. Those two 
contentions, for example, are divergent. Yet, they are both manifestations of the same 
phenomenon, revolution, which, as this chapter has illustrated, is not defined by a particular 
contention or by the size of the mobilisation but, instead, by the nature of the contention: 
whether it is inclusionary or exclusionary.  
Here, too, Gramsci’s work helps to explain further how and why revolution is not 
consolidated in passive times, yet it is continuously manifested in different, disjointed and 
‘silent’ contentions. Gramsci argued that subaltern classes, from which traditional 
revolutionary challengers emerge, are rarely, if ever, united, until they are able to become a 
‘state’, or, in the words of this thesis, take over or divide the polity (Gramsci 1971: 52). 
Otherwise, in passive times, their disunity is natural, because each group has a different 
‘position’ vis-à-vis the polity and its members, which consequently produces different ‘wars 
of position’.  
Therefore, separate contentions advancing different inclusive demands have the same 
phenomenological value: revolution, which is affirmed in the constant possibility of those 
groups eventually realising their shared interest in a more inclusionary polity. Until then, 
their contentions are narrow and disjointed, thus relatively less effective. 
Counterrevolution is not dissimilar to revolution in its many forms of contentions, 
which also share the same phenomenological value of exclusionary demands. For instance, 
counterrevolution manifests itself through both, an ultra-nationalist Hindu group mobilising 
and contending for the exclusion of the Muslim community from India’s polity, and a 
neoliberal elite removing restrictions on agricultural imports without compensating for or 
protecting 72% of India’s population which directly or indirectly relies on the agrarian 
sector.20 Those are not necessarily coordinated contentions, as being two different 
counterrevolutionary projects carried out by different forms of mobilisation. Yet, both 
contentions are manifestations of counterrevolution. 
However, as mentioned in the previous section which defined counterrevolution, 
counterrevolution is often led by polity members, who, by virtue of their privileged positions 
in the polity, are more able to realise their shared interest in exclusionary contentions. 
Counterrevolutionaries are naturally more prone to unity, because they often contend from 
                                                           
20 For a study on the effect of neoliberalisation on India’s agrarian population, and its intersection with 
Hindu-Muslim violence, see Chatterjee, I. (2009).  
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within organised structures of polity. Gramsci reaffirms this counterrevolutionary advantage 
over revolution, by maintaining that ‘the unity of the ruling classes occurs in the state’ (ibid.). 
The recognition of a common interest in consolidating power at the expense of other classes, 
is precisely the advantage that polity members have over their challengers. And their 
awareness of this drives policy and management of the strategic resources by virtue of their 
polity membership.  
But, at the same time, counterrevolutionary contenders often depart in their views on 
how to share exclusionary power. Yet their contentions rarely risk to dismantle the existing 
exclusionary structures, given the mutual concern over elevating revolutionary contenders. 
Keeping their competition ‘in-house’, their contentions are often silent and unnoticed, or at 
least limited in scope. As the definition of counterrevolution illustrated, 
counterrevolutionaries often compete amongst each other for better positions within 
exclusionary structures. And when their struggle is publicised, it is often a strategical 
posturing to overshadow the revolutionary struggle. Each counterrevolutionary side presents 
its power struggle as revolutionary, and divide the masses over it. This is typically manifested 
in the ancien regime-Islamist divide in the Middle East, as we shall see later in the case 
study, or, more broadly the conservative-reactionary power struggle. This posturing 
sometimes turns violent, if one of the counterrevolutionary contender finds an opportunity to 
weaken its rival.  
The persistence of counterrevolution is, therefore, dependent on the ability of its 
incumbent elite to incorporate new contenders, demote and defeat others, and handle new 
types of demands (Zartman 1980: 94). The ‘periodic build-up and bunching of elites and 
demands with normal stretches in between’, resembles, in a Gramscian sense, a ‘passive 
counterrevolution’, which lead to changes in the positions of contenders while maintaining 
exclusionary polity structures. 
Studies of elite politics can give us a better idea of the contentious strategies used by 
polity members to manage and maintain counterrevolutionary structures during passive times. 
It unravels how politics of inclusion and exclusion is represented in daily politics; elections, 
public servants hiring, government reshuffle, institutional reform, party splits or takeovers, 
changes in legal qualifications, among other tactics. Indeed, disagreement among 
counterrevolutionary contenders can lead to coups or wars centred around two or more 
counterrevolutionary projects. But, as Ira Zartman argues, passive contentions (competition) 
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amongst them are equally important to the maintenance of and access to ‘institutional 
positions’ – i.e. polity membership (ibid.: 95).  
Zartman’s rigorous study of elite strategies suggests that ‘all political change’ in the 
polity is a matter of ‘strategies of accession and strategies of absorption’ (ibid.). This 
accession and absorption is, for this thesis, indicative of continuous contentions which affect 
the positions of contenders vis-à-vis the polity. Depending on how ruling elite members 
perceive their contingent circumstances, they either try to absorb ‘elite aspirants who find no 
means of access into institutional positions’, or they seek to ‘block and bunch’ (exclude) 
them (ibid.).  
This section explored how counterrevolution and revolution manifest themselves in 
passive times. It first addressed the relationship between polity changes and 
counterrevolution and revolution. Their slow and turbulent contentions match slow and often 
unnoticed changes in the polity. Then, this section resorted to Gramscian concepts, 
particularly ‘war of position’ and ‘passive revolution’, to explain the nature of 
counterrevolutionary and revolutionary contentions during passive times: silent and 
disjointed. Then, it went on to describe how disjointed contentions are manifestation of the 
same phenomena: either counterrevolution or revolution.  
Despite the different demands, the centrality of resource access to all those demands 
link them together. This link is made more evident in the following section, which expands 
on the relationship between counterrevolution and revolution. Because resource access is at 
the centre of all their contentions, contenders learn from each other, as well as from their own 
past contentions. Their learning process and cumulative knowledge, political memory, 
networks, resources, etc. which each acquires through, and from, the other over time leads to 
evolved contentions. This evolving nature explains why and how counterrevolutionary and 
revolutionary contentions, which are relatively disjointed, ineffective, slow and carries 
narrow demands during passive times, become, at certain historical conjunctions, unifying, 
effective, radical and carries all-encompassing demands. 
 
3.2 Evolving Counterrevolution and Revolution 
While this chapter has provided separate definitions of counterrevolution and revolution, it 
has argued that neither can be fully understood in isolation from the other. To fully 
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understand either requires an understanding of how both are structurally related in 
contentious processes that are continuous and that extend beyond the bounded events to 
which scholars apply the terms ‘counterrevolution’ and ‘revolution’.  Their continuity is not 
reducible to a particular set of ‘counterrevolutionaries’ and ‘revolutionaries’, but to 
innumerable contentions, wars of position, which accumulate knowledge and experiences that 
influence the mobilisation and strategies of re-emerging and new contenders.  
At different historical conjunctions, political groups organise, re-organise, or dissolve. 
However, the lessons, experiences, loyalties and organisations of previous 
counterrevolutionary and revolutionary contenders are passed on through surviving actors 
and carried knowledge. 
As mentioned earlier, the evolution of both phenomena is not linear, and thus does not 
necessarily progressively culminate in more powerful and effective contentions. Instead, it 
oscillates between passive and intensive forms. But, in order to explain the importance of 
evolution and how it is manifested, Figure 3.2, below, shows three timeframes representing 
the evolution process, assuming it reaches, in a linear manner, an episode of intensification. 
 
(Figure 3.2) Evolving Revolution 
 
At (T1), revolution takes the form of disjointed passive contentions, centred around 
narrow inclusionary demands, advanced by innumerable contenders (C1 and other smaller 
grey circles). Those contenders have access to different set of resources (R1 and other smaller 










contenders who previously advanced narrow demands, recognise mutual revolutionary 
interests, and consolidate their mobilisation efforts, forming coalitions and solidarity 
networks amongst each other (C3), advancing more encompassing demands. Consolidating 
their mobilisation means that resources previously available to each contender separately, are 
now accessible to them both (in the form of a bigger circle R3). Similarly, a bigger coalition 
takes the form of (C4), which is yet to find its intersection with (C3). 
During (T2), the new coalitions (C3) and (C4) develop their respective contentions 
vis-à-vis counterrevolutionary contenders, and, through experience, learn how to utilise a 
bigger pool of resources (R3) more efficiently and strategically.   
Having further accumulated knowledge, resources, organisation, and skills in 
mobilisation, and absorbed more revolutionary contenders, (C3) and (C4) await for an 
opportunity (T3) to unite and, consequently, intensify their contention in all-encompassing 
demands. This opportunity depends not only on the outcome of all the existing contentions, 
but on contingent internal and external factors.  
Revolutionary contenders have learned, over the course of (T1) and (T2), as well as 
from previous experiences prior to (T1), how counterrevolutionary contenders counter their 
demands, and how to coordinate and make more efficient use of their resources. They also 
learned more about their source of exclusion. In (T3), (C3) and (C4) realise the possibility 
and opportunity to unite their efforts, in what becomes broader (more radical) demands for 
inclusion. As a result, contentions are no longer slow, passive and disjointed. Their ‘wars of 
position’ become a ‘war of movement’, an all-encompassing demand to transform a wider 
section of the polity structures.21 This thesis refers to this historical conjunction as an 
‘episode of intensification’. 
This section has shown why T3 can be better understood if it is situated in a historical 
process which encompasses earlier points in time (depicted here as T1 and T2). A 
comprehensive study of counterrevolution and revolution must take into account their passive 
contentions, such as the ones described at T1 and T2. These do not necessarily lead to radical 
                                                           
21 The revolutionary struggle, in Gramscian terms, is gradually and organically elevated or ‘prepared’ 
for by means of ‘wars of position’ until such time as the subaltern classes become capable of effectively 
threatening the state in rapid ‘frontal attacks’, through what Gramsci calls a ‘war of movement’ (Gramsci 1971: 
291). His ‘war of movement’ is illustrative of what this thesis calls ‘episode of intensification’.  
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transformations in the polity but can, and often do, culminate in counterrevolutionary and 
revolutionary ‘outbursts’, such as the episode of intensification during (T3). As Tilly puts it, 
the study of contention and state transformation should consider the similarities and 
differences among various forms of contention and attend more closely to the historical 
processes which connect them (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 26). The following section 
elaborates on the intensification of counterrevolution and revolution, connecting it to their 
passive forms discussed in this section.  
 
3.3 Intensive Counterrevolution and Revolution 
Thus far, this chapter has mainly focused on the passive, inter-related and evolving continuity 
of counterrevolution and revolution. It has alluded to episodes of intensification in which 
relatively passive contentions turn into effective large-scale mobilisations with mutually 
exclusive claims. This section provides a further elaboration of these episodes.  
 The events to which counterrevolution and revolution are usually reduced to by 
traditional theories and in the media are what this thesis characterises as ‘episodes of 
intensification’: the dramatic moments of outburst, coup d’état, mass uprising, large-scale 
collective action, riots, unrest, and the rapid changes in the polity that accompany them. The 
term ‘episode’ is used instead of ‘event’ because counterrevolution and revolution are not 
conceived of as events which can be understood in isolation from historical processes, and 
from various contingent and coincidental factors on which their sudden occurrences depend.22   
Alternatively, the term ‘episode’ refers to bounded sequences of continuous 
interaction which involves contentious and interactive demand-making (Tilly 2008: 11). An 
episode of ‘intensification’ is distinguished from passive episodes (or the passive times of 
counterrevolution and revolution) by the effective mobilisation that occurs as a result of the 
articulation and interaction of broader demands, and its ‘rapid eventfulness’, so to speak.  
The most intensified revolutionary episode is one that sees previously narrow 
revolutionary demands of separate contenders come together under an all-encompassing and 
                                                           
 22 Zartman suggests that the ‘dynamic stability’ in the polity maintained by elite strategies of co-
optation, circulation, accession and training, sees ‘a measure of intensity’ by coincidence, when several types of 
‘demands and demand-bearing groups’ coordinate their efforts – hence become effective in their contentions 
(Zartman 1980: 89). For similar arguments on the occasional overlap of demand-bearers and the impact this has 
on polity stability see, among others, Simmel 1955, Coser 1956, Lipset 1960, Dahrendorf 1988, Rae and Taylor 
1970, and Shepsle 1971. 
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polarising demand. In its most intensified form, revolution carries a mutually exclusive 
demand: ‘us or them’. This, in other words, reduces all politics to two sides: ‘us’, all 
segments of society who are relatively excluded in different ways and via different polity 
structures, and ‘them’, the small privileged segment which enjoys routine and exclusive 
access to resources.  
When revolution culminates in this or similar levels of intensification, elite tactics 
discussed in the previous section can no longer pre-empt, postpone, or contain this 
revolutionary challenge. In the face of mutually exclusive demands, the usual political 
strategies of co-optation, reform, compromise, diplomacy, coercion, etc., as well as 
referendums and electoral occasions to ‘fix blame, renew hopes, and redirect aspirations’, 
often fail to contain revolutionary intensity (Zartman 1980: 94). In other words, the 
institutions which often regulates political rivalries, especially in countries that have 
established constitutional traditions, effective diplomatic channels and interest articulation, 
are obstructed by mutually exclusive demands (Mayer 1971: 59). When these institutions fail, 
military institutions become increasingly active in state attempts to enforce order.  
Consequently, these levels of intensification are typically and notably violent, with 
incumbent counterrevolutionaries using their monopoly of violence to crush the united 
revolutionary camp, and the revolutionary camp using their greater pool of resources and 
more effective mobilisation to take over or divide the polity. This explains why military 
institutions, most notoriously the police, become the political accomplices (manifestation of) 
counterrevolution during intensification (ibid.: 60).  
Yet the revolutionary binary, being broad and simplistic, is prone to co-optation by 
counterrevolution, given that, during episodes of intensification, counterrevolutionary 
contenders are often not restricted to the state apparatus. At times of intensification, new or 
re-emerging counterrevolutionary contenders will, more often than not, seize the opportunity 
to press for structures that are even more exclusionary than existing ones. 
Under existential threat from revolution, the ruling/incumbent counterrevolutionaries 
would seek to turn the revolutionary binary on its head by elevating a ‘worse’ 
counterrevolutionary contender and using the revolutionary binary to describe, not the 
revolutionary-counterrevolutionary struggle, but the inter-counterrevolutionary struggle 
between incumbent contender and elevated counterrevolutionary challenger. This co-optation 
strategy leaves the public with the ‘least worst’ option after crushing the revolutionary camp. 
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In other words, incumbent (ruling) counterrevolutionary contenders reduce political 
possibilities, after exhausting revolutionary momentum, to the ‘lesser of two evils’. We shall 
see how this strategy, during the peak of revolutionary intensification, is manifested in our 
case study. 
It is worth noting, however, that considerable strategic resources are required to 
sustain intensified contention, be it revolutionary or counterrevolutionary. The mobilisation 
of revolutionaries has to be effective, not only in threatening the existing polity members or 
overall government at the time, but, even more so, in maintaining that threat and its 
momentum in the face of intensifying counterrevolution. On the other hand, incumbent 
counterrevolutionaries have to be able to crush the intensified revolution, or promptly co-opt 
the revolutionary binary through elevating other counterrevolutionary contenders, as 
suggested above, and/or pursue other resource-demanding strategies. In conclusion, episodes 
of intensification are characterised by the allocation and utilisation of significant amount of 
resources.  
 
4. The Question of Outcomes 
What the discussion of episodes of intensification suggests is that, while it is usually possible 
to credit revolutionary contenders for its beginning, it is imminently matched with 
counterrevolutionary intensification. In that sense, episodes of intensification involve 
intensification of both revolution and counterrevolution. Therefore, the ‘ending’ of an 
episode is never a volcanic event of ‘counterrevolution’. It is, however, often concluded with 
the gradual resumption of counterrevolutionary domination, albeit with varying degrees of 
polity reform.  It includes a relatively gradual process of revolutionary de-intensification, 
where mutually exclusive demands are gradually less dominant. This is often met with 
institutional modifications and varying levels of compromises, such the breakup of the single 
polity into multiple polities, or, more often, the introduction of a new counterrevolutionary 
power-sharing arrangement between incumbent and new contenders which gives greater 
access to previously restricted resources but, as a whole, maintains an exclusionary polity.  
 Regardless of what the ending of a given episode looks like, the outcome for either 
revolution or counterrevolution can never be treated as definitive. The outcome of an episode 
of intensification influences the future strategy and alliances of surviving and new actors, 
defines what resources are accessible based on the new positions of contenders, and 
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consequently, redraws the frontlines of ‘wars of position’. But whether counterrevolution 
won the round and instituted greater exclusion, or revolution won more with the introduction 
of more inclusionary policies, the new arrangement becomes the basis for the continuation of 
both processes in passive contentions, or ‘wars of position’.   
This historical understanding provides a way out of the dilemma that confronts 
scholars after every ‘wave of revolts’, which is how to explain the often ambiguous and/or 
disappointing outcomes of revolutionary ‘outbursts’. In the perspective developed in this 
chapter, a disappointing outcome marks neither the end of a revolution nor the beginning of a 
counterrevolution. The outcomes of one episode do not conclude – or end the history per se – 
of either revolution or counterrevolution. Thus the phenomenological question of what it is 
that you are studying when you study counterrevolution and revolution, cannot be answered 
with reference to events – rebellions, strikes, mass protests, civil disobedience, assassinations, 
coups, petitions, or wars – which occur at a particular time and place. Counterrevolution and 
revolution are present in ‘politics as usual’, in the history of passive ‘micro-battles’ – the 
everyday struggles for ‘bread’, as much as they are present in large-scale coordinated action 




















1.  Introduction 
This chapter lays out a methodology for studying counterrevolution and revolution as 
continuous, inter-related, and evolving processes involved in contentions over resources. 
As Chapter 1 discussed, existing studies explore ‘revolution’ and ‘counterrevolution’ 
within narrow temporal domains. Those that purport to adopt a historical perspective tend to 
use history as a background, rather than as intrinsic to the phenomenon under study, or to 
answer questions like why ‘revolution’ did not occur up until given date or why revolution 
eventually occurred. The spatial domains employed in conventional studies are also overly 
narrow. A sizeable portion of the literature on revolution (and counterrevolution) assumes 
revolution to be a phenomenon strictly internal to the state. In contrast, the theorisation of 
counterrevolution and revolution presented in Chapter 2 acknowledges the transnational and 
international factors that are involved in structuring the resource access at a local level. The 
following sections illustrate alternative temporal and spatial dimensions for the study of 
revolution and counterrevolution. 
 
2. The Temporal and Spatial Dimensions  
2.1 Counterrevolution and Revolution as Historical Processes 
A historically-grounded explanation of counterrevolution and revolution is not one that 
simply provides an historical background to both, but one that accounts for counterrevolution 
and revolution as continuous and interrelated processes throughout history. Historically, 
polities are far from static, though changes in them may not always be noticeable. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, polities are continuously subject to changes in their resource 
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structures and contenders’ positions. It has also argued that these changes in resource 
structures are both, an outcome and a continuation of counterrevolution and revolution. In 
other words, counterrevolution and revolution shape and are shaped by changes in the polity. 
Thus, to study the continuity, inter-relatedness, and evolution of both phenomena in history, 
we must be able to survey the presence of both despite (and through) changes in polity.  
To do this, the study divides the history of a polity into timeframes based on the most 
significant and long-term changes that occurred. These changes are measured based on 
variations in political participation and economic inclusion.23 Political participation can be 
assessed through the scope of political competition, and the extent to which existing polity 
structures allow for and facilitate such competition. This will require data from the polity’s 
constitution – particularly distribution of power among state institutions and electoral laws – 
and from news agencies and historical accounts that can give us an idea of the main 
contenders, their positions and contentions vis-à-vis the polity. 
The second variation, economic inclusion designates the extent to which subaltern 
classes are involved in economic activity. It can be assessed through data on fiscal and 
economic policies which reflect the ways in which the resources are allocated and rewards of 
development are shared.  
Delimiting these timeframes – identifying the beginning and end of a timeframe – 
within a given polity involves, first, pinpointing those historically noticeable incidents which 
often lead to significant changes in political and economic participation, such as regime 
change, war, coup, miss displacement, radical reforms (top-down ‘revolutions’), recession, 
among others; and then assessing the extent to which each incident transformed that polity’s 
resource structures (revealing developments for revolution and counterrevolution).  
Table 2 below summarises this method of studying the relationship between 




                                                           




1. Pinpointing key incidents within a given polity: regime change, war, coup, miss 
displacement, radical reforms (top-down ‘revolutions’), and recession, among others. 
2.  Selecting, among these key incidents, the ones which led to significant changes in that 
polity’s resource structures -- in access to political and economic resources. 
3. Defining timeframes – their beginning and end – based on these significant changes.  
 
(Figure 2) A Method of Delimiting Timeframes for Counterrevolution and Revolution 
 
Starting with the first timeframe, the positions of key (most effective) local and 
external contenders relating to a polity advancing RCR demands are mapped. This mapping 
is then revised to take account of whether counterrevolutionary and revolutions contentions 
continue and evolve and how, if at all, they relate to changes in the polity. The following 
section elaborates on this spatial aspect. 
 
2.2  The Spatiality of Counterrevolution and Revolution 
Each timeframe involves significant changes in a given polity and in key (most effective) 
contenders. For each timeframe, the study assesses how these demands evolved and how 
contenders learned both from one another and from the outcomes of the previous 
intensification. Key contenders are those who are most effective in that period relative to 
other contenders representing similar revolutionary or counterrevolutionary demands as, for 
instance, the largest conservative contender, despite the presence of other religious-
conservative organisations, or the largest labour organisations, despite the presence of other 
labour contenders. Key contenders are also international actors who exercise significant 
authority in structuring local resource access.  
Given the key role of international contenders, counterrevolution and revolution often 
involve permeable contentions which are not restricted to the state and its polity; and it is 
their extension beyond a single polity that often guarantees their continuation. Consequently, 
 52 
the spatial dimension discloses the extension of polity’s resource structures beyond the 
borders of the state, connecting regional and international actors to local contenders, and 
assessing the permeability and transnational activity of key local contenders. It does not 
provide a complete or comprehensive map of international and regional relations, but selects 
the most effective, defining, and instructive actors to unravel the international links of 
counterrevolution and revolution. This study, therefore, gives sustained consideration to the 
intersection between the national, regional, and international resource structures that is 
increasingly manifested in today’s globalised world. In that sense, this thesis synthesises 
Tilly’s polity model with international political economy, borrowing Tilly’s illustrative terms 
to map out the setting and the changes that occur over time, while blurring the line between 
what Tilly describes as ‘the external actors’ and the polity.  
Figure 3, below, lists the methodological process of studying the spatial domain of 
counterrevolution and revolution. 
 
  (Figure 3)  The Spatial Study of Counterrevolution and Revolution 
1. Identify the most effective contenders and their positions based on their level of 
access to strategic resources.  
2. Determine the size of the cohort of contenders based on how resourceful it is (how 
much access it has). Draw connections among allies. 
3. Assess the extent to which contenders are permeable across state borders, or operate 
internationally.  
4. Identify the most effective and involved international actors, and connect them with 
their most effective local allies or proxies.  
 
 Alongside the spatiality addressed above – which helps us trace the survival and 
evolution of traditional political contenders, this thesis examines the survival of an 
increasingly connected, transnational and resourceful network of business, political and 
military elites who benefit from and advance counterrevolution. These elites often play an 
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active role in its continuation by utilising their privileges and networks to reproduce their 
exclusive privileges when polity structures are changed or threatened.  
The following section presents the case study that will be the focus of the investigation, 
and explains why it is an illuminating case for exploring the hypotheses of this study. It then 
illustrates the temporality and spatiality of this case study based on the discussion of this 
section. 
 
3. Case Study 
This thesis focuses on Egypt as a case study. Egypt is particularly instructive to the study of 
counterrevolution and revolution and, at the same time, exemplifies basic and generalisable 
characteristics of those processes. The recent wave of counterrevolutionary and revolutionary 
intensification across the Arab world contributed to a resurgence of interest in 
counterrevolution and revolution, and their complex dynamics and outcomes, though without 
sufficiently delving into the concept of ‘counterrevolution’. Yet Egypt’s case remains the 
most revealing on this issue. As subsequent chapters will show, the available data on Egypt 
suggests that it is a case which is particularly demonstrative of continuity, inter-relatedness 
and evolution in revolutionary and counterrevolutionary politics.  
Egypt has the largest population in the region and hence the largest labour force. Its  
large labour force has made its revolution more salient relative to other Arab states. 
Furthermore, its geopolitical, economic and cultural significance, has provided regional and 
international actors with incentives to give support to its contenders, and get involved in 
structuring its resource access. This has contributed to Egypt’s increasingly concentrated 
wealth and power. In that sense, the traditional manifestations of counterrevolution (political 
exclusion) and revolution (independent labour organisation) are more salient, and thus more 
accessible to study in the case of Egypt.  
Yet the Egyptian polity is not unique, which makes it a useful and comparable case 
study. Similar to other developing states, neoliberal policies have further integrated its polity 
into international economic structures which, in turn, has sustained its revolution and 
counterrevolution. Neoliberal counterrevolution empowered an increasingly resourceful and 
inter-connected group of polity members who are struggling to manage and accommodate a 
growing population while sustaining their own exclusive privileges. Despite significant 
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changes in the polity over time, counterrevolution was reproduced in new or resilient 
structures and, as a consequence, many members were able to retain their privileges. In sum, 
Egypt provides a particularly illuminating case, but one that is also comparable to other cases.   
The continuity of counterrevolution and revolution in Egypt is examined by: 1) 
surveying traditional contentions and contenders – labour, military, etc. and 2) drawing a 
sample of the inter-connected group of polity members, or network of privileges, formed over 
time through counterrevolutionary contentions. 
For the first aspect, the study maps out how, in Egypt, the changing polity structures 
continued to exhibit counterrevolutionary and revolutionary contentions by key contenders, 
who not only survived changes in the polity, but also evolved with time. The study of this 
first spatial layer draws on a diverse body of both primary and secondary sources, including 
media, economic, fiscal and policy-related data, as well as relevant studies of elite politics, 
historical sociology, and political economy of development in Egypt.  
As for the study of the second aspect of continuity, the thesis compiles a sample of 
business and military elites connected through business and marital ties, and positions this 
network (and their privileged access to resources) in the context of favourable changes in 
local, regional and international structures. Data was first collected on Egypt’s current 
wealthiest families. Historical and archival records were examined, as were other primary and 
secondary sources that directly and indirectly provide information on these families with 
regard to their business and wealth, family descent, and commercial and political 
partnerships. Most of this data came from biographies of Egyptian elites, newspaper archives, 
local and international business reports on Egypt in both Arabic and English, official websites 
of Egyptian companies, and research and documentaries on Egypt’s presidents. Some of the 
data was collected through mostly informal interviews with Egyptian economists, journalists, 
activists and researchers. The rest of the data is available online and was easily accessed, or 
found in archival sources and previous research related to Egypt’s economy.  
As Figure 3, below, shows, this data was then stored and organised using a basic 
genealogy software, GreatFamily, which allows us to visualise this network not only spatially 
(as a family tree of business and marital ties), but also temporally (based on the timeframes 
and polity of the time).  
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(Figure 3)    GreatFamily Software 
 
Alas, mapping out the marital and business ties of Egypt’s military and business elite 
is a time-consuming and challenging process. Because of the time and resource constraints 
involved, this study does not provide complete and comprehensive findings on privileged 
networks. Instead, it presents a sample of connections, spanning the entire temporal domain 
of the study, relating to how, empirically, today’s privileged network sustained its exclusive 
privileges despite and through changes in the Egyptian polity. This sample is a testimony of 
existing counterrevolutionary structures which, even in passive times, ensured that a small 
portion of the population continuously enjoyed exclusive privileges.  
 
 3.1 Egypt’s Timeframes: (1800s-2013) 
The case study begins with the earliest manifestation of modern counterrevolution and 
revolution, which are characterised by contentions centred around integration in global 
capitalist markets and modern statehood. In the case of Egypt, this can be traced back to the 
early 19th century, when Khedive Muhammad Ali and his successors began a process of 
integration in European markets and formation of a modern state. To cover the period from 
1804 to 2013, the case study is divided into four timeframes. For each timeframe, the study 
will 1) draw the polity and its main contenders, 2) assign the most illuminating and relevant 
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contentions to counterrevolution and revolution,  and  3) compare these findings with the 
previous timeframe to see how the Egyptian polity has changed and what that means for 
counterrevolution and revolution. The study of each timeframe adds to our understanding of 
both phenomena, with particular focus on how they relate, continue and evolve. 
Each timeframe will be studied based on the temporal and spatial methods explained 
earlier: a temporal examination of what has changed in counterrevolutionary and revolutions 
terms over time (tracing changes in forms of contention) and a spatial examination of how the 
polity looks like after this change (tracing changes in contenders, their positions vis-à-vis 
polity, and the polity structures).  In the case of Egypt, this process of tracing changes 
produces four timeframes, starting with Muhammad Ali’s regime and concluding with the 
recent intensification between 2011 and 2013. These timeframes were demarked based on 
significant changes in one of both dimensions: scope of political participation and level of 
mass inclusion in the economy.24 Figure 4.1, below, illustrates those timeframes. 
 
(Figure 4.1) Egypt’s Domain 
 
 
During the first timeframe T1 (1800s-1950s), the Egyptian polity can be described as 
a liberal oligarchy, one which restricts political and economic participation to a small 
number of notable families. Despite nominal independence from Britain in 1922, resource 
structures remained unchanged and was ruled, therefore, by a handful of rich landowning 
families in close ties with the palace and Britain. There was a rush for economic 
                                                           
24 The naming of those timeframes is borrowed from Raymond Hinnebusch’s rigorous study of the 
‘historical sociology of Middle East states’, where he determines ‘typical regime types’ based on 1) scope of 
elite competition and 2) the level of mass inclusion (2010: 201). Although what has historically existed is hybrid 
regimes falling on different points in the political-economic inclusion axis, categorising regime types allowed 
Hinnebusch to study historical trends.  
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development, which was part of the process of state formation; but the rewards of 
development remained largely concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy and notable 
families (Hourani 1991: 379). The same could be said about political participation: elections 
took place and parliaments were formed, but without meaningful political competition. The 
second timeframe T2 (1950s-1960s) witnessed an episode of intensification manifested in 
significant changes to polity, when the so-called ‘Free Officers’ launched a successful 
military coup and established what this study will describe as a populist authoritarian polity. 
The third timeframe T3 (1970s-present) is defined by the reversal of the populist policies 
after military and economic defeats and the introduction of neoliberal structures under the 
late President Anwar Sadat through his ‘infitah’ (liberalisation) plan. The polity during T3 
will be described as ‘neoliberal authoritarianism’.  
Despite the resilience of neoliberal authoritarianism, evidenced by its continuation up 
to this day, it was opposed by an unprecedentedly effective revolutionary intensification in 
2011, one in which popular demands for ‘bread, freedom, and social justice’ threatened to 
force the introduction of more inclusionary structures. All timeframes face significant 
changes as a result of some level of intensification. However, this most recent intensification 
is particularly illuminating, because it saw the most evolved and broad revolutionary 
coalition. Despite its failure to produce significant changes in the polity, this case of 
intensification, known as the Arab Spring (and its counterrevolution as the ‘Arab Winter’) 
provides a useful focus for the study of counterrevolution and revolution. Moreover, there is 
an abundant amount of data and secondary sources available on this particular intensification 
compared to the less effective and often less documented intensifications of previous 
timeframes. Consequently, particular attention will be given in this study to the timeframe of 
this intensification, T4 (2011-2013); for even though it did not significantly alter the 
neoliberal authoritarianism of the previous timeframe, it helps to illuminate the inter-
relatedness and evolution of RCR in intensified contentions.  
The following sections expand on each timeframe, suggesting some of the key 
changes in spatial and temporal domains and the data used to document them. 
 
 3.1.1 T1 - Liberal Oligarchy (1800s-1950s) 
The first timeframe, (T1), begins with the changes to the resource structure which Khedive 
Muhammad Ali undertook in Egypt. Ali was an Albanian commander in the Ottoman army 
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who became the governor of Ottoman Egypt. His imperial ambition drove him to concentrate 
Egypt’s land ownership in the of a small minority of large landowners, in the hopes of 
expanding the production and exportation of cotton.  By the end of the nineteenth century, the 
great majority of Egypt’s peasantry were either landless or land-poor, while a new class of 
large landowners emerged and would remain the dominant counterrevolutionary class until 
the coup and subsequent land reform of 1952 (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 8).  
When Britain took over Egypt in late 19th century, it accelerated the integration of 
Egypt in capitalist markets, connecting Egypt’s large landowners with foreign capital, and 
producing Western-educated liberal elites. Upon granting Egypt nominal independence in 
1922, the same large landowners consolidated their power through appropriating as private 
property the most strategic resources and, in particular, land, oil, and bureaucratic seats. 
During this period, these elites owned the lands and controlled those who laboured on them, 
and competed for these valued goods amongst themselves with varied intensity (Bromley 
2005: 508).  
The exploration of this timeframe will trace how, after nominal independence, the 
leading liberal oligarchs co-opted the organic evolution of the working class in pursuit of 
greater power. This will require highlighting the partnerships between local, regional and 
international capital which contended against the emergence of an independent labour. 
Instead, the British established a parliamentary monarchy that represented the interests of the 
large landowners-turned parliamentarians, the palace, and foreign capital. This triangular 
power-sharing arrangement delay meaningful industrial development, which allowed them to 
accumulate wealth exclusively through exportation of primary products to world capitalist 
markets, while their subjects continued to labour on their lands for minimal returns. This 
study traces counterrevolution in this timeframe by focussing on the continuity of 1) 
economic exclusion through policies which delayed the expansion of the economy and hence 
maintained a concentration of wealth; and 2) political exclusion through the manipulation of 
elections and the constitution, and the concentration of oligarchical power and weakening 
parliaments.  
Typically, counterrevolution evolved further and faster than revolution which, by the 
turn of the century, began to emerge, first through foreign labour with union experience in 
Egypt, and, then, through the coordination of foreign and Egyptian labour in Egypt’s few 
industrial pockets. From the perspective of revolution, this thesis will survey these early 
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labour contentions, and the response of the triangular counterrevolution – Britain, large 
landowners, and the palace, referring to data from historical accounts on Egypt. It will also 
show how a segment of the intelligentsia and cultural elite developed ideas centred around 
anti-colonialism and pan-Arabist populism, as well as attempts by wage-earning middle class 
segments to organise, particularly in urban settings, in coordination with the working 
classes.25 
But the most effective contenders at the time, which eventually managed to transform 
the polity’s structures, came from the military academies. Economic and policy data on 
Egypt’s government in that period, and particularly sources on the formation of the Egyptian 
military, will illustrate how liberal oligarchs and their Western allies mobilised strategic 
resources – in the form of education, training, weaponry, loyalty and exclusive legal 
privileges – for segments of the Egyptian working classes to form an army that was supposed 
to protect their exclusionary polity. Instead, this new contender carried revolutionary 
demands into its institutions, while other segments of the working class which did not get the 
same access to resources were less effective in their revolutionary mobilisation. 
On the other hand, counterrevolution was manifested not only in the polity members’ 
policies, but in an emerging religious conservative challenger, the Muslim Brotherhood, with 
region-wide ambition and a conservative-exclusionary agenda focused on transnational 
Islamism.  
This period concludes with an episode of intensification, when post-WWII upsurge of 
social and communist groups helped militarise the working class and escalated class 
contentions against the triangular counterrevolution. The counterrevolutionary intensification 
came not from the incumbent rulers, but from the military academy. A group of nationalist 
officers took power in a coup, ending the monarchical regime, and transforming the state into 
a populist authoritarian republic. The revolutionary intensification in late 1940s and early 
1950s was met with a military-led intensification, culminating – in T2, in significant changes 
to resource structures, greater inclusion in economic activity but in a stricter, more corporatist 
polity that destroyed communist challengers and co-opted the labour movement for a 
                                                           
25 The interaction between these classes will be discussed later in this thesis in counterrevolutionary 
and revolutionary terms. For now, see, for instance, Lockman 1994a, which elaborates on the role of Egyptian 
nationalist intellectuals in ‘political and ideological contestations’ that galvanised the workers and helped form a 
new ‘collective social agent’ in the form of an Egyptian ‘working class’ and a national identity based on the 
‘worker’ instead of the English-looking ‘oligarch’.  This complements the work of Joel Beinin (1981) on the 
formation of the Egyptian working class, which is essentially an evolutionary feature of revolution in Egypt. 
 60 
nationalist state-led capitalist project. The following section introduces T2, defines the new 
resource structures, and accentuates how this thesis will examine the continuation of 
counterrevolution and revolution in a changing Egyptian polity. 
 
 3.1.2 T2 - Populist Authoritarianism (1954-19670) 
Based on the two-dimensional lens, we can observe how, during this timeframe, the working 
class were granted meaningful access to important  socio-economic resources, while 
simultaneously restricting its evolution as a political contender. This timeframe is defined by 
the significant changes that took place in the polity. In general, this period saw 
counterrevolution evolve in two main ways: 1) corporatisation of labour movement in statist 
union confederation, along with a vicious crackdown on militant challengers and 2) the state 
taking charge of industrialisation in partnership with national bourgeoisie.  
Therefore, for this timeframe, this thesis will investigate the following aspects: 1) 
Nasser’s reform policies and their impact on economic structures by comparing T1 and T2 
policy and economic impact, and 2) the corporatisation of working class in a populist ruling 
party and a statist union confederation. 
The extent to which Egypt’s Free Officers’ ‘top-down revolution’ was ‘revolutionary’ 
remains open to debate. Despite adopting important inclusive policy reforms and populist 
narrative which somehow reinvigorated revolutionary zeal, the new ruling elite did not grant 
the Egyptian working class meaningful political rights. Independent labour organisations, 
leftist and communist groups were supressed. Alternatively, revolutionary working class 
politics was co-opted and corporatised in an over-arching single ruling party, giving segments 
of the working class a symbolic political role and, in return, framing the new political order 
as empowering for previously excluded subaltern classes.  
Nonetheless, the new structures gave Egypt’s working class routine access to 
economic and social resources previously restricted to privileged families, such as education, 
healthcare, land and other key subsidies. The thesis will examine how these double-edged 
policies represent evolutionary characteristics of counterrevolution and revolution. Prime 
example to be studied is the formation of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) under 
Nasser, which had legal monopoly over trade union organisation (Beinin 2012: 1). On the one 
hand, the new labour structure secured economic privileges for the workers but, on the other, 
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undermined their continued revolutionary contentions for the sake of a bourgeois nationalist 
project. For instance, it legally guaranteed employment after university for everyone (ibid.). 
The trade-off, however, was denying workers their political rights and systematically 
excluding them from the political arena. This thesis will survey how workers often 
challenged ETUF monopoly, culminating into more effective revolutionary labour 
movements. 
These contradictions within the polity reaffirm how counterrevolution and revolution 
co-exist and are inter-related and evolving processes. In this case, the pursuit of independence 
which began in T1 contributed to the evolution of counterrevolution in the form of 
independent yet state-controlled economy, protected by a corporatist authoritarian polity with 
nationalist populist hegemony.  
From the perspective of counterrevolution, a broad coalition, or any meaningful mass 
inclusion, would require distributing the benefits of state-controlled development more 
widely, which in turn risks a stronger labour challenge. For that matter, class contentions 
were curbed by the state after the new structures guaranteed some strategic resources to the 
working class. A continuation of class contentions would be considered harmful for the 
nationalist state project. The new regime claimed that it ended class struggle, so to speak, 
through a ‘class balance’ in the ‘national interest’.26  
In sum, counterrevolution is reflected in the concentration of political and economic 
power in the hands of a thin stratum of military elite through an increasingly centralised and 
bureaucratic polity, and the continued business, political and personal ties with segments of 
the bourgeoisie which agreed to accumulate wealth under the auspices of the government. 
The de-intensification of revolution, however, required strategic compromises, which 
included significant welfare policies and socio-economic resource access for the subaltern 
classes.  
The evolving nature of counterrevolution is also manifested in the rise of the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a key challenger to the nationalist polity. Although it was founded during the 
time of liberal oligarchy in 1926, the Muslim Brotherhood movement became a more 
effective contender when revolutionary challengers, particularly labour organisations and 
leftist parties, were crushed by the military regime. The nationalist authoritarian polity 
                                                           
26 See Gamal Abdel Nasser’s interview on CBC Television channel in 1954, accessed here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=toyIh9yZH_Y 
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reduced the possibilities for opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood and other conservative 
religious organisations, before supressing the Brotherhood too. However, the Brotherhood 
remained an important contender. Although its activities during most of this period were 
underground, it benefited from region-wide authoritarian rule, expanding transnationally and 
accumulating resources to become, eventually, as we will see mostly in T3 and T4, a 
resourceful counterrevolutionary force. This thesis will explain how and why the 
Brotherhood played a counterrevolutionary role in Egypt, reflecting on its exclusionary 
demands and alliances with exclusionary polity members.  
Nasser’s militant pan-Arabism eventually exhausted the polity’s resources in Yemen 
and, more notoriously, in the six-day war in 1967. And the failure of state-run development 
jeopardised the resource protection granted to the subaltern classes.27 The survival of the 
ruling elites required structural transformation in the polity. This thesis will trace post-Nasser 
economic policies to show how the cost of war was incurred by subaltern and wage earning 
middle classes, as Nasser’s successor, Anwar Al-Sadat, went on to privatise resources which 
were previously state-controlled and accessible to the working class, compromising on free 
healthcare, education, fuel and food subsidies. This transformation is known as the ‘infitah’. 
 
 4.1.3 T3 - Neoliberal Authoritarianism (1970-2011) 
This timeframe saw significant changes in both, political participation and economic 
inclusion. The state gave some political access for its challengers, while gradually denying 
the working class access to socio-economic resources. The ruling military elite required 
external support to survive in power after the defeat of their pan-Arabist project in 1967 and 
the failure of their economic development plan. This section will trace the new support lines 
from international financial institutions, the US and Arab oil-rich states, and will link it to 
slow neoliberal reforms of the period, which squeezed the resources previously guaranteed 
for the working class, without compromising the privileges of the incumbent elite (Costello 
2014: 12). The direct and indirect conditions these international financial organisations and 
states (international actors in the polity model) attach to their loans led to significant 
structural changes in Egypt’s polity. Starting with late President Anwar Al-Sadat, austerity 
programmes, fiscal policy, taxation system, privatisation schemes, state-funded 
                                                           
27 See Jesse Ferris’s comprehensive account of the impact of both wars on the Egyptian state (2013). 
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infrastructural projects, and government expenditure and budget became largely monitored 
and influenced by the IMF and the World Bank.28 
The way in which Egypt implemented those reforms compromised the state’s 
authority over national resources in favour of the private sector, without significantly 
compromising the polity members’ access to these resources. The military and state 
bureaucrats did not give away their exclusive access to previously national resources in 
favour of the private sector. Instead, they used pressures for privatisation from international 
financial institutions to appropriate public sector assets for themselves, in partnerships with 
private and foreign capital.29  
A review of the new structures - neoliberalised authoritarian polity – will show how 
the military’s long-established corporatist structures, which already infiltrated the private 
sector, remained largely in control of what gradually became private resources. 
Predominantly unchanged structures of authoritarian state-run capitalism were used to 
facilitate crony capitalism authorised exclusively for military elite and reinvigorated old 
bourgeoisie. Therefore, for this period, this thesis will focus on how counterrevolution 
evolved in two main ways: 1) previously existing exclusionary structures restricted access to 
the opportunities and rewards of neoliberalisation and 2) the Muslim Brotherhood now filling 
the vacuum left by the eroding welfare-based social contract between the state and the 
subaltern classes, and the continuously suppressed leftist and labour organisations.  
 This method illuminates those two layers of counterrevolution between 1970 and 
2011: one controlling neoliberal economic structures and the other dictating conservative 
structures. Those structures were not mutually exclusive and, in most of this period, they co-
existed and overlapped.30 Although members of the Muslim Brotherhood were largely 
excluded from the Egyptian market, they accumulated wealth in the markets of Arab 
                                                           
28 This thesis will dig into official reports from IMF and World Bank on Egypt, as well as independent 
organisations and existing secondary sources, to highlight the counterrevolutionary terms  of  neoliberalisation, 
and the counterrevolutionary contentions that the Egyptian ruling elite took in that pursuit. See, for instance, 
IMF press release (2006), ‘Statement by the IMF Mission on the 2006 Article IV Consultation with the Arab 
Republic of Egypt’, as well as other revealing reports by IMF mission to Egypt (2008) and IMF Executive 
Board conclusion (2010).  
29 See S. Heydemann (2004) and S.J. King (2009), who explore how the new neoliberal structures did 
not alter the privileged and exclusionary economic position of the military elite. 
30 To explore this overlap between two counterrevolutionary contenders (member and challenger), this 
thesis will synthesise findings from a wide range of literature on neoliberalism in Egypt. As a starting point, see, 
for instance, Timothy Mitchel’s acute analysis of the contradictions of neoliberalism under Mubarak (1991). A 
more recent and timely study was conducted by Shana Marshall and Joshua Stacher (2012) on the army’s 
commercial interests and control of economic structures in Egypt, and how this ‘Military, Inc.’, as Robert 
Springborg (2011) famously named it, undermines revolutionary prospects.  
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conservative monarchies. This wealth became crucial for the conservative contender to 
mobilise, expanding its support base and loyalty across Egypt. The thesis will then trace the 
evolving role of the Muslim Brotherhood’s counterrevolution which culminated in T4. 
Although the conservative contendership was never reducible to the Muslim Brotherhood 
(there were numerous other organisations and groups), but the Brotherhood was historically 
more resourceful and popular. Hence, focusing on the Brotherhood is sufficient for the 
analytic purposes of this thesis. As for the military and business elite, the anti-status quo pan-
Arabist populism no longer served the new economic module. Instead, they resorted to 
patronage and neo-patrimonialism, and invested in already existing coercive intelligence and 
security institutions.31  
 
4.1.4 T4 – Episode of Intensification (2011-2013) 
Each period saw a degree of intensification which affected the polity and its members. 
However, from the perspective of revolution, the intensification of 2011 has been the most 
effective and thus more illuminating to the study of intensive forms of counterrevolution and 
revolution. In this eventful period, the position of contenders changed rapidly. Alas, the 
constellation that took place in the polity eventually led to the reproduction of the same 
exclusionary structures. Despite momentary victories for revolution through changes in 
constitution, laws and policies, and the crude force of democratic mass mobilisation, 
counterrevolution eventually restored a stricter neoliberal authoritarian polity. This process 
included not only counterrevolutionary polity members (military and neoliberal elite), but 
also saw conservative challengers, most notoriously the Muslim Brotherhood, actively 
contending for an alternative counterrevolutionary order.  
 From the perspective of revolution, the efforts of previous contenders culminated into 
effective and mutually exclusive demands: ‘al-shaab yurid isqat al-nizam’ (the people want 
to topple the regime). Millions of Egyptians took to the streets, and long-established networks 
of solidary through mostly passive revolution – be it syndicates, civil society organisations, 
women-led organisations, political and social activists, among others, facilitated, in a matter 
of days, the emergence of revolutionary committees and movements. All of those challengers 
                                                           
31 See Bou Nassif (2015) on the use of security structures formed under Nasser for the protection of 
neoliberal polity. Also, see Bou Nassif (2013) on the ‘second careers’ and business privileges that the military 
elite received under neoliberalism. 
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consolidated their resources under one unifying demand, ‘bread, freedom, and social justice’. 
Along with the mutually exclusive demands, the size of the mobilisation, and the enormous 
amount of resources utilised for it, especially newly found communication and media tools, 
are indicative of revolutionary intensification. It wasn’t long, though, before incumbent 
counterrevolutionary contenders flexed their muscles, exercising their monopoly of violence 
and securing an intensification of counterrevolution.  
In T4, previously unaccounted contentions in passive times surface and dominate 
social relations. For instance, gender contentions which focus on the inclusion of women 
become more pressing and salient in episodes of intensification. This thesis will address 
illuminating cases related to women’s role in politics, to reflect on how the struggle against 
exclusionary patriarchy, which is often unnoticed in passive times, surfaces during 
intensification, and intersects with other revolutionary struggles.  
The systematic exclusion of women from economic and political participation, as well 
as imposing limits on their mobility, behaviour, legal and hereditary rights among other 
limitations, have been part and parcel of counterrevolutionary projects, be it that of the 
military establishment or the conservative alternative. During T4, this thesis will address the 
revolutionary role of women. On the other hand, it will account for the counterrevolutionary 
attempts to fend off such calls for gender inclusivity, by either defending exclusionary order 
under the auspices of patriarchal military establishment or advancing a more exclusionary 
one through religious conservative contenders. For this purpose, this thesis will resort to data 
published by local and international NGOs on women’s rights and assaults on women 
protestors during this period. 32  
Similarly, the study of this timeframe will highlight the relevant counterrevolutionary 
and revolutionary contentions to the Coptic community. The unifying demand of revolution 
appealed to segments of the Coptic community, who joined different revolutionary groups 
and stood against the exploitation of their religious minority status by a long-standing 
dictator. Alas, a survey of the military’s relations with Coptic business and religious elites 
reveals the recurring instrumentalisation of sectarianism to divide and delegitimise 
revolutionary demands.  
                                                           
32 Sufficient data for the analysis of women-focused organisation in T4’s RCR context is accessible 
online through the Egyptian centre of Women’s rights, Harras Map, Imprint Movement, I saw Harassment, I 
wish Campaign, Operation Anti Sexual Harassment (OpAntiSH), Sexual Harassment Action Group, and Tahrir 
Bodyguard, among others. 
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As theorised in Chapter 2, counterrevolutionary contenders often resort to sectarian, 
ethnic, and tribal identities to divert subjects of counterrevolution from realising their 
common interests in revolution – hence reproducing and legitimising exclusionary structures. 
This strategy is most salient in the case of minorities. In general, counterrevolutionary ruling 
elites present their exclusionary polity to minorities as a necessary and indispensable bargain 
for their survival. By incorporating some of the minority elites who accepted the bargain (and 
punishing those who did not), the counterrevolutionary elites suggest to minorities that this 
arrangement is their best shot at accessing the polity. Any alternative polity type, so to speak, 
would lead to their exclusion by the majority sect or ethnicity.   
 This is clearly reflected in the relationship between the ruling elite in Egypt and the 
Coptic community. On the other hand, conservative counterrevolutionary challengers, which 
emerge from the ‘majority’ sect or ethnicity, exploit the ruling elite’s bargain with minorities 
to exacerbate sectarian/ethnic division and, consequently, legitimise their alternative 
counterrevolutionary project. This minority-based contention becomes more aggressively 
fought during intensification by the two powerful counterrevolutionary contenders, 
incumbent military elite and conservative-religious challengers. In tandem with this, 
revolutionary groups seek to undermine both divisive counterrevolutionaries by negating 
their demands through a unifying and all-inclusive demand, transcending sects and 
ethnicities, and centralising the question of unconditional or unbiased inclusivity.  
The Coptic community in Egypt has been constantly faced with these contending 
demands, and its elite played a revealing role in counterrevolution and revolution, particularly 
during their intensification in 2011.33 Using news archives, public statements of polity 
members, protestors’ chants, statements of Coptic religious and business elites, social media 
among other diverse secondary sources, this thesis will highlight how questions of inclusion 
and exclusion of Copts surfaced during counterrevolutionary and revolutionary 
intensification.  
 Last but not least, the study of intensification will focus on labour politics. Although 
labour politics is the focus of the study throughout the thesis, given its central and traditional 
role in revolution, the study of its intensification in 2011 is of particular importance. The 
                                                           
33 Several key and recent sources on Coptic relations with the Egyptian state will be useful to set the 
grounds for analysis. See, for instance, S. W. Hibbard (2011) on Egypt’s legacy of sectarianism and M. Tadros’s 
revealing account of sectarianism in post-Mubarak Egypt and the challenges of building inclusive polity in 
Egypt from a sectarian perspective (2011 and 2013). 
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labour movement is consistent with the definition of revolution: a call for more inclusive 
ownership of, or control over, productive resources. Over the period of T1, T2, and T3, 
counterrevolutionary elites have learned and mastered strategies to balance class interests and 
pacify revolutionary working class mobilisations. Populist authoritarian elites incorporated 
labour organisations in state-controlled nationalist structures, thus turning class contentions 
into national mobilisation on the side of the national capitalists. Then, neoliberal contenders 
used patronage and neo-patrimonial networks, coercive security agencies, and sectarian 
tensions, to undermine labour revolutionary unity and solidarity. Despite state oppression and 
co-optation of labour mobilisation throughout history, organic efforts constantly led to the 
(re-)emergence of independent labour organisations in defiance of increasingly capitalist 
structures.34 
 This rocky but continuous revolutionary role of organic labour organisation is most 
evident during intensification. In counterrevolutionary intensification, the exclusion of labour 
from the polity rises to the surface of political debate, even in official statements, such as that 
of Military General Mahmoud Mansour live on Egypt’s ON TV channel on February 15, 
2016: ‘Working people should not discuss or criticise the government. People’s role is to 
labour’ (Moktar and Wahba 2002).  
Yet, labour played a crucial role in this intensification. Few years prior to 2011 
intensification, four independent unions were formed for real-estate tax collectors, teachers, 
and health technicians (Ramadan and Adly 2015). However, at the time, the Ministry of 
Manpower denied them legal recognition. During the revolutionary intensification of 2011, 
the workers breached the state-controlled ETUF’s legal monopoly on labour organisation and 
established the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), which was the 
first over-arching labour structure to emerge from the revolutionary intensification (Beinin 
2012: 1). Following EFITU, hundreds of new and independent unions were formed, 
successfully mobilising for a higher minimum wage (ibid.).  
 This thesis will link those contentions with the responses of counterrevolutionaries, be 
it in the laws they drafted to curb labour activity or the co-optation tactics on the ground.  
                                                           
34 This section of the thesis will make use of informative secondary sources on the history of labour 
politics in Egypt, which will provide the numbers and the cases to illuminate the continuity of labour 
contentions. See, for instance, Beinin (1987; 2007; 2012; 2013),  Alexandre (2014), Marfleet (2016),  Shenker 
(2016), and  De Smet (2014). 
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4. Research Limitations 
This research explores how counterrevolution and revolution continued throughout history, in 
changing circumstances and polities. It, therefore, adopts a wide domain. This naturally 
compromises its nuance and details. It does not address all aspects of counterrevolution and 
revolution which, as Chapter 2 theorised, manifest themselves in contentions made by a 
number of contenders over various types of resources, from the smallest workplace to 
strategic assemblies in public squares. Instead, it draws on larger trends of contentions and 
contenders (in timeframes listed in the previous section) which allow for sufficient 
examination of the validity and utility of the theoretical argument. 
This means that this thesis will overlook relevant historical data, particularly 
innumerable contentions in passive times and possibly several episodes of intensifications. 
However, this does not compromise the quality of this research, because the question is not 
about measuring the extent to which intensification reoccur, or the number of contentions in a 
given time. Any amount of evidence, or manifestation of continuous, inter-related and 
evolving counterrevolution and revolution over this long period under study suffices this 
research question. 
Due to security concerns, and after the despicable murder of fellow PhD student, 
Giulio Regeni, during his field trip to Egypt, my department has advised against fieldwork in 
Egypt. Given that I study counterrevolution, I reckon that the current Egyptian regime is 
systematically terrorising local and foreign researchers who seek to document elements of the 
Egyptian revolution, or attempt to make sense of the counterrevolution. This reckoning made 
it difficult for me to simply ‘avoid Egypt’. I saw it as a betrayal to Regeni himself, and to the 
thousands of heroic Egyptian women and men who faced a brutal regime, which I witnessed 
first-hand in my last trip to Cairo in 2012. I am aware that my inability to conduct field 
research have compromised the originality of my data. However, I worked with available 
resources to produce what I hope is a sufficiently rich empirical examination of my 





5. Ethical and Security Considerations 
As illustrated in previous sections of this chapter, the bulk of the data required and selected 
for this research is already available and accessible, which largely minimises the risk of 
confidentiality. However, this research required conducting mostly informal interviews to 
verify some of the data found in diverse sources, particularly on the sample of privileged 
network. Given that I was unable to travel to Egypt for security reasons, I also resorted to 
informal interviews with great Egyptian friends inside and outside Egypt via their preferred 
mean, email or Skype, to discuss and authenticate my arguments on Egypt. 
 For those interviews, I approached participants with ethical considerations and 
extreme security precautions. Participation in interviews was completely voluntary, and 
individuals who chose to decline or drop out were comfortably allowed to do so without 
incurring any cost. Participants were informed beforehand, even in informal interviews, that 
the questions asked are for the purpose of verifying existing data for academic research. All 
participants were briefed on my academic background, the reason why they’re being 
interviewed, and the ways in which the information they provided will be used. In summary, 
interviews were conducted with the informed consent of the participants.  
 As for security considerations, participants were granted the right to privacy with 
regard to not only their identity – the right to anonymity, but also the right to decide what 
information they were willing to make public during or after the study. All means of 
telecommunication were either encrypted, or anonymised. Given that most of the useful 
information gathered from those interviews were about verifying existing data or 
speculations, I avoided mentioning names or even pseudonyms altogether. Therefore, 
individual safety was prioritised over credibility, making sure that I avoid putting anyone at 
any level of risk, ensuring that it is impossible to 1) identify participants and 2) identify 
information provided by these interviews.  
Equally important is the ethical consideration given towards public figures and 
individuals mentioned in this research (particularly in the sample of privileged network). To 
the best of my knowledge, none of information provided or the names mentioned as part of 
the privileged network, or anywhere else in this thesis, infringe the rights of anyone directly 
or indirectly, or put any individual or a group at risk. For instance, even when mentioning 
wealth, privileges or business/marital ties amongst elite, the information involved in such a 
study was not initially made confidential by the involved subject. Indeed, I resorted to 
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interviews to confirm some of these connections, but the initial data of business and marital 
ties is not confidential. Last but not least, the arguments presented in this thesis are not 
intended to appeal, directly or indirectly, to racist or bigoted practices and discourses. It does 




This chapter has laid out a new method of studying counterrevolution and revolution, as 
defined and theorised in Chapter 2. This new method is concerned with scrutinising 
counterrevolution and revolution in history, and tracing their relational continuity in passive 
and intensive times. Given the importance of continuity and evolution to the research 
question, any method of answering this question should require a wide domain. For that 
purpose, the central aim of this method is to cover a wide temporal domain with sufficient 
rigour, by dividing a long period of history into timeframes based on revealing changes in the 
polity, and devising a method of unearthing counterrevolution and revolution vis-à-vis those 
changes. This thesis has also highlighted the importance of studying counterrevolution and 
revolution in passive and intensive times. Therefore, this method has chosen a timeframe 
focused on an illuminating case of intensification, while others cover a longer period of 
passive and intensive contentions. 
 This thesis also emphasises the extension of counterrevolution and revolution beyond 
the single polity, through international structures, contenders, and contentions. Consequently, 
this chapter’s methodology illustrated a mechanism of not only mapping counterrevolution 
and revolution inside a polity, but linking its most dominant contentions to powerful and 
involved international actors and transnational resource structures. After explaining how 
counterrevolution and revolution can be studied in wider domains, this chapter introduced the 
case study, Egypt, and briefly set out its four timeframes and changes in its spatial domain. 
The following chapter begins the case study, covering its first timeframe (1804-1952), which, 





CHAPTER 4  
 
THE BEGINNING OF MODERN COUNTERREVOLUTION AND 




This chapter examines the earliest phase of modern counterrevolution and revolution in Egypt, 1804-
1952. Chapter 2 defined ‘modern counterrevolution and revolution’ as contentions centred around 
capitalist development and modern statehood; and it advanced the assumption that the most 
significant and over-arching contentions in a capitalist setting typically represent class interests. These 
contentions consist not only of televised momentary outbursts, such as large-scale anti-austerity 
protests; they also include passive and silent forms of contention such as changes in taxation, tariffs, 
and government budgets; and local petitions against a corrupt governor. Chapter 2 argued the 
importance of studying both momentary outbursts (which this thesis has defined as ‘episodes of 
intensification’) and passive contentions. 
While a narrower timeframe might suffice to demonstrate the relationship of modern 
counterrevolution and revolution to contentions over resource access, it would not enable an 
exploration of their continuity and inter-related evolution. As Chapter 3 argued, what is needed is an 
examination that starts with the early beginnings of capitalist development when contentions are still 
largely pre-modern, and then traces how these contentions evolve over time as classes develop and 
become politically organised. This will enable us to identify episodes of intensification, as defined in 
Chapter 2, examine the changes that these episodes produced with respect to both counterrevolution 
and revolution, and trace them as they continue afterwards in evolved forms.  
In the case of Egypt, modern counterrevolution begins with the systemic concentration of 
large strips of agricultural land in the hands of an aristocratic class at the expense of the peasant 
majority, beginning under Khedive Muhammad Ali. Ali was an ambitious Albanian commander in the 
Ottoman army who became the governor of Ottoman Egypt at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, and exploited the declining Ottoman central government to create for himself an empire 
based in Egypt. In his pursuit of independence from the Ottoman Empire, Ali redirected Egyptian 
trade away from the Ottoman empire and towards the West, and, in the process, restructured Egypt’s 
resource access in a manner that enriched his own entourage. The state seized all produce at low 
prices and sold them to Western markets. Gradually, the West-oriented economy was reduced to the 
export of a single crop: cotton. The cotton business and new taxes on peasant land funded a costly 
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modern army amassed from Egypt’s rural villages and commanded mostly by loyal Ottoman officials. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the great majority of Egypt’s peasantry were either landless or 
land-poor, while a new class of large landowners emerged and would remain the dominant 
counterrevolutionary class until the coup and subsequent land reform of 1952 (Beinin and Lockman 
1987: 8). In the second half of the nineteenth century, large landowners evolved to become an 
organised and conscious class, represented in political parties and in commercial enterprises that 
gradually became integrated into world capitalist market. In parallel, revolution is represented in the 
gradual emergence of the Egyptian labour movement which, by the turn of the century, evolved into a 
self-conscious working class and became represented in political parties and labour organisations. 
This chapter will focus on the following major contentions which emerged in this context and 
which represented the beginning of modern counterrevolution and revolution: 
 
1) The establishment of an absolute monarchy. 
2) Granting exclusive ownership of large swaths of land to a small group of aristocrats 
3) Excluding the majority of peasants from access to and control of land, through increased 
tax burdens, forced corvée labour, and conscription 
4) Excluding small and medium tradesmen and craftsmen from meaningful economic 
activity 
5) The emergence of an Egyptian feudal classes. 
6) The gradual takeover of the Egyptian state by the French and British 
7) The emergence of the nationalist struggle 
 
The first section will explain the beginning of modern counterrevolution, focussing on how 
and why, under a new dynasty, a small minority managed to take control of most of Egypt’s cultivated 
land. The second section will discuss the establishment of structural privileges which allowed 
European entities to become active contenders in the Egyptian polity and, thus, to play a role in 
modern counterrevolution and revolution. The third section will introduce modern revolution, 
highlighting its earliest manifestations and its evolution via-a-vis counterrevolution. The fourth 
section covers the emergence of the nationalist contender, situating the new contender in the context 
of modern counterrevolution and revolution. Then, the fifth section surveys the evolution of 
counterrevolution and revolution during the interwar period, before connecting their evolution with 
the post-WWII intensification in the sixth section.  
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The evolution of modern counterrevolution and revolution, this chapter will argue, was the 
result, not only of Muhammad Ali’s policies: international developments –  most notably the British 
occupation of Egypt after 1882 intensification, the world wars, and the cold war – influenced 
counterrevolution and revolution. It will show how ideological trends representing 
international/regional counterrevolutionary and revolutionary contentions crystallised in post-WWII 
Egypt and intensified thereafter until the coup of 1952. The chapter concludes, therefore, by showing 
how post-WWII intensification led to the military coup of 1952, emphasising the continuity and 
evolution of both counterrevolution and revolution up until – and after – the ‘revolutionary’ coup.  
 
2. The Beginning of Modern Counterrevolution 
Ali exploited land, agricultural produce, and labour, in the service of his imperial project.  
He was actively seeking to expand and ‘colonise’ land in Western Arabia, Syria, and Sudan. This 
required a large and modern standing army, which Egypt’s pre-industrial resource structures could not 
provide. Therefore, Muhammad Ali secured the necessary capital by monopolising cotton trade and 
acquiring European loans (al-Gritly 1937: 97).  
 Whatever new industries Muhammad Ali and his entourage established did not produce 
enough surplus and did not last past his death, unable to compete with European industries, and short 
on skilled labour and machinery. With the failure of industrialisation, Egypt was gradually 
transformed into a single-crop export economy tailored to the demands of the European market and 
increasingly burdened by debt. The attempted leap from a subsistence to a complex economy had 
failed, and cotton remained the main beneficiary of the government's investment (Issawi 1961: 7). All 
other sectors of the economy, such as transport, commerce, and finance, had as their main function to 
maximise the returns on the cotton trade (Richards 1977: 17). Between 1840 and 1860, Egyptian 
cotton exports increased by 300 percent. Capitalising on the cotton boom during the American Civil 
War, cotton cultivation in Egypt increased almost fourfold (Davis 1983: 18). 
In order to increase the volume of cotton production, Ali and his successor, Khedive Ismail, 
turned over large swaths of land to members of the ruling family, Turko-Circassian notables and 
former officers, and Egypt’s rural notables.35 By 1858, large landholders were able to register private 
ownership of taxable land, and, consequently, labour became a mobile, marketable commodity 
(Issawi 1961: 7). Peasants who managed to keep hold of cultivated land were forced to sell their crops 
                                                           
35 The distinction between state and khedival land was not always made (indeed, khedival lands were 
used as collateral for large European loans made to Egypt); consequently, it would not have seemed irregular to 
use on khedival estates labour gathered by the state administrative apparatus (Brown 1993: 121). 
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to the government at low fixed prices, which the government then sold to Europe for greater profit 
(Crouchley 1938: 5).  
Under Ismail (1863-1879), the state’s profitable export was no longer able to cover the 
growing imperial and large infrastructural projects. A prominent case is the Suez canal project, where 
Ismail was pressured into purchasing the unsold shares of the canal, entailing the first debt on the 
Egyptian finances (Marsot 1975: 91). Peasants were paying the lion’s share of the increasing debt 
service, with peasant land tax remaining significantly higher than estate tax. As the size of the foreign 
debt grew, taxes on peasants were increased further in an effort to meet the payments. Between 1865 
and 1868, taxes were increased by 70 percent, which forced many peasants to give away their land 
and further concentrated land in the hands of large landowners (Beinin 2001: 52). Those who lost 
their land were either forced into corvée labour on agricultural expansion projects or conscripted and 
paid low wages in the army.  
Therefore, we can say that the beginning of counterrevolution is reflected in the change in 
peasants’ positions vis-à-vis strategic resource (land): a shift in their status from independent 
producers with rights to use the land and economic decision-making power, to being landless 
labourers forced to work as wage-labourers or to migrate to the cities where they became part of the 
‘urban dispossessed’.36 The beneficiaries, on the other hand, of modern counterrevolution are 
aristocratic and notable families who accumulated wealth through the concentration of land 
ownership. Some came directly from Khedive’s circles, and others emerged from the bureaucracy 
which ran the economic affairs of rural villages.  
This early beginning of modern counterrevolution in Egypt is illustrated in figure 2.1, below, 
which applies to this period the conceptualisation of the polity setting presented in Chapter 2. The 
circle on the left shows a simplified map of the Egyptian polity prior to Muhammad Ali’s takeover. Its 
inner circle represents the Mamluk polity, with its members: (1) Mamluk and Ottoman officers, and 
(2) clerical and rural elites. Contender (3) represents the majority of the Egyptian population: a 
scattered and unorganised peasantry who were mostly subjected to corvée labour by contenders (1) 
and (2), but still had routine access to some of the land and its produce – thus in close proximity to the 
polity but not included in it.  
Then, between 1805 and the 1830s, Muhammad Ali’s policies pushed the Egyptian peasantry 
– represented in contender 4 – away from land, as mentioned above. Land then became increasingly 
concentrated in the hands of Turco-Circassian Mamluk notables (contender 1), rural notables who ran 
the expanding bureaucracy (contender 2), and Ali and his family (contender 3). Despite the 
consolidation of Muhammad Ali’s power, Egypt remained a province of the Ottoman Empire, and 
                                                           
36 See Tucker (1979) for a detailed account of this transformation in the life of Egyptian peasants. 
 75 
Ottoman agreements and jurisprudence remained binding. Therefore, the outer circle of the polity 
represented, not Egypt per se, but over-arching Ottoman laws and institutions. In the background, 
European powers (5) began to influence trade and economic patterns, and their role as external actors 









The Beginning of Modern Counterrevolution in Egypt’s Polity (Figure 2.1) 
 
The following section expands on the rise of those polity members (1) and (2) who, between 
1805 and the 1830s, became an effective counterrevolutionary force in Egypt, up until 1952.   
 
2.1 The Turko-Egyptian Landowning Class 
Muhammad ‘Ali developed a modern administrative apparatus which, by connecting rural villages 
with the central government, worked to shore up and extend his power and enable him to more 
effectively exploit Egypt’s material and human resources. Provincial administrators and tax collectors, 
often drawn from the ranks of rural notables ‘’umda’ or village elderly ‘shaykh’ (Davis 1983: 15-20), 
facilitated direct revenue collection, the mobilisation of rural peasants and their allocation to various 
agricultural and development projects.  
Indeed, village ‘umdas and shaykhs had held a privileged position in the pre-modern Egyptian 
polity. However, the expansion of the Egyptian state bureaucracy granted them more power over rural 
subjects and resources. The beginning of modern counterrevolution is then also represented in the 
increasing power of rural notables, and their abuse of their new powers to grant themselves and their 
families wealth and private ownership of large parts of rural land. Rural notables extracted bribes 
from peasants to exempt them from conscription or corvée (Richards 1977: 36). They also 
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appropriated the lands of those who failed to pay their taxes or fled conscription (Baer 1969: 52). 
Gradually, they became part of a larger Turko-Egyptian landowning class, consisting mostly of 
Pashas, ‘umdas, and shaykhs – former Turko-Circassian officers, Egyptian notables, and village 
leaders.  
With an increase in trade with Europe came European pressure on Egypt to open up its local 
market to competition. Despite the large landowners’ resistance, this important change in resource 
structures was imposed on Egypt through trade agreements between the Ottoman government and 
European powers. The following section explains how foreign capital and entities became a privileged 
contender in the Egyptian polity. 
 
2.2 European Contenders 
Since the beginning of his reign, Muhammad Ali struggled to get the support of European powers, 
who were largely against destabilising the Ottoman regional status quo, which already secured British 
trade routes to India and helped to maintain the balance of power in Europe. The survival of the 
Ottoman Empire was important for Britain, as a bulwark to Russian expansion which would endanger 
Britain’s hold on India, as well as (along with France) a concern that the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire would intensify the European competition over its resources and, consequently, upset the 
balance of power in Europe. Letters and articles written by involved British diplomats at the time 
reaffirms this interest, and suggests a European belief at the time, in the ability of the weakened 
empire to be reformed and integrated into European markets (Lamb 1993: 243). Therefore, when Ali 
marched his army into southern Anatolia in December 1832, and the Sultan called upon Russia for 
military support, Britain (and also France) intervened to bring about the withdrawal of Ali’s troops 
(Lawson 1988: 403). Britain, on the other hand, was more concerned with Ali’s monopolisation of 
Egypt’s market. The Sultan thought that, by granting the Europeans their economic demands, he could 
secure, in return, their support and, indirectly, weaken Ali’s monopoly on Egypt’s resources. 
This came to fruition in 1838, when the British and the Ottomans signed The Balta Liman 
trade agreement which abolished monopolies across the Empire, decreased tariffs and granted British 
merchants significant advantages in local trade (Demirbas 2015: 240). For instance, British merchants 
were exempted from paying any duty when carrying on local business, while Ottoman traders had to 
pay 8 percent duty. Within three years, the treaty was signed by eight other European countries, 
providing them with similar commercial privileges.37 Bound by the Anglo-Ottoman trade agreement, 
Ali had no choice but to succumb to the agreement, open up Egypt to European imports, and loosen 
                                                           
 37 It is worth noting, however, that capitulation treaties granting European commercial concessions in 
the Ottoman Empire date back to the sixteenth century, but did not come at the expense of the local big 
merchants.  
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his monopolistic control of Egypt’s resources (Demirbas 2015: 243). He was compelled, as well, to 
reduce his armed forces in 1841, following the intervention of European powers to end his occupation 
of Syria, and this put an end to his territorial ambitions in the Ottoman Empire. Following the 
conclusion of this treaty, Egypt was integrated, ‘as an agricultural unit’ into the capitalist economic 
system (Issawi 1961: 8). European businesses and entrepreneurs accumulated enormous wealth in the 
banking and financial sectors that expanded under Ismail. Other European businesses accumulated 
wealth using pre-capitalist conditions, mainly forced and unwaged labour (Richards 1977: 5).   
Despite fluctuating income from cotton trade, the Khedive continued spending enormous 
resources on imperial and infrastructural projects, and the aristocratic class continued to exhaust state 
budget on lavish events.  The continuity of both became increasingly dependent on European loans, 
which in turn gradually invited European involvement in decision and policy making in Egypt. 
Remaining restrictions for foreigners were removed, facilitating foreign investment in Egyptian 
agriculture by means of mortgage and other loans. Additionally, the establishment of the Mixed 
Courts in 1875 institutionalised ‘a legal framework that gave foreigners the widest measure of rights’ 
(Issawi 1961: 9).  
 By the mid-nineteenth century, modern counterrevolution in Egypt became represented not 
only by the Khedive’s exclusionary polity, but, additionally, by 1) European encroachment catering 
for European financial interests and 2) growing nationalist challenge led by disenfranchised notables 
and military elite affected by European control of resource structures. The previous sections have 
shown how counterrevolutionary contentions of Khedive and European powers increasingly excluded 
the majority of the native Egyptian population – peasants, craftsmen, small and medium merchants 
and business owners – from reaping the rewards of economic activity or owning their labour. The 
following section will expand on the emergence a third counterrevolutionary force, the nationalist 
contender. It will discuss its evolution vis-à-vis the developments discussed earlier, and conclude on 
its counterrevolutionary nature.  
 
2.3 The Emergence of Counterrevolutionary Nationalist Contenders in the 19th Century 
Between 1840s and 1870s, Britain and France became increasingly involved in decision and policy 
making in Egypt, be it through European commissions with executive power or through the litigations 
of Mixed Tribunals. This was the direct outcome of unsustainable debt levels incurred by the 
Egyptian government. This unavoidably undermined the authority of the Khedive, and, by the late 
1870s, it provoked segments of the elite who felt threatened or restricted by European encroachment 
into Egypt’s political and economic affairs. This was evident in the military academies, where 
European decision-makers reduced military expenditure, lowering pay and benefits, retiring 
prominent officers, and replacing them with British officers (Vatikiotis 1980: 129). Alongside 
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disenfranchised military offices, different segments of the Egyptian society – Egyptian notables and 
landowners, ministers, journalists, intellectuals and religious elites, and other urban groups – whose 
routine access to state resources was gradually diminishing because of European encroachment, began 
organising mostly in secret societies with different strands, but with a rather unified demand: 
structural reform that restores “Egyptian” control over resources in Egypt. This also meant that 
Egyptians should take the initiative in financial debt relief, without resorting to foreign advice and 
command.  
By 1879, resourceful contenders – civil and military – were mobilised for a struggle against 
European control. The new Khedive, Tawfiq (1879-1892), attempted to restore administrative order – 
with the assistance of European advisors – by adopting fiscal and economic reforms demanded by 
Europeans as a way to ease the debt crisis. This included abolishing forced labour schemes, and 
reforming taxation system. Such reforms catalysed greater opposition from Egyptian notables and 
landowners, given that these reforms worked against their own economic interests. The opposition 
was largely framed in nationalist terms; accusing the Khedive of succumbing to European demands. 
In this context, nationalist civil and military challengers were increasingly co-ordinating action. By 
1880, secret meetings were being held between anti-Khedive army officers and notable figures 
(Vatikiotis 1980: 143). Their meetings culminated in a Manifesto (known as Manifesto of 4 
November), which accentuated proposals that contradicted European policy recommendations, and 
demanded autonomy and freedom from European control (ibid.). It also manifested itself in alliances 
and groupings which emerged and died out at different stages of this intensifying power struggle.   
The most effective among those contenders was a group of rebellious military officers, led by 
Ahmed ‘Urabi, which, in 1881, was close to acceding to power after a series of political victories and 
forced concessions from European powers and the Khedive. The ‘Urabist military challenger was able 
to play out tensions between European powers, the Khedive, and the Ottoman government, until 
‘Urabi’s position in the Egyptian state became an existential threat to the financial interests of Britain 
and France. In 1882, Britain and France forced ‘Urabists out of the government, and triggered nation-
wide violence between Egyptian and European residents. ‘Urabi claimed to be leading a ‘national 
struggle for liberation’, mobilising troops and civilian activists through the funds and resources of 
segments of the notables and land-owners.38 The eruption of full-scale rebellion invited British 
military intervention, which eventually contained the rebellion and left long-lasting scars in the 
memory of Egyptians. These memories, lessons, and scars, were crucial to the evolution of the 
nationalist contender later on, culminating in the Nasserist takeover in 1956.  
The Orabi-led intensification was the first of its kind in modern Egypt, centred around 
nationalist demands. It was led by notables and military officers, but it enjoyed wide-spread support. 
                                                           
38 See Cole 1993 and Scholch 1981.  
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Although it called for Egyptians to own Egyptian resources, it did not necessarily advance an 
inclusionary claim of ownership or access. Given that the intensification was only possible through 
the resources of wealthy aristocrats and politically ambitious military figures, it is unlikely that 
resource distribution, even if and when returned to Egyptian control, was on their agenda. Therefore, 
it is sensible to suggest that the earliest forms of nationalist contendership in the 19th century paved 
the way for the emergence of resourceful counterrevolutionary nationalist contenders in the 20th 
century, whose ability to mobilise large segments of the working class blurred its 
counterrevolutionary project. 
On the other hand, the beginning of modern revolution is represented in the early forms of 
resistance to the new exclusionary structures of the khedive. Taking that into consideration, the 
following section studies the beginning of modern revolution in Egypt by tracing the early responses 
of labour to forced and systemic exclusion by both, the Turco-Egyptian landowning class and 
European capital. 
 
3. The Beginning of Modern Revolution 
Peasants faced transformations in their access to land (the most strategic resource at the time) 
beginning with Muhammad Ali’s counterrevolutionary policies mentioned earlier, and continuing 
through the policies of his successors. As we have seen, peasants were the first to experience 
exclusion due to modern counterrevolution, and thus were the first to contend it. But these early 
contentions were largely ineffective, restricted by pre-capitalist paternal relations with families and 
village notables. Although they were often abused by their village notables even before the 
privatisation of land, their exploited labour then was not mobile, and hence helped develop their own 
villages and benefitted their own families. But Ali and his successors redefined the role and position 
of peasants. With shaykh’s mediation, peasants were conscripted for both corvée labour in agricultural 
projects across the country, and military service. This forced labour system continued to be resisted in 
pre-modern and ineffective ways. Peasants frequently disobeyed orders and disrupted production, but, 
without the resources to stand their grounds, they were crushed easily time and again.39 Others fled to 
the cities looking for jobs in industries or even to Syria, where they were granted refuge by Ali’s 
enemy, ‘Abdallah of Akkah (Richards 1977: 23).  
 At the turn of the century, modern revolution began to evolve among the urban pockets of 
industrial workers, galvanised by the resources of European labour. The skilled European migrant 
labour which industrial development in Egypt invited brought with it experience in trade unionism, 
                                                           
 39 A series of revolts were recorded as early as 1812, when the grain crop was seized for the first time 
by the government. Most revolts were crushed violently. For more on early peasant revolts, see Richards (1977: 
22).  
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socialism and syndicalism (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 37). Consequently, European workers played 
an early and leading role in mobilising industrial workers for modern revolutionary contentions in 
Egypt. The more Egyptians migrated to the cities and joined the wage-earning industrial workforce, 
the more they interacted with foreign labour and, gradually, began forming associations and 
organising collective action.40  
 Figure 3, below, illustrates these changes in the Egyptian polity. Contenders (1) and (2), large 
landowners and rural notables, largely contended for the same class interests and so together formed a 
broader aristocratic landowning class. In the polity which existed from the 1830s to 1900s, they are 
represented as (a single) contender/polity member (2), while the khedive and his entourage are 
represented as contender/polity member (1). External actor (3) represents, not only British troops and 
the British government, but, also the increasingly influential foreign capital and businesses which 
became an effective force particularly after the implementation of foreign capitulations in the 1840s. 
They are placed outside the limits of Egyptian-Ottoman jurisprudence (outer circle), given their 
extraterritorial rights protected by special courts inside Egypt. They are ‘linked’ to polity member (1) 
mainly through the flow of foreign capital into government-led development projects, in the form of 
loans and financial agreements. Modern revolution begins to emerge with peasants (4), albeit, in 
reality, their contentions were dispersed and thus do not amount to a coherent bloc. However, modern 
revolution evolved through contenders (5) and (6), which represent the urban coordination between 
Egyptian and foreign industrial workers. 
 
 
The Evolution of Modern Counterrevolution and Revolution (Figure 3) 
                                                           




 By 1903, at least eight workers’ associations were formed, mainly under Greek, Italian and 
Armenian leadership (Al-Ghazzali 1968: 26). Although Egyptian workers did lead contentions for 
better pay and working conditions as early as 1900 in, for instance, al-Ahliyah Spinning and Weaving 
Company in Alexandria, their contentions remained largely ineffective. Strikes led and attended by 
European workers were more effective and better organised, which reflects the differences in 
experience and accessible resources (Beinin 1981: 16). Another factor which contributed to making 
these contentions ineffective was the pre-capitalist structures of early Egyptian labour associations – 
such as the Manual Trades Workers’ Union (MTWU), which bundled non-wage labourers, small 
property owners, and employers, and some associations refused members on the basis of religion and 
nationality (De Smet 2016: 123).  
The rise of nationalism helped sustain such broad organisations, because it homogenised the 
various social strata’s perceptions of exclusion by the British authorities who, in 1882, occupied 
Egypt. Peasants, industrial workers, as well as small business owners, tradesmen, skilled craftsmen 
and wage workers in low-level white collar jobs perceived themselves, and were increasingly 
perceived by others, as an undifferentiated mass of workers, ‘al-‘ummal’, which broadly faced the 
same structures of exclusion (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 6). This loosely defined labour image 
became central to the anti-colonial configuration of a national identity, and helped blur the lines 
between the emerging counterrevolutionary nationalist project led by conservative large landowners 
and the revolutionary labour movement.  
 
As we shall see in the next section, the nationalist contenders co-opted labour organisation, 
which then served counterrevolutionary nationalism over transnational labour solidarity. Yet, at the 
same time, it will show how access to nationalist resources helped the labour movement evolve and 
mature politically, eventually breaking with bourgeois nationalism and forming independent 
revolutionary contenders. 
 
4. Counterrevolutionary Nationalist Contenders at the Turn of the Century 
A decade after Britain crushed the ‘Urabi revolt and took control of Egypt in 1882, a segment of the 
intellectual and highly skilled middle class built on earlier lessons and led a national struggle for 
independence (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 66). These were, in particular, young professionals who, as 
part of the bureaucratic expansion of the government, were sent to Europe or received European-style 
education in Cairo earlier in the century.  Loosely referred to as ‘effendiya’, these lawyers, journalists, 
teachers, government bureaucrats and other professionals were often the sons of urban or rural small 
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or medium property owners, whose businesses and political ambition were impeded by the British 
occupation. Led by a young orator and publicist, Mustafa Kamil, the new nationalist elite were joined 
in their pursuit of independence by politically ambitious landowning aristocrats. This pursuit began 
with mobilising and organising the emerging national capitalist class, which predominantly consisted 
of large landowners, landowners turned industrialists, and bourgeois middle class elements mentioned 
above. With this mobilisation, the national capitalists sought to peacefully bring international pressure 
on Britain to grant them independence (ibid: 67). 
However, following the Anglo-French entente cordiale in 1904, the new nationalist elite 
became convinced that international pressure alone could not be effective, and that their nationalist 
project should attend somehow to the mounting struggles of the Egyptian masses.41 This new strategy 
was adopted after the death of Mustafa Kamil and the official formation of the National Party ‘al-Hizb 
al-Watani’ in 1908 (ibid: 67). From 1908 onwards, the National Party sought to develop ties with the 
expanding and unorganised urban workforce. It sought to help to organise it as a primarily nationalist, 
rather than class, contender, often muddying the two through co-opting socialist demands. From the 
outset, then, nationalist contenders sought to instrumentalise working class contentions, framing them 
with identity and national demands and, consequently, ensuring that workers would not be able to 
evolve into an independent revolutionary contender that could challenge the capitalist interests of the 
bourgeois nationalist elite in the post-independence era.  
It was in the context of this overall strategy that they resolved to share resources with labour 
organisations so as to enable these organisations to more effectively contribute to the pursuit of 
independence. As soon as the Party was formed, its leader Muhammad Farid began demanding labour 
legislation to improves working conditions in Egypt, and nationalist newspapers, most prominently 
al-Liwa’, publicly supported the labour movement (al-Rafi’i 1951: 110). To provide urban workers 
with education on history, geography, religion, ethics, hygiene, and arithmetic, among other topics, 
the nationalist elite also established, in Cairo and other provincial cities, what came to be known as 
the people’s night schools (‘madaris al-sha’ab al-layliyya’) (ibid.: 109). Nationalist university 
students, as well as senior party members, participated in these courses, often ‘exalting the virtues of 
the Arab race and the advantages of free government’ (ibid.). Thousands of workers attended the night 
schools, benefitting from the knowledge of the educated nationalists and, for most, affiliating 
themselves directly or indirectly with the party’s agenda. Most of them eventually joined committees 
of groups of the nationalist movement. 
                                                           
 41 The Anglo-French agreement in April 8, 1904, secured French recognition of Britain’s control of 
Egypt. With it, the Egyptian nationalist elite were no longer able to instrumentalise colonial rivalries in the 
pursuit of independence. For more on the Anglo-French entente and its regional and international ramifications 
(see Géraud 1954). 
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The National Party also provided workers with legal, financial, medical, and educational 
resources to form unions and syndicates, defend them in courts, help formulate demands, draw up 
union statutes, and evaluate proposals from management (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 77). Under the 
patronage of the nationalist elite, workers began to organise more effectively and to more effectively 
contend against Britain’s occupation and protection of foreign capital and privileges. Although 
Egyptian landowners continued to accumulate wealth from their large estates and in the European-
dominated banking and financial sector, in collaboration with European capital, they nonetheless 
portrayed themselves in paternalistic terms, offering a vision in which, after independence, they 
would take good care of their fellow Egyptian workers.  
From a counterrevolutionary perspective, the nationalist project was not about securing a 
more inclusive economic and political development. Instead, it was a struggle to achieve greater 
inclusion for some segments of the Egyptian population. Therefore, the nationalist mobilisation of 
anti-colonial opposition hampered the evolution of modern revolution. It did so because it delayed the 
emergence of the working class as an independent political contender, and co-opted the revolutionary 
demand for social justice in favour of a national capitalist agenda. The influence that the bourgeois 
nationalist project has had, since the early history of modern Egypt, on the ability of the Egyptian 
working class to engage in effective political activity is indicative of the intrinsic relationship between 
counterrevolution and revolution. As we shall see in the following sections, the interaction between 
modern counterrevolution and revolution in Egypt, represented in this convergence of labour and 
nationalist activity, would continue to define the evolution of both. 
 A salient case in point is the nationalist effort to undermine the ability of revolutionary 
foreign workers to influence Egyptian workers. In order to advance the nationalist agenda, while 
undermining the power of the working class, native workers were increasingly encouraged to 
differentiate themselves from foreign workers. For example, workers were encouraged to give a more 
authentic and nationalist dimension to their unions by linking them with older and more indigenous 
forms of labour organisations. In response, they started referring to their organisations as unions, 
‘niqabat’, instead of using the term association ‘jam’iyya’, which might have been perceived as an 
imitation of the organisations established by foreign workers in Egypt (ibid.: 68). At the same time, 
European employers also teased identity tensions in order to diffuse transnational working class 
solidarity. The material and structural privileges enjoyed by European workers – as, for instance, the 
fact that European workers were paid higher wages than their Egyptian counterparts in all sectors 
(Beinin 1981: 17) – contributed significantly to making these divisive counterrevolutionary strategies 
effective. Within this context, the most effective labour organisations to emerge were those sponsored 
and led by National Party members:42 the Manual Trades Workers’ Union (Niqabat ‘Ummal al-Sina’a 
                                                           
 42 Most notably ‘Umar and Ahmad Lutfi, and ‘Ali Bey Tharwat  (ibid.).The control that the National 
Party had over the labour movement is embedded in the structures of Egypt’s workers associations. Unions gave 
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al-Yadawiyya, known as MTWU), formed in 1909; and the Tramway Workers’ Union (Niqabat 
‘Ummal al-Siqaq al-Hadidiyya), formed in 1908.  
Reliance on the global cotton market made the Egyptian economy extremely vulnerable to 
global economic trends. At the turn of the century, this vulnerability led to deep economic instability 
and mass lay-offs across all sectors, which in turn fuelled further unionisation among striking 
workers. The nationalist counterrevolutionaries contended that the economic woes of the Egyptian 
masses were the result of the country’s extreme dependency on foreign capital which puts foreign 
interests first, rather than those of the national economy. Building on this economic instability and 
volatility, the nationalists’ call for independence continued to gain resonance across all segments of 
the population, though what the achievement of the ultimate aim of that struggle, independence, 
would produce was perceived differently by different groups. 
 In 1910, the British security apparatus in Egypt, represented by the Public Security 
Department of the Ministry of the Interior and, more locally, by the commandant of the Cairo Police 
began violently repressing nationalist contention, leading to bloody clashes erupting during strike 
actions.43 Newspapers were suspended, opposition publishers prosecuted, individuals believed to 
constitute ‘a danger to public security’ were jailed, and labour activity was crushed by force 
(Lockman 1988b: 451). The National Party was dissolved, its resources seized, and its leading 
activists harassed, imprisoned, or exiled. Although labour organisations did not disappear altogether, 
those that survived the repression saw their activity, their access to resources and ability to mobilise, 
dwindle significantly  (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 80). 
With the outbreak of World War I in the summer of 1914, and the expectation of war with the 
Ottoman Empire, Britain proclaimed martial law in Egypt (November 1914). The following month, 
Britain established a protectorate over Egypt and deposed the pro-Ottoman khedive, Abbas Hilmi II, 
who was at that time in Constantinople.  The nationalist elite had won substantial popularity after the 
departure of Abbas, who had secretly supported the nationalist movement, and instrumentalised the 
labour struggle to advance the nationalist cause (Chalcraft 2016: 206). Consequently, revolution 
continued only in silent and ineffective contentions. These contentions were manifested in workers’ 
petitions demanding independence, national control of industries, higher wages, lower working hours, 
better working conditions and equal treatment of foreign and Egyptian workers.44  
                                                           
contributing members who paid double the regular monthly dues and honorary members who contributed some 
capital to the organisation, half the seats on the executive board (See Beinin and Lockman 1987: 68).  
43 There are recorded cases of  violence in, for instance, the ‘Anabir strike of October 1910 and the 
Cairo tram strike of July-August 1911 (Lockman 1988b: 451). This included the exiling of the president of the 
Nationalist Party, Muhammad Farid, in 1910 for the rest of his life. 
 44 One can argue that revolution also continued in intellectual activity of nationalist economists and 
political thinkers who produced and circulated knowledge on counterrevolution during WWI, exposing the 
immense inequalities and systemic exclusion of Egyptians. 
 85 
With the war, economic policies were adopted that were designed exclusively to serve 
Britain’s wartime interests. Economic activities were either halted or their resources redirected to the 
economy of war. Hundreds of thousands of Egypt’s working class and peasantry were forced to 
labour with the Allied forces outside Egypt (Skilling 1949: 205). Heavy demand for agricultural 
produce by Allied forces stationed in Egypt, compounded by import cut-offs and increase in cotton 
plantation in response to price hikes, led to severe food shortages and an exponential rise in 
inflation.45 But, at the same time, this economic crisis was a golden opportunity for business firms and 
large landowners in Egypt. Controlling the means of production, they were able to increase their 
profits as prices of basic needs skyrocketed and imports decreased. Moreover, the British authorities 
intervened to safeguard the interests of landowners by granting them financial privileges and 
underwriting loans to banks (Tignor 1976: 43). In the aftermath of WWI, the gap between landowners 
and the Egyptian masses increased exponentially. 
In that sense, the political economy of World War I in Egypt augmented exclusionary 
resource structures and, in doing so, cemented a long process of counterrevolution. By the end of the 
war, the exclusion of the Egyptian masses, experienced in living conditions and real wages, inevitably 
catalysed the revival of labour activity in more evolved forms of contentions.  
Figure 4, below, provides an illustration of counterrevolution and revolution at the turn of the 
century. This map of the polity from 1900 to 1919 represents, in simplified terms, the inter-elite 
rivalries over questions of independence, and the role of foreign capital and the palace. Therefore, 
contender (1) represents the palace (khedive and entourage), as well as loyal segments of the 
landowning aristocrats who organised politically in support of the monarchy. Contender (1) was 
supported by Britain and its agents in Egypt (3). On the other hand, contender (2) represents 
politically ambitious segments of the aristocratic class, most notably organised in the National Party, 
which coordinated activities with Egyptian working class organisations (5) as a base of support for 
their pursuit of independence. As discussed above, the nationalist role in working class politics 
undermined the revolutionary link between Egyptian workers (5) and foreign workers (6), in favour of 
a ‘national’ front led by counterrevolutionary bourgeois nationalists. 
                                                           




The Evolution of Counterrevolution and Revolution in the Beginning of the Twentieth Century 
(Figure 4) 
 
5.  Counterrevolution and Revolution in the Interwar Period 
Foreign forces deployed in Egypt and buying from its local markets worked to enrich an already 
wealthy and powerful aristocratic class which owned the means of production, and to generate 
thousands of temporary jobs for Egyptians. As the battlefront receded eastward away from Egypt in 
1917, the industries that expanded due to wartime military demands faced rapid contraction. 
Consequently, unemployment rose sharply and inflation remained at wartime levels while the real 
wages of many workers remained below pre-war levels (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 123). In these 
conditions, revolution in Egypt gradually intensified through a series of large-scale strikes in both 
Cairo and Alexandria involving, at first, cigarette workers who had suffered wage cuts and 
unemployment due to mechanisation and post-war recession (ibid.: 85).  
Cigarette workers had more resources than did workers in other industries, which might 
explain why they were the first to re-intensify revolutionary contentions following World War I. Their 
wages were higher than other workers, they were relatively more educated, they included a higher 
proportion of foreigners (particularly Greeks) among them, and they had a longer history of labour 
struggle and organisation which made it possible for them to restart the unions following the war 
which they had first established more than a decade earlier (ibid.). A few months later, workers in 
other industries started to regroup and take action. Among those groups were the tramwaymen who, 
by December 1918, began to reiterate the same demands for which they had fought in pre-war 
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contentions. Eventually, the two largest pre-World War I challengers to the Egyptian polity, the 
MTWU and the National Party, were re-established by unionists and nationalist activists.46  
 On the international stage, the Allies were negotiating for the spoils of war in Eastern Arabia 
while the Nationalist Turks fought for independence. A regional, and indeed global, wave of militant 
and violent struggles for national self-determination after World War I provided a golden opportunity 
to intensify the Egyptian demand for independence. Hence, a new delegation (wafd) of nationalist 
intellectuals and notables, most of whom were large landowners, sought to attend and to place the 
demand for full independence before the Paris Peace Conference. However, British authorities denied 
the delegation recognition and prevented them from travelling to the conference (Berque 1972: 308). 
Led by a charismatic aristocratic figure, Sa’d Zaghlul Pasha, the Wafd began to mobilise segments of 
the upper and middle classes, including bureaucrats and notables (ibid.: 306). It further consolidated 
its position by including two representatives of the National Party in their delegation. Moreover, 
despite its aristocratic leadership, its demands also resonated with the vast majority of the population. 
The evolution of the nationalist camp was evident in the growing popularity of the Wafd and 
the consequent resignation of the Egyptian government which, unlike the Wafd, acted as apologists 
for the British protectorate (ibid.). Building on decades of nationalist-labour contentions against 
British control prior to World War I, counterrevolution and revolution in Egypt intensified 
significantly, culminating in what came to be known as the ‘1919 Revolution’. The intensification 
started after the arrest of the Wafd’s leaders and their deportation to Malta, although, as mentioned 
above, revolution had already gradually intensified prior to 1919, as evidenced by a series of large-
scale strikes. But, in evidence of the relationship between counterrevolution and revolution, the 
counterrevolutionary political crisis (over bourgeois nationalist leaders), occurring during a time of 
revolutionary labour unrest, ignited a larger mobilisation across the country. 
Workers in the Cairo and Alexandria tramway systems, the state railway, government press, 
arsenal and government workshops, the Cairo light company, postal, port, lighthouse and customs 
facilities, as taxi and carriage drivers, and in sugar refineries and textile factors followed each other’s 
lead to halt economic activity (Lockman 1988a: 272). In more rural settings, peasants cut rail and 
communication lines, isolating Cairo from the countryside and halting the distribution of basic goods 
(Goldberg 1992: 261). Thousands of British troops had to re-establish control by force (ibid.). 
Wherever the British authorities were able to break a strike, public boycott of that enterprise would 
                                                           
 46 The MTWU had much more resources than other labour challengers. For instance, it had a long 
record in labour struggle and, consequently, carried solid political credentials. And, after the war, its new leader, 
Dr. Mahjub Thabit, became a prominent figure among the workers because of his pre-war role in the 
organisation. However, this all-encompassing union had to confront the changing realities of the working class 
after the war. MTWU wanted to unite all workers and artisans, regardless of trade, industry, or relationship to 
ownership of the means of production. This soon was confronted by more specific industrial and craft unions 
(Beinin and Lockman 1987: 87).  
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follow (ibid.). Even after the British succumbed and released Zaghloul and his colleagues in April of 
the same year, the intensification continued in the pursuit of independence and of recognition of the 
Wafd as the representative of Egypt (Berque 1972: 309).   
 During this intensification, nationalist hegemony over working class activity became more 
salient. Wafdist leaders assembled striking workers along with other segments of society, collected 
donations for their strikes and gave speeches on behalf of the national cause. Mass assemblies were 
often held in mosques, a safe haven from police intrusion (ibid.). A notable example is a mass rally of 
some 80,000 people in Al-Azhar Mosque, where speeches were given by ‘Coptic priests, women, 
young students, railroad workers, and even shoemakers’ (Fahmy 2011: 148). The palatial homes of 
Wafd leaders were also used for rallies and meetings. During 1919-1922 intensification, then, as is the 
case with all intensifications, the intrinsic relationship between counterrevolution and revolution 
became more salient. 
 The 1919 intensification is mapped out in figure 5, below. Contender (1) represents the 
palace, loyal segments of the aristocratic class, and their military-security apparatus, supported by 
Britain and its local agents (2). On the other hand, contender (4) represents the Wafd delegation, 
which was able, due to its enormous resources and wealth, and coordination with large segments of 
the upper middle class nationalist ‘effendiya’ (3), to become an effective and leading contender for 
independence. The nationalist hegemony discussed above is represented in the ‘link’ between Egypt’s 
organised working class (6) and the Wafd (4). Contender (7) represents organised foreign workers 
who often struck against their employers, but were increasingly detached from Egyptian workers, 
whose activism was subsumed under the broader nationalist umbrella.  
 
The Egyptian Polity During the 1919 Intensification (Figure 5) 
 
Given the nationalist hegemony which prevailed over revolutionary contenders, the 
intensification led to mixed outcomes that ensured the continuation of both, counterrevolution and 
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revolution. Indeed, workers won higher wages, improved benefits, and reduced working hours (Beinin 
and Lockman 1987: 124). But most of these gains were soon reversed, and a long industrial struggle 
ensued, thanks to none other than the Wafd, especially after the party became a polity member in 
1924. The following section focuses on how, in the aftermath of the 1919 intensification, both the 
working class and counterrevolutionary contenders grew stronger as a result of the restructuring of the 
Egyptian polity by the British to include the bourgeois nationalists. 
 
5.1 The Evolution of Modern Counterrevolution 
From the perspective of the British, the increasingly politicised and mobilised working class in post-
World War I Egypt required that they coordinate with nationalist counterrevolution. The nationalist 
bourgeoisie presented a lesser evil than an independent and revolutionary labour contender. One 
might go so far as to suggest that the nationalist bourgeoisie were not even a lesser evil, but a 
convenient partner in a more sustainable counterrevolutionary capitalist arrangement between foreign 
capital and Egyptian capitalists. This argument is reflected in British policy after the intensification of 
1919. In the aftermath of the intensification, Britain unilaterally declared the ‘independence’ of Egypt 
and the end of the protectorate in 1922. Although far from creating a sovereign polity, the new 
constitution did turn Egypt into a parliamentary monarchy, distributing power between the Palace, the 
parliament, and, more subtly and indirectly, the British authorities .47  
Despite rhetorical opposition to the new constitution, the Wafd party participated in the 
electoral process held in 1924 and consolidated its parliamentary power. The political arena, which 
was previously restricted to the Palace and the British authorities, now included the Wafd. The new 
configuration is commonly perceived as a triangular interaction between the Wafd, representing the 
bourgeois nationalist movement with overwhelming popular support, the Palace represented by King 
Fu’ad, and the British represented by its High Commissioner. In counterrevolutionary terms, this 
triangular polity represented the consolidation and evolution of counterrevolution after 1919 
intensification.   
 Now in power, Wafdists sought to corporatise labour organisation more effectively. Learning 
from the 1919 intensification, the Wafd sought to ensure labour support for Wafdist-led independence 
without ‘inquiring too closely into their class interests’ (Chalcraft 2016: 213). Much like their 
bourgeois nationalist predecessors, Wafdist involvement in labour politics was not motivated by real 
                                                           
47 Chalrcraft 2016: 215. The British representative in Egypt, the High Commissioner, continued to 
interfere and manipulate politics in the interests of the empire, be it through influencing policy or filling up key 
positions in the bureaucracy. Furthermore, the new constitution protected most of the foreign legal and 
commercial privileges, and maintained British military presence around communication and trade routes, land, 
and sea (Smith 1979: 455). 
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concern for the socio-economic difficulties of Egyptians, but by the strategy of using labour as a 
‘playing card amid negotiations at the top table’ (ibid.). The General Federation of Labour Unions 
(GFLU) was established in 1924 for this purpose (Ismael and al-Sa’id 1990: 28). 
But a socialist surge in the aftermath of the 1919 intensification posed a serious challenge to 
Wafdist authority over the labour movement.48 An illuminating example is the Egyptian Socialist 
Party (ESP), which was established in 1921 by Egyptian students who returned from Europe after 
World War I, bringing with them socialist experiences (De Smet 2016: 127). A year later, ESP 
endorsed Bolshevism and became the Communist of Party of Egypt (CPE), and a member of the 
Comintern (ibid.). As soon as the Wafd came to power, the communists were crushed violently during 
a strike action in Alexandria in 1924. CPE vanguards were arrested and the communist movement 
collapsed (ibid.). The Wafd became largely unchallenged, thereafter, and workers were willing then to 
accept the Wafd’s hegemony, so long as the governing party would take serious action to alleviate 
their immediate economic woes.  
This, of course, was not achieved, because, after the counterrevolutionary nationalists were 
granted membership in the polity, their more aggressive pursuit of their capitalist interests further 
alienated workers from ‘their’ bourgeoisie. The success of its capitalist policies, in coordination with 
‘foreign’ capital, reduced the opposition of the Wafdist government to the monarchy and to British 
influence. A prominent case in point is the formation of Bank Misr and the Federation of Industries, 
which represented the consolidation of nationalist and foreign capitalist counterrevolution. Both 
organisations were established in the direct aftermath of the 1919 intensification, in parallel with the 
political accommodation that brought about the inclusion of the Wafd in the polity.  
Bank Misr represented the counterrevolutionary political ambition of Egypt’s landowning 
aristocrats to gain exclusive rule in an independent Egypt. Their project required the concentration 
and corporatisation of both Egyptian labour and Egyptian capital. The former was co-opted and 
corporatised in the GFLU, while the later required a national bank. Bank Misr was established in 1920 
as the first national bank with shares exclusively owned by Egyptians and with Arabic as its official 
language of commerce.49 It came after decades of on and off negotiations and failed attempts by 
nationalist aristocrats to establish a national bank. Several attempts to establish local provincial banks 
had proved to be of no avail (Tignor 1976: 52). However, because of the lessons these failures 
provided to the nationalist elites, their efforts ultimately culminated in the establishment of Bank 
Misr.  
                                                           
 48 See Ismael and El-Said (1990) and Botman (1988) for an extensive account of communist and 
socialist parties in Egypt, and their emergence in the context of international communism. 
 49 There was The National Bank, ‘al-bank al-ahli’, but it was managed and owned by foreigners (Deeb 
1977: 70).  
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The intellectual input of the Bank Misr’s founder, Tala’at Harb, as well as that of Yusuf 
Aslan Qattawi, Ismail Sidqi and Umar Sultan, in the inter-war period, provided the policy experience 
and knowledge required for the establishment of the national bank.50 These nationalist activists 
studied economic data and balance sheets to expose the exploitative nature of foreign banks and 
businesses in Egypt across all sectors, lamenting the loss of national wealth through the repatriation of 
profits (ibid: 53). Then, they sent a delegation to Europe, headed by Harb, to acquire further 
knowledge and skills on modern banking.51 Large landowners, who were wary at first of the idea of 
redirecting their strictly agricultural investments into new sectors, were gradually encouraged to 
contribute to Bank Misr, especially after the wealthy governor of Alexandria, Midhat Yakin publicly 
supported Harb’s new bank.52 At least 87 percent of the bank’s initial capital came from the country’s 
wealthiest landowners: al-Sayyid Badrawi ‘Ashur, Mohammad Sha’rawi, Mohammad Badrawi, 
Mohammad Ahmad al-Sharif, Ali Islam, Ali al-Manzlawi and Sayyid Khashaba (Deeb 1977: 72). 
The bank was well received by the Egyptian public, who saw in it a tangible economic basis 
for independence. The bank, benefitting from the Wafd’s rise to power, become a modest vehicle for 
industrial development, albeit in industries still closely linked to the cotton sector, which reflected the 
interests of the bank’s largest shareholders (ibid.: 58). It first invested in ginning, shipping and textile 
firms on lands owned, by these shareholders, hence directly and exclusively reaping the rewards of 
development. It also allowed for chambers of commerce to be set up across the country, closely 
connecting landowners, merchants, and the small class of local bourgeois industrialists. Those 
chambers were useful in marketing and selling local produce through exhibitions that were 
independent from marketing firms owned by foreigners and, most notoriously, by the British Chamber 
of Commerce in Egypt.  
In counterrevolutionary terms, the Misr Bank group directed the resources of large 
landowners into industry and enabled them to maintain their economic privileges through projects that 
exclusively benefitted them. Yet, thanks mainly to decades of nationalist propaganda, the appeal of 
Bank Misr resonated with the Egyptian masses even if, apart from educational grants and local 
initiatives, the returns of its economic projects did not trickle down to them.  
                                                           
 50 Tala’at Harab and his colleagues, most of whom were large landowners themselves, produced 
important assessments of the inefficiencies and injustices of the foreign-controlled Egyptian economy. Harb 
called for a diversified economy and increased investment in industrial sectors, and criticised British plans to 
extend the Suez Canal concessions for another forty years (Tignor 1977: 52). His articles, as well as those of his 
colleagues, were published in several Arabic newspapers, including al-Akhbar, al-Ahram, al-Muqattam, and al-
Jarida.  
 51 Harb and his colleagues were inspired most by the German banking model, which emphasised the 
single nationalist objective of German pre-eminence and the prioritisation of industrialisation over capital 
accumulation. German influence was also reflected in nationalist youth organisations, which carried fascist 
slogans but remained largely ineffective. 
 52Yakin was a descendant of a Macedonian noble who had married Khedive Muhammad Ali’s sister, 
and his cousin, ‘Adli Yakin, was the Prime Minister of Egypt in the 1920s (Tignor 1976: 56). 
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On the other hand, the Federation of Industries was formed to protect the 
counterrevolutionary interests of foreign capitalists in Egypt. The federation represented the interests 
of big sugar, salt, textile, cement, cotton and mining enterprises. According to Article 2 of its Statute, 
the Federation’s aim was to ‘bring together the important industrial establishments so that the 
industrialists will be able to pursue common interests and study the means of advancement … and if 
necessary the protection of local industry’.53 
 By 1925, Bank Misr and the Federation of Industries were coordinating efforts to suppress 
labour, be it foreign or Egyptian, in their common pursuit of capitalist development. There was less 
interest in meaningful market competition and more interest in regulating markets, cartelising new 
sectors, and keeping the expanding proletariat at bay. Harb sat on the Federation’s board of directors 
and both groups coordinated their efforts to pressure the government on tariff reform and support for 
local industries and products (Tignor 1976: 60). For landowners, the agricultural sector proved to be 
extremely volatile in response to local and global events and no longer as profitable (hence affecting 
their wealth and growth), and it was a matter of urgency for the nationalist elite to push for 
diversification, on the one hand securing and developing the wealth accumulated by large landowners, 
and, on the other, responding to the alarming rise of unemployment which could be mitigated by the 
expansion of the industrial sector. When the government responded positively to economic policy 
recommendations advanced by the Bank/Misr Federation alliance, the Bank Misr group, along with 
foreign and national industrialists, further integrated the capital of the Bank Misr group with foreign 
capital, in effect manifesting a common counterrevolutionary capitalist interest.  
 The Misr Airways Company was established in 1932 with 40 percent of its shares held by 
British partners. The same shareholding profile existed for the Misr Tourism Company, which was 
established in 1934. The Misr Insurance Company was established in 1934 in partnership with the 
British Bowing Company and Assicurazioni Generale di Triesta (Deeb 1977: 77). In the same year, 
the Misr Shipping Company was established with the support of Cox and Kings (al-Gritly 1937: 435). 
After the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, this industrial trend became more dominant, with large 
companies like the Misr Spinning and Dying of Fine Cotton of Kofr el-Dawwar companies, formed in 
1937, in a 50 percent partnership with Bradford Dyers Association.54  
 The improved position of nationalist landowners, both in the political as well as the economic 
realms (the former represented by their involvement in the cabinet and the parliament), posed 
challenges to their unity. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, disagreements within the nationalist camp 
started to surface, especially with regard to relations with foreign capitalists, the representation of the 
                                                           
 53 See Misr al-Sina’iya 1925: 15. 
 54 See Bank Misr report in 1938, p.27. And for a more detailed account on the integration of foreign 
and Misr capital (see Tignor 1980b: 101-118).  
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nationalist project and the path towards independence. The privileges that the Wafd monopolised 
were challenged by other nationalist landowning magnates with political ambition.55 And the signing 
of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936, which was hailed as independence, exacerbated those tensions. 
Although it granted additional power to the Egyptian political, the treaty preserved the triangular 
status quo at the expense of meaningful participation and real opposition, and raised questions over 
the process of of achieving complete independence. Britain retained thousands of troops in geo-
strategic parts of Egypt, most notably in the Suez Canal, and maintained the right to occupy the 
country in case of unrest.56 Following the treaty, the nationalist camp became increasingly divided 
into factions affiliated with different aristocratic leaders. But the Wafd party remained the most 
popular opposition in Egypt. Thus the power struggle over Wafd leadership was fierce among those 
factions. 
 Figure 5.1, below, reflects this consolidation of counterrevolution, through the triangular 
arrangement between the palace (1), the Wafd (2), and British and foreign capital (3). Contender (4), 
and other smaller black squares inside the polity, represents a sample of smaller bourgeois nationalist 
rivals. The Wafd’s grip on Egypt’s organised working class (6) is still represented in the map, but, as 
the following section will show, this connection continues to weak as revolution evolves. 
 
The Evolution of Counterrevolution and Revolution after 1919 Intensification (Figure 5.1) 
 
 
                                                           
 55 The British saw in the Wafd a credible party to sign future treaties, and thus saw it useful to grant the 
party access to strategic resources that can maintain its popular support and loyalties among Egyptians. This 
came to the dismay of other politically ambitious oligarchs who were not given leading positions in the Wafd, 
and rejected the Wafd’s monopolisation of parliamentary life. For a detailed account of the political rivalries 
between the Wafd, Liberal Constitutional Party, King Fuad’s Ettihad Party, pro-monarchy al-Sha’ab Party, Al-
Azhar-affiliated groups, and other nationalist political elite in the period between 1922 and 1936, see H. L. 
1936. Who/What is this? 
 56 See Bentwich 1924 for a pithy summary of the new constitution. 
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5.2 The Evolution of Modern Revolution  
From the perspective of revolution, several contingent factors contributed to the evolution of working 
class mobilisation, which is primarily manifested in the emergence of politically independent working 
class groups. The first factor was the weakening grip of Wafd on political life and nationalist inter-
rivalries led to the gradual independence of labour contenders. Anti-Wafd nationalists sought to 
undermine the Wafdist position by countering its authority over labour unions and, in the process, 
allowed labour unions to instrumentalise those rivalries in the pursuit of workers’ rights. A notable 
example is that of Prince Abbas Ibrahim Halim, a great-grandson of Muhammad Ali and a cousin of 
King Fouad, who gathered labour unions under the National Federation of Trade Unions in Egypt 
(NFTUE) as a labour organisation in support of his bid for power, and encouraged workers instead of 
the Wafdist bourgeoisie to lead the unions (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 210-215). 
 Secondly, union leaders matured politically through their experiences with the Wafdist elite 
who, time and again, proved to be deceptive and opportunistic in their dealings with strike disputes. 
The labour movement thus learned from earlier setbacks and gradually evolved to challenge the 
Wafdist control over its activities, especially after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936. In that period, 
Egypt witnessed worker-led protests directed at Wafdist leaders, and the Wafd government not only 
took the labour threat seriously, but, in some instances, it was forced into granting their demands and, 
other times, rushed to contain their mobilisation through new co-optive measures. For instance, the 
government established institutions dedicated to resolving labour disputes, such as the Labour 
Conciliation and Arbitration Committee; and, for the first time in the history of Egypt, went as far as 
legalising trade unionism in its Law 85 of 1942 (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 291). The law was 
celebrated by many workers as a victory for their cause. But its effect on revolution was double 
edged: on the one hand, it helped further unionise workers and sectors which had not been previously 
organised, thus adding more resources to the revolution; but on the other hand, it imposed limitations 
on unionisation through a bureaucracy of government licensing (ibid.: 291-293). So, the Wafd 
continued to adopt policies that concealed the diverging interests between the working class and the 
bourgeois nationalists. But the alienating experiences of labour in industries now owned, even if 
partially, by Egyptian capitalists, made it increasingly difficult for the bourgeois nationalists to 
maintain their grip on working class activity. 
 Thirdly, and most importantly for revolution, in the 1930s, Egypt witnessed a resurgence of 
communist and socialist groups whose aim was to strengthen and politicise the working class. 
Communist influence benefitted from and accelerated the changing relationship between the Wafd 
and labour (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 310). At first, communist groups were founded by foreign 
intellectuals, particularly Jewish ones, who presented communism to workers as an attractive 
alternative to rising fascism which, at the time, provided an appealing anti-British ideology. These 
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anti-fascist organisations – such as the Federation of Peace Partisans ‘Ittihad Ansar al-Salam’ and, 
later, the Democratic Federation ‘Ittihad al-Dimuqrati’ – were gradually able to reach beyond 
intellectual circles in Egypt, and attract students and urban wage-earning middle class elements who 
were increasingly disillusioned with the status quo (Beinin 1990: 104). Communist groups were able 
to reformulate the idea of national struggle around working class revolution, through informal 
underground activity devoted to organising workers in urban industrial workplaces, independent from 
all parties.  
Workers were able to develop a consciousness as a class that was separate from that of the 
nationalist bourgeoisie (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 318). The working class ‘ummal’ was not merely 
a symbol that leant authenticity to a bourgeois nationalist struggle, nor a vague and abstract 
categorisation of all Egyptians struggling against the status quo. Instead, independent unions 
presented an image of the working class as a proactive, militant participant in the liberation and 
development of Egypt. This is not to say that unions which had communist board members were 
politically anti-Wafd. In fact, many communists were members of the Wafd party. And the youthful 
urban intelligentsia of the Wafd who were fed up with the corruption and conservatism of the Wafd 
veteran leaders, formed a left-wing group within the party which came to be known as the Wafdist 
Vanguard ‘al-Tali’a al-Wafdiyya’ (ibid.: 311). But the overall contribution of communist activity to 
revolution is in amplifying the role of the working class as an independent and self-conscious force 
contending for a more inclusionary and independent Egyptian polity.  
For example, the New Dawn group, ‘al-Fajer al-Jadeed’, which brought together key Jewish 
and non-Jewish Egyptian Marxist intellectuals, like Yusuf Darwish, Yusuf al-Mudarriq and Mahmud 
al-‘Askari, invested in the unionisation of an industrial suburb of Egypt, Shubra al-Khayma, where 
over 20,000 industrial workers were based (ibid.: 315). The group created strong links with the 
General Union of Mechanical Textile Workers in Shubra al-Khayma and Cairo (GUMTWSKC) 
which, with 9,000 textile workers, was one of the largest unions in that area (ibid.). The New Dawn 
gave the union access to important resources, such as legal counselling, organisational support and 
educational services, and connections with non-workers who can expand union support among the 
public.  
 Several effective communist contenders emerged during and after World War II, which were 
inspired by the Soviet Union and were in response to increasing socio-economic difficulties. They 





6. Post-World War II Intensification 
Egypt witnessed a revolutionary intensification after the Second World War which had a lot in 
common with the global wave of revolutionary intensification at the time. A conjuncture of post-war 
economic recession and disillusionment with liberal nationalism propelled an independent and, this 
time, militant mobilisation of the working class (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 311). Indeed, the 
outbreak of the Second World War presented new economic opportunities – not too dissimilar to 
those presented by the First World War – to the landowning class and the small industrial bourgeoisie. 
New factories were built and tens of thousands of Egyptians were employed in the growing industrial 
sector which remained largely controlled by landowning aristocrats turned bourgeois industrialists. 
However, by the end of the war and the withdrawal of the Allied forces, the market for local produce 
shrank. Factories established during the war and catering for the artificially expanded market of the 
war had to cut their production, laying off thousands of workers who faced the dire consequences of 
having little and inconsistent access to basic resources.  
The aristocratic ruling elite were unable  to look beyond their narrow counterrevolutionary 
interests, protecting their industries and capital at the expense of the Egyptian working class, which 
suffered the biggest costs of the post-war recession. Controlling the parliament and the cabinet in 
close coordination with the palace and British authorities, the Wafd served the interests of the 
triangular status quo, which served to amplify its detachment from the real struggles of the Egyptian 
masses.57 The parliamentary system was dominated by nepotism and patronage, crippling the 
bureaucracies of the state while ensuring the interests of the politically-active landed aristocrats. 
Notable and wealthy families with connections to the Wafd party occupied seats in the parliament and 
in the cabinet.58 Their integration into global capitalist markets, and with European enterprises in 
Egypt, consolidated their counterrevolutionary positions. They joined the United States-led global 
coalition against communism, and raised the anti-communist banner to justify their maintaining 
exclusive access to resources (Halperin 2005: 1139).  
The resulting exclusionary polity was then challenged by a revolutionary intensification that 
was more effective and disruptive than the one that followed World War I. The increase in the size of 
the working class, particularly its urban proletarian strata, presented greater opportunities for 
                                                           
 57 By 1950, the ruling Wafd elite cultivated their ties with King Farouq and his entourage. They 
processed pensions and payments for Farouq’s civil servant a year in advance, approved enormous funds for 
maintenance of the royal yacht, cracked down on the reporting of news unfavourable to the royal family, and 
argued that a petition to the king by liberal constitutionalist opposition to fight corruption in the palace was a 
form of treason (See Reid 1980: 735-36). 
 58 Take, for example, the infamous case of then Wafd Secretary General and cabinet Premier Fouad 
Siraj al-Din. His first brother, Jamil Siraj al-Din, was vice-president of the parliament. His second brother, 
Abdelhamid Siraj al-Din, was a member of parliament and president of the *parliament’s financial committee. 
His third brother, Yassin Siraj al-Din, was also a member of parliament and president of the foreign affairs 
committee (see Reid 1980: 736).  
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unionisation. Moreover, the ‘conscious assimilation of the accumulated political lessons of the pre-
war years’ by trade union leaders contributed to the emergence of a stronger, independent labour 
movement after the Second World War which slowly ended the patron-client relationship between 
workers and the Wafd (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 309).  
This was both catalysed by and, in turn, helped to catalyse communist and socialist groups 
which had been previously divided and largely ineffective. Some groups merged together to form 
effective revolutionary contenders. A key example is the Democratic Movement for National 
Liberation (DMNL or HADITU in Arabic), which was born in 1947 out of the merger of two 
prominent communist organisations, the Egyptian Movement for National Liberation and Iskra ‘Ash-
sharara’ (ibid. 328). HADITU united the student front through the Communist Student League, and 
led the Preparatory Committee for an Egyptian Students Federation (ibid.). It also played a role 
among the unions and in strike actions in the textile factories at Mahalla Al-Kubra after 1945 
(Chalcraft 2016: 282). Other groups, like the New Dawn, mentioned earlier, played an active role in 
the formation of new independent trade unions, particularly in the growing private sector after the war 
(Beinin and Lockman 1987: 327).  
Even the Wafd was overwhelmed by its revolutionary left-wing youth, and its mainstream 
aristocratic leaders sought to co-opt the socialist narrative to survive, sometimes referring to the 
Wafd’s programme of free secondary and technical education as socialist policies (El-Amin 1989: 27-
28). When the Arab Socialist Party’s parliamentarian, Ibrahim Shukri, spoke up for economic and 
land reform, prominent Wafd leader Fuad Siraj al-Din responded, ‘You are not the only socialist 
member in the parliament. The 226 Wafdist members of parliament represent socialism – and true 
socialism’.59  
But the continuing prominence of foreign capital and its visible integration with local capital 
gave union leaders an opportunity to lead and redirect the nationalist struggle, while creating a broad 
national alliance between workers and other bourgeois segments. The alliance with ‘patriotic’ 
bourgeois elements was an application of the general strategy of the Comintern for communist parties 
in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. This leading political role was encouraged by communist 
groups, who facilitated the establishment of political organisations run by and representing the 
working class, such as The Workers’ Committee for National Liberation – The Political Organisation 
of the Working Class (WCNL), ‘Lajnat al-‘Ummal lil-Tahrir al-Qawmi, al-Hayia al-Siyasiyya lil-
Tabaqa al-‘Amila’ (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 336).  
The communists also expanded into the military academy, forming ‘Democratic Committees’ 
in the army and air force (Laqueur 1956: 46). The communist group within the army established 
                                                           
 59 See The Egyptian Gazette, 1 February 1950, 5. Accessed online https://dig-eg-gaz.github.io/contents/ 
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contact with some of the leading figures of the Free Officers Movement, an anti-British anti-
aristocracy underground military society established in the interwar period which eventually staged a 
successful coup in 1952 (Johnson 1973: 3).  
However, revolutionary intensification faced an imminent intensified counterrevolution. For 
instance, some of the nationalist elite tried to discredit the communists, by propagating the accusation 
that they were Zionists, highlighting the ‘compromised stance’ of the communist groups on the 
Palestinian cause, as dictated by the Comintern.60 Traditional coercive means were employed too. The 
ruling Wafd party purged opposition leaders between 1950 and 1951 (al-Rafi’i 1951: 317-325). 
Revolutionary figures, like Mustafa Musa, the leftist student leader who rose from the ranks of the 
Wafd, were forced out of the party and detained. Bills were introduced to clamp down on socialist and 
communist ‘suspects’ and restrict press use (ibid.).  
The counterrevolutionary intensification was even more significantly manifested in the 
emergence of new challengers to the status quo, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free 
Officers, who sought to capitalise on the regime’s weak moment. Both new challengers were 
perceived by imperialist powers as lesser evils, if not perfectly favourable, compared to communists 
and the revolutionary contenders of the working class. The following chapter will examine how these 
emerging contenders had indeed different political projects than that of the ruling aristocracy, albeit 
largely preserving counterrevolutionary resource structures in different ways. It will also discuss how 
the Free Officer military coup in 1952 was the outcome of both, the revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary intensification, and, as such, the resulting polity structures guaranteed the 










                                                           
60 Ginat provides an enlightening account of how communists in Egypt, among them Jewish leading 
figures, were caught between Soviet geopolitics and hostility to an ethnic nationalist movement they denounced 









This chapter surveys the second phase in modern Egypt’s counterrevolution and revolution, which 
covers the period between 1952 and 1970. This phase was marked by regime change: from the 
parliamentary monarchy run by a triangular alliance between the palace, landed aristocrats, and 
Britain (discussed ion Chapter 4), to a republic run by a group of nationalist military elites. This 
chapter will argue that, contrary to popular belief, what occurred in the military coup in 1952 was not 
a ‘revolution’; and the regime that came to power was not ‘revolutionary’. Indeed, as this chapter will 
show, Egyptian masses were granted routine access to important economic resources with the coming 
to power of new military rulers. In that sense, the new regime increased economic inclusion. 
However, those gains were not granted through the unencumbered initiative of the new ruling elite, 
but, instead, were unavoidable concessions if the new nationalist rulers were to consolidate power, de-
intensify an evolving working class revolution, and align the working class with state-led capitalist 
development. The degree of economic inclusion was a sensible step in that direction. From the 
perspective of counterrevolution, the military elite were counterrevolutionary pro-capital forces, and 
they sought accumulation through the state. 
Overall, regime change brought about a transfer of political power from an aristocratic 
oligarchy led by a king to a military oligarchy led by a military strongman, Gamal Abdel Nasser. This 
chapter will explore the Nasserist counterrevolution by focusing on three overarching set of 
contentions. Firstly, the military regime repressed and eventually dismantled effective labour-oriented 
challengers, most notoriously the communists and independent labour organisations. Throughout this 
period, Nasser fought working class militancy at home and abroad. Secondly, the military regime did 
not demolish capitalism, but, instead, sought to accelerate it through handing the state the driving 
wheel of production. It centralised and corporatised economic and political power, and, therefore, 
articulated single-handedly policies of development and structures of resource access.  Thirdly, 
Nasser sought to balance class forces in the service of this state-led capitalism by banning class 
contentions and rewarding obedience. It was a strategy of reward and punishment – or concession and 
coercion, which gave each social strata just enough resources to keep it in line with state-led 
development, and, when a challenger arose, it was coerced by force and its resource access 
withdrawn.    
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 This chapter will unravel this two-sided approach – concession and coercion – in dealing with 
the revolutionary intensification, showing, along the way, how it reflects the intrinsic relationship 
between counterrevolution and revolution, and how this relationship ensures the continuation of both 
phenomena. As part of this two-sided strategy, the military regime granted significant economic 
concessions to the working class and peasants. Two months after the coup, a series of laws were 
issued that improved working terms and conditions, and expanded the employers’ obligations towards 
their workers. They were followed by legislation that set a minimum wage, and put a cap on rental 
rates and leases. Employment became an ensured right, and arbitrary layoffs were banned. Equally 
significant was the redistribution of a portion of the large landowners’ estates to peasants.  
But, in tandem, the new regime crushed militant working class elements from the very 
beginning, and gradually decreased the number of union federations, until, in 1957, it was able to 
fully incorporate the working class in a single union confederation, the Egyptian Trade Union 
Federation (ETUF), whose leadership was consistently appointed by the state. It thus deprived the 
working class of political autonomy by incorporating it into a single, state-controlled, union 
confederation. Hence, the new regime advanced a degree of economic inclusion through welfare 
policies, and further restricted political participation by dismantling independent labour contenders. 
Credit must be given to the military regime for recognising that the continuation of modern 
counterrevolution, i.e. capitalism, would require such economic concessions, which significantly 
reduced class tensions – de-intensified modern revolution, and ensured increasing labour productivity. 
As this chapter will show, this recognition by the new regime arose, not from revolutionary concerns, 
but from pro-capital ones. While it adopted a rhetoric of extolling Egyptian workers and granted 
concessions that improved their living and working conditions, the regime did not wish to enhance the 
social and political power of labour or allow it to function as an independent political class – 
something to which this period of post-WWII revolutionary intensification was aiming to achieve.  
As was argued in Chapter 4, through the integration of local capital with global markets and 
the alienation of the peasantry, Muhammad Ali’s policies laid the basis for modern counterrevolution 
and revolution in Egypt. Modern counterrevolution developed with the concentration of land 
ownership in the hands of a small group of notable aristocrats who impeded meaningful industrial 
development and exploited peasants to advance their own, narrow commercial interests. Political and 
economic access were both restricted. Modern revolution, on the other hand, developed with the 
emergence of urban pockets of new industries in which skilled and experienced foreign workers were 
brought together with the budding Egyptian proletariat. Chapter 4 then traced the complex 
relationship between an emerging revolutionary labour movement and an emerging 
counterrevolutionary bourgeois nationalism. It explained how the latter worked to subsume the former 
under the banner of nationalism. Eventually, however, capitalist development exposed the increasing 
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integration of local capital with foreign capital, further alienating the working class from owners of 
large capital. This was the context in which the labour movement matured and evolved into a class-
conscious and independent contender; and this contention intensified after WWII with the help of 
overlapping contingent factors (see Chapter 4). In this context, the new contender (Free Officers) 
emerged from the military to de-intensify revolution and ensure the continuation of capitalist 
development, albeit in an allegedly more ‘effective’ manner. They have, therefore, represented the 
interests of capitalists and were their best hope to avoid a communist takeover. 
The first section discusses how this new military contender took control of the Egyptian 
polity in 1952, and how strategic weaknesses of revolutionary intensification paved the way for it.  
The second section addresses how, through intensive labour attempts to have a say in the formation of 
the new polity between 1952 and 1956, revolutionary intensification continued even after the Free 
Officers assumed power; and how Nasserist counterrevolution de-intensified it. The third section 
discusses Nasser’s first presidential term, between 1956 and 1960. It focuses on how, in the wake of 
the Suez victory, the regime consolidated its power over capital and labour; and how it responded to 
regional revolutionary challenges in a way which further exposed its counterrevolutionary aims.  The 
fourth section unpacks the contentions that shaped the Egyptian polity after the failure of its 
unification with Syria in the United Arab Republic which, between 1962 and 1967, further 
concentrated Egyptian resources in the hands of the new state bourgeoisie at the expense of the 
private sector. Finally, this chapter discusses the impact on the Nasserist polity of the six-day war in 
1967 and on the continued counterrevolution and revolution. 
 
2. Prelude to the Coup 
Revolution intensified in the wake of post-WWII political and economic crises when communist and 
other leftist social groups re-emerged, and unions became more effective and independent political 
contenders. But several contingent factors prevented these revolutionary contenders from tipping the 
balance of class power in Egypt. First, as a consequence of the failure of communists to develop a 
unified strategy, labour continued to be largely subsumed by the more resourceful and better 
organised bourgeois nationalists, with whom many communist groups and unions forged ‘patriotic 
alliances’ in accordance with the Comintern strategy for liberation struggles (Botman 1986: 351). 
Thus, while labour demands played a crucial role in disrupting economic activity during that period, 
they were often instrumentalised by rival nationalist elite factions. Second, neither unions nor 
communist groups proved able to organise and involve rural workers and peasants. This was perhaps 
due to the fact that most of these groups had been founded for only a decade or less, which was 
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insufficient time in which to expand beyond the urban workforce.61 Third, and most importantly, 
union and communist groups were attacked by every other counterrevolutionary contender and, most 
particularly, by the government and its security apparatus, with the support of the British military, 
Egyptian aristocrats turned industrial bourgeoisie, and the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 In 1952, the Free Officers exploited a protracted political stalemate to stage a coup and take 
control of the Egyptian polity.62 The following section surveys the evolution of the Free Officers from 
an underground military society to a ruling elite. 
 
2.1 The Evolution of the Free Officers  
From the beginning of its occupation of Egypt in 1882, Britain had worked to ensure that the Egyptian 
army remained detached from Egyptian political contentions (see Mitchell 1991). Britain controlled 
the resources of the Egyptian army, dictating the number of troops, supply of arms for, and military 
structure and vetting of, the armed forces. Additionally, recruitment and promotion were determined, 
not by merit, but by patronage and family ties to urban and landowning families (Hurewitz 1982: 
124). It was not until 1936, in the aftermath of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty (see Chapter 4), were the 
middle- and lower-class Egyptians given access to the Royal Military Academy. By then, the 
landowning elite required a larger force to replace the British officers. The new entrants brought with 
them anti-status quo ideas which were dominant among their classes (McDermott 1988: 151, Gordon 
1997: 40-50). In the inter-war period, a secret military society, the Free Officers Movement, was 
formed with the aim of establishing an independent republic by force, and dispossessing the 
aristocratic elite in the process (Johnson 1972: 3).  
 However, while they agreed on the general aim of establishing an independent republic, the 
Free Officers did not agree on its shape (Ismael and Al-Sa’id 1990: 73). Divergent ideological 
currents were represented in their ranks – including communists, nationalists, and Muslim Brothers; 
some high-ranking members were even linked to the palace and to property interests.63 Yet their 
shared combat experience  (mainly the humiliation  in 1948 in the war for Palestine) and social class 
                                                           
61 Leon Trotsky articulates this problem, arguing that ‘a backward colonial or semi-colonial country, 
the proletariat of which is insufficiently prepared to unite the peasantry and take power, is thereby incapable of 
bringing the democratic revolution to its conclusion’ (Trotsky 2005:263, quoted in De Smet 2016: 134).  
62 Between January and July 1952, the government formed four different cabinets, and the security 
situation deteriorated due to an increase in guerrilla attacks and riots directed, mostly, against British assets 
(Botman 1986: 350).  
63 Botman 1986: 350. Yusuf Siddiq and Ahmed Hamrush, among others, were members of the DMNL 
while working with the Free Officers. On the other hand, Abd al-Mun’im Abd al-Ra’ouf, Kamal al-Din Husayn 
and Husayn al-Shafi’i, were members of the Muslim Brotherhood and served at the Revolutionary Command 
Council. Anwar al-Sadat was a Muslim Brotherhood sympathiser and liaised between them and the Free 
Officers in its early years (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 419). 
 103 
(petty bourgeoisie families from rural Egypt), and their common hatred of the status quo helped 
maintain trust and secrecy among them (ibid.). But they had no clear strategy beyond the coup and the 
broad aims which united them. Thus, their success was more about luck and improvised decisions 
than anything else. As Joel Gordon eloquently describes it, ‘the story of the coup is one of good 
fortune and near disaster, and not a small amount of clever extemporaneous acting’ (Gordon 1997: 
52). 
After the coup, the Free Officers established a military body, the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC), which took full control of the Egyptian polity and supervised the transition to a 
republic. Counterrevolutionary contenders, along with the United States, France and Britain, 
welcomed the RCC as a solution to the protracted political stalemate in Egypt, which threatened a 
communist takeover.64 When, on the eve of the coup, British and foreign venues in Egypt were set on 
fire, it likely appeared to all observers that only a local military contender could restore order and 
protect private property.65 In that sense, this military contender did not represent class interests that 
were fundamentally antagonistic to that of the traditional large landowners in Egypt, though they did 
disagree on how the process of capitalist development should proceed (Hussein 1973: 95). Thus, the 
British army did not intervene on behalf of the ousted King. The British, as well as the French and US 
governments, negotiated with the new regime, and made concessions that ‘helped to consolidate its 
power’ (Halperin 2005: 1143).  
However, as the following section will show, the revolutionary intensification was not ended 
immediately after the Free Officers assumed power. The shape of the new polity was intensively 
contested not only among the officers, but by pressure groups, political parties, union leaders, 
intellectuals and representatives of the national capitalist classes.66 It was contested on the ground, as 
well, by the mobilisation of all segments of society, not least the already mobilised and intensified 
revolutionary contenders, which included communists, socialists, and labour organisations.  
Indeed, most workers and trade union leaders supported the new regime on the basis of a 
vague nationalist programme which reiterated the general goals of anti-imperialist struggle, including 
full independence, and the establishment of a republic and social justice, the abolition of feudalism, 
                                                           
64 See Morsy 1995: 307-316. Khalid Muhyi al-Din, a member of the Free Officers, suggested in an 
interview that several days before the movement seized power, a US Colonel at the US Embassy in Cairo 
assured an intermediary that the US would not intervene against the movement as long as it was not communist 
(Ismail and Al-Sa'id 1990: 72, cited in Halperin 2005). 
65 These events took place on 26 January, also known as ‘Black Saturday’. As a result of the Egyptian 
government’s unwillingness to declassify documents from that time, the instigators are still unknown, although 
communists and socialists are commonly accused of burning and looting some 750 venues [Al-Ahram Archives, 
retrieved from 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110512021201/http://www.ahram.org.eg/433/2011/02/04/457/55/Malafat.aspx] 
66 It is important to note here that it was not the army as a whole that seized power, but a quite small 
number of officers, 90 to 100, who had closely worked underground for years (Gordon 1997).  
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and the establishment of a strong national army, etc. (al-Khafaji 2004: 199). They saw the new rulers 
as allies who were reliable and represented a favourable, drastic change from the era of the monarchy 
(Beinin and Lockman 1987: 419). Initially, the Democratic Movement for National Liberation 
(DMNL), the largest communist organisation at the time, supported the coup (Botman 1986: 351). In 
fact, its leaders were informed of the planned coup ahead of time, and played an important role in 
disseminating the message of the Free Officers to the public by printing and distributing their leaflets 
(Hamrush 1977: 287-88). However, soon after the coup, the new regime banned revolutionary 
contenders (Mansfield 1973a: 75). The plan was to de-intensify revolution by prioritising economic 
development -- something, it was assumed, would be favoured by the masses simply because capital, 
from 1956 onwards, was owned exclusively by Egyptians. 
By granting workers some crucial rights mentioned earlier, the regime established credibility, 
reduced class tensions, and gained support for the nationalist project. Those rights, or economic 
concessions, were used as proof of the regime’s allegiance to the working class, and as something that 
would gain for the regime, in return, the political loyalty of the working class and an increase in their 
productivity. Despite the expansion of capitalist relations of production, Nasserist populism 
encouraged workers to imagine that they were both gaining ownership of their own product and 
benefiting ‘their nation’. This imagined collective benefit was to be achieved through a single mass 
party, the National Union, which involved even the remotest villages in national activities. Despite not 
having a meaningful political role, the masses, through their constant mass expression of loyalty to 
Nasser, gave them the perception that they were represented. This justified the criminalisation of work 
disruption, since it harmed ‘national production’ (Pratt 2001: 112). Consequently, labour disputes 
were resolved exclusively by government intervention (Beinin 1989: 77).  
On the other hand, the military elite was able to convince national capitalists that  concessions 
to labour were a necessary for the maintenance of capitalist development, as it would increase labour 
productivity and, more importantly, de-intensify class contentions. But the de-intensification of 
revolution and the establishment of this class-balance was a long process after the coup which, as 
these introductory sections have shown, is not isolated from counterrevolution and revolution that 
preceded it. The following sections discuss the long process that unfolded after the coup, again 
affirming that the coup did not end either phenomena which preceded it. 
 
3. Post-Coup Intensification (1952-1956) 
Contrary to common belief, the coup in 1952 was not a ‘revolution’. It neither started, nor ended, a 
revolution. Building on decades of revolutionary struggle trade unions, supported by communists and 
socialists, sought to play an active role in shaping the post-coup polity. The intensification of 
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revolution that had preceded the coup continued and even further intensified in the years following the 
coup, with more frequent strikes and larger mobilisation (Audsley 1958: 99-102, Beinin 1989: 76). 
Because the new military elite made revolutionary promises, revolutionary intensification no longer 
advanced the mutually exclusive demands that had been raised under the monarchy. But mobilisation 
continued, and represented a continued intensification which aimed at exerting pressure on the new 
rulers to implement their promises. 
On the other hand, counterrevolution continued under military rule. There was systematic 
attacks on militant trade unions, especially communists and their allies, to prevent the disruption of 
production and maintain a business-as-usual climate for private capital investment (Beinin and 
Lockman 1987: 418). The repression of communist and independent elements in the labour movement 
was an essential component of the RCC labour strategy and it preceded the labour reform measures 
that it eventually undertook (Beinin 1989: 73). The RCC’s 1952 labour law set the ground for a 
‘monistic, hierarchical, and semi-official model of union organization’ that would gradually co-opt 
small and independent unions until they are all incorporated under a statist labour confederation in 
1957 which would monopolise representation of the labour movement (Bianchi 1986: 431). The new 
law permitted one union federation for each occupational category, which then could be subsumed by 
the central confederation (ibid.). In order to further centralise union activity, the RCC continuously 
decreased the number of these federations between 1952 and 1957 (ibid.: 432).  
Union leaders who capitulated to the corporatisation of the labour movement were rewarded 
with highly attractive and unprecedented legal guarantees of job security, promotion, and retirement 
benefits. Thus, the corporatisation of the labour movement also involved ‘the selective co-optation of 
a collaborative, powerful, and handsomely rewarded segment of the non-communist union leadership’ 
(ibid.).  
The subjugation of communist, communist-leaning, and independent unions involved early 
and heavy use of force. A notorious case was the regime’s response to a strike a few weeks after the 
coup at the Misr Fine Spinning and Weaving Co. in Kafr al-Dawwar. Although the striking workers 
were demonstrating in favour of the new regime and in the expectation that it would grant their 
economic demands, the army clashed with the workers and broke the strike by force (Beinin 1989: 
73). A military tribunal ordered the execution of two workers, Mustafa Khamis and Muhammad al-
Baqri.67 Their execution drew an important and early line between the working class and the new 
regime, and became a rallying cry for disillusioned workers. Kafr al-Dawwar became a stronghold of 
                                                           
67 Abdel-Munim Amin, who presided over the military tribunal that found them guilty, was known to 
have close relations with the American embassy and to have encouraged foreign capital to invest in Egypt 
(Beinin 1989: 74).  
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the Marxist left (ibid.). When, in 1953, all political parties, except the Muslim Brotherhood, were 
banned, its union's leaders, including Muhammad Mutawalli al-Shacrawi, Fayiz 'Allam, Mahmud 
'Atallah and Ahmad al-Yabani, were later accused of being members of communist organisations, . 
Because of this early lesson about the new counterrevolution, revolutionary elements evolved 
in Kafr al-Dawwar ahead of those in other parts of the country. While workers would be granted 
access to important resources, they would be deprived from acquiring political power as a class. The 
banning of all political parties (except the Muslim Brotherhood) a year later made clear this aspect of 
Nasserist counterrevolution.  
As mentioned earlier, the de-intensification of revolution was attained, not by coercive means 
only, but by concessions to the working class. As early as September 1952, a series of laws offered 
increased severance compensation, longer holidays, free transport to remote factories, free healthcare, 
and, most importantly, job security, which was ‘the single most important demand of the postwar 
workers’ movement’ (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 432). These laws were fiercely contested by some 
national capitalists, and this led to their repeal in March 1953 (Beinin 1989: 74). Following a 
resignation letter submitted by a communist-leaning member of the Free Officers, Khaled 
Muhieddine, these laws were reinstated a few months later.68 That same year, land reform decrees 
secured the regime substantial support from peasants (ibid.). New legislation set a minimum wage, 
and put a cap on the size of private ownership, and on rental rates and leases (Al-Qazzaz 1971: 123). 
It also established cooperatives so that peasants who had acquired land would have greater access to 
the market and ability to secure credit loans for the purchase of the requisites of cultivation – seeds, 
fertilizers, cattle, and agricultural machinery (Berger 1964: 22). These laws brought dramatic 
improvements in rural standards of living, income distribution, and agricultural productivity. As many 
as 350,000 families benefited from the agrarian reform laws, accessing 700,000 feddans (Sallam 
1998: 4).  
 Alas, disparities in land holding and rural inequality continued, since less than 15 per cent of 
cultivated land was distributed (Bush 2007: 1601). Although these measures altered land access and 
ownership, it did not destroy the large landowning class altogether. It did, however, accelerate the 
transformation of large landowners into a national bourgeoisie (Bush 1999: 11-12). Each affected 
landowner received compensation for his excess land in government bonds worth ten times more than 
the rental value of the land, and were encouraged to invest their capital in more profitable industrial 
sectors in partnership with the state, since those bondholders were not eligible to purchase additional 
land (Beinin 1989: 72). The largest of those projects was the Iron and Steel Co. at Helwan, established 
                                                           
68 Khaled Muhieddine’s letter to Gamal Abdel Nasser, March 31, 1953, published with commentary in 
al-Ahali, July 24, 1985. Muhieddine was a DMNL member in 1947 (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 419). 
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in 1954. 50 percent of its capital was private and the other 50 percent was state financed (ibid.). 
Figure 3, below, maps out the polity and its contenders after the coup. 
  
Egypt’s polity between 1954 and 1956 (Figure 3) 
 
Contender (1) represents the RCC, in business partnership with the private sector’s 
bourgeoisie (2) which maintained their routine access to resources. Outside the polity, several 
challengers were still trying to find their way into the new polity, most notably the Muslim 
Brotherhood, communist and socialist groups, trade unions, and peasants (though, as ever, less 
organised as a contender). Externally, contenders 3 and 4 represent the two camps of the cold war, 
Western powers – mainly the US – and the USSR. Foreign capital was still present in Egypt and 
linked to the private sector’s bourgeoisie (3)-(2). The Soviet Union, on the other hand, routinely 
supported the communists and thus linked to it as a challenger. 
The rapid rise in Nasser’s popularity sanctioned further repression and coercion and, 
consequently, de-intensified revolution. But now-passive and ineffective revolutionary contenders 
continued to operate, though often without directly opposing the government’s overall nationalist 
project. The events which followed upon the Suez crisis in 1956 is an illuminating example of the 
continuity of revolution despite Nasser’s repression. During the Trilateral Aggression by the United 
Kingdom, France, and Israel, Egyptian unions collected donations from their members to form and 
arm popular defence units under the name of Trade Union Committees for Popular Resistance 
 108 
(al’lijan al’niqabiyya al-sha’abiyya) (ibid.). Over fifty local committees, involving hundreds of 
workers, were formed to coordinate war efforts in Port Said region. The popular resistance ‘published 
an underground newspaper, organised neighbourhood food supply, held mass demonstrations and 
carried out armed attacks on the European troops’ (Beinin 1987: 577).  
From the perspective of revolution, an armed and organised working class had the potential to 
impose itself again as a political actor. From the perspective of counterrevolution, the prospects of a 
communist-led and armed working class was a direct threat to the counterrevolutionary national 
project, although  its guerrilla tactics played a crucial role, according to most historical accounts, in 
delaying an imminent military defeat.69 The regime feared that armed working class segments with 
war experience might alter the balance of class power. Although the popular resistance, including 
communists, had closely cooperated with the Egyptian army during the war, and maintained an anti-
imperialist national unity discourse, days after the conclusion of the war, the popular resistance 
committees were disbanded and the houses and offices of communist instigators were raided (ibid.). 
The following sections examine how, in the wake of this victory, the government further 
concentrated foreign and local capital through wide-scale sequestration, and further subjugated labour 
by purging whatever was left of revolutionary challengers, and criminalising all labour activity that 
took place outside the framework of the state.  
 
4. Counterrevolution and Revolution between 1957 and 1962 
In July 1955, Nasser concluded his first major arms deal with the USSR; and, as relations between the 
two governments developed, recognised the People's Republic of China. In return, the United States 
and Britain cancelled their offer of loans for the building of the Aswan high dam, which the Free 
Officers were relying on as the cornerstone of Egypt's economic development. When Nasser retaliated 
by nationalising the Suez Canal Company in November 1956, Britain and France attacked Egypt, in 
collusion with Israel, This act of war provided the reason, not only for Nasser to cancel the Anglo-
Egyptian agreement and liquidate the Suez company, but to sequestrate Britain’s and France’s still 
very considerable economic assets in Egypt.  
After nationalising the canal and surviving a military retaliation by Britain, France, and Israel, 
Nasser had now become an invincible and unchallenged leader, not only of Egypt, but for the entire 
                                                           
69 After the war, union leaders, Fathi Kamil, Ahmad Fahim, Sayyid Abd al-Wahab Nada, and Nur 
Sulayman Jasr, published a book describing the contribution of the working class to the war effort. They 
recounted workers' enthusiastic expressions of support for the anti-imperialist and nationalist stands of the 
government. But they also argued that workers had played ‘the most important role in the defeat of imperialism’ 
(Kamil et al 1957: 7).   
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Arab world (Mansfield 1973b: 675). Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, the policies of the new regime 
developed often in response to unfolding events. Its only concrete policy was its economic 
development strategy of building a giant dam on the Nile near Aswan, which this chapter will discuss 
later.  
Therefore, it is likely that the sequestration of all foreign capital was not a pre-planned policy 
or part of a concrete governing strategy but, rather, a retaliatory one (Tignor 2015: 96). Regardless of 
this debatable point, the nationalisation trend strengthened the government’s grip on the economy, as 
much of the liquidated foreign capital was transferred to the Egyptian government. Between 1957 and 
1960, a number of public economic institutions were formed while others already in existence were 
expanded in order to manage the state's interests (Mansfield 1973b: 680). 
After the sequestration of foreign enterprises in 1956, the state bourgeoisie – consisting of 
bureaucrats, technocrats, and the free officers military elite, who managed these enterprises, became 
more economically powerful, undermining the private sector (Hinnebusch 1985). This led to policies 
which most of the literature on this period describes as ‘contradictory’, ones which led to an 
increasingly disenfranchised private sector (Tignor 2015: 110-112). Among the growing state 
bourgeoisie, there were disagreements over the role that private capital should play, and the role that 
the state bourgeoisie should play in directing private capital (see Abdel-Malek 1968). Despite 
government attempts to reassure the business community that its actions were meant to strengthen the 
private sector, the sequestration of Ahmad Abbud’s Egyptian Sugar Company, which had strong links 
to French capital and was one of the private sector’s most capital-intensive enterprises, was seen by 
the private sector as a threat to ‘business autonomy’ and its access to resources.70  
Undoubtedly, the private sector was continuously concerned about the trajectory of Nasser’s 
policies, and these concerns were larger for those who failed to establish personal ties with the 
growing state bourgeoisie, or had a controversial Wafdist history. But, generally, the regime 
continued to maintain a class balance, with a populist nationalist discourse which increased support 
for anti-communism and state-led capitalism.71 
Contrary to the expectations of many Egyptian Marxists, the shift in the balance between 
private and public capital after nationalisation did not bring about an automatic and dramatic change 
in relations between labour and capital. Instead, Nasser established a statist corporatist union, the 
                                                           
70 Ibid. Abbud Pasha was one of the wealthiest businessmen before the coup. By the 1940s, he owned 
the Sugar Company, the Khedival Mail Line as well as the Egyptian General Omnibus Company. In addition, he 
was the largest shareholder of Bank Misr, and obtained a seat on its board of directors in 1950. In the same year, 
he became the first Egyptian director of the Suez Canal Company, which at that time was still owned by 
foreigners. He was also an active and leading member of the Wafd party, especially in its final years. For more 
on Abbud Pasha, see Vitalis 1990: 291-315. 
71 Nasser’s interview with CBC network in Cairo 1954, retrieved from 
[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=toyIh9yZH_Y] 
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General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions (GFETU) in 1957, and granted it ‘legal monopoly over 
trade union organization’ (Beinin 2011: 1). The regime openly stated that the establishment of 
GFETU would make unions ‘centres of revolutionary radiation [sic] and instruments for pushing 
forward the wheels of production’, in contrast to  their previous role of ‘seizing of rights of defence of 
interests in opposition to employers’.72 The association of workers with ‘wheels of production’ – i.e. 
capital -- embodied the blurred line between counterrevolution and revolution that had emerged from 
decades of labour-nationalist convergence, where bourgeois-led nationalist subsumed the emerging 
working class. It shows how Nasser instrumentalised this convergence to redraw the revolutionary 
line, shifting it from class realities to a national imaginary.  
The government-appointed GFETU board of executives included Ahmad Fahim, who became 
Vice President of the GFETU. Fahim was the representative of the textile workers' unions and the 
only member of the executive board who had a history of association with independent leftist unions 
(Beinin 1989: 78-85).  The implications of Fahim's appointment to the GFETU executive board was, 
much like most of Nasser’s policies, double-edged. On the one hand, it represented a certain victory 
for revolution and a concession to the revolutionary contenders’ continuing strength in the textile 
industry (ibid.). On the other hand, Fahim himself was now incorporated into a state bureaucracy that 
restricted labour militancy and many of his comrades were now made to operate under the auspices of 
the government.  
Other union leaders were persuaded to join parliamentary life, which Nasser himself 
advocated as a further mechanism to place trade unions and their leaders under the control of the state. 
In the parliamentary elections July 1957, the first to be held since the fall of the monarchy, many 
union leaders announced their candidacy as part of a coordinated campaign endorsed by GFETU, in 
order to comply with the government’s view that trade unions ought to be apolitical, and restricted to 
raising narrow labour demands such as a 48-hour week and universal free education (Beinin 1989: 
84). Despite the state’s co-optation of major unions, revolution continued as, for instance, in 
promulgating proposals during the election hype in 1957 on the role of workers ‘as a class’ in the 
political process.73  
One can also argue that revolution continued through the activities of the remaining 
communist cells and Marxist intelligentsia. Some of these were allowed to write and publish after the 
Suez crisis, as long as they limited themselves to topics on which they supported the government's 
                                                           
72 Government notice published in Al-Ahram Al-Iqtisadiya, 1 December 1961; quoted in Posusney 
1997: 73. 
73 Ibid. Salah Ahmad 'Ali, a member of the executive board of the Shubra al-Khayma textile workers' 
union, proposed a comprehensive electoral program for workers grouped under the categories of national, trade 
union, and political objectives (ibid.) By providing a more political campaign, Ali and other union leaders were 
making a statement that workers' class interests were not strictly economic (ibid.).  
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policy or criticized them indirectly (Ismael and Al-Sa’id 1990). Others moved to Beirut and other 
cities of exile to continue producing revolutionary knowledge.74 Of course, such contributions 
remained passive – on the margins of a public discourse which was increasingly hegemonised by 
Nasser. Even the unity and re-emergence of the Communist Party in 1957 did not produce an effective 
contender, because its members agreed on little other than the necessity of unity, but it remained a 
continuous threat to the Nasserist counterrevolution (ibid.). Nonetheless, as we shall see in the 
following section, anti-communism remained a key concern of Nasser’s policies, both in Egypt and 
regionally. The following section explores  Nasser’s reaction to revolution in neighbouring Arab 
polities as representing the continuation of counterrevolution under his leadership.  
 
4.1 Regional Counterrevolution and Revolution 
Whether from Nasserists or Syrian Ba’athists, the reaction of Arab nationalists to the rise of 
communist and radical social groups in late 1950s and 1960s reaffirmed their counterrevolutionary 
stance vis-à-vis the working class. As this section will show, their economic support for the working 
class gave military elites the legitimacy needed to exercise exclusive decision-making power over 
political and economic matters. But while deriving legitimacy from the working class, they 
consistently denied them the right to exercise their power as a political class.   
 When leaders of the Syrian Ba’athist coup were threatened by rising communist and socialist 
challengers, they rushed to Nasser for help. Despite his initial reluctance, in 1958, Nasser accepted 
their desperate call for unity and formed the United Arab Republic (UAR).75 The rush to unity proved 
to be a disaster for both countries, as the Nasser overstepped his mandate to rid Syria of revolutionary 
challengers, by outrooting the Syrian nationalist state bourgeoisie from the polity. Nasser, however, 
accused the Syrian communists of plotting to detach Syria from the UAR.76 Months later, Iraqi 
communists rose to power in alliance with the leader of the Iraqi Ba’athist coup, Abd al-Karim 
Qassim, supported by the Soviet Union.77 The rise of the Iraqi communists intensified a regional 
power struggle between Cairo and Baghdad. The UAR presented the new struggle as one between 
‘true Arab nationalism’ – i.e. Nasserism – and the new ‘Communist imperialism’ which has made Iraq 
                                                           
74 Communist parties in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq welcomed Egypt’s revolutionaries and inspired their 
passive contentions even at the peak of Nasser’s reign. See Agwani 1969.  
75 Nasser was well aware that tampering with the status quo through such unification schemes can 
create a backlash from the local Syrian bourgeoisie, which it did. This is why Nasser reiterated in speech after 
speech that when he preaches unity, he means primarily a united Arab front - in line with Egypt's traditional 
Arab solidarity policy - and not a territorial merger of all the Arab States (see Seale 1960: 299).  
76 Nasser’s speech in Port Said on 23 December 1958. 
[http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=1015&lang=en]. 
77 For more on the nature of the new regime in Iraq under Qassim, see Bashkin 2011: 293-312, 
Dawisha 2009, and Phebe 2004.  
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its spring-board (Seale 1960: 297). For its part, the revolutionary Iraqi government characterised 
Nasserism as a ‘reactionary’ bourgeois ideology with predatory ambition (ibid.).  
 In contending against the Syrian and Iraqi communists, Nasser put at risk his crucial 
economic and military relations with the Soviet Union. But, in counterrevolutionary terms, the risk 
was justified, given that the conflict with Iraq in particular was no longer a rivalry between nationalist 
bourgeoisies over the leadership of the Arab cause, but an existential rivalry of opposing systems – or 
polity structures, i.e.  between a counterrevolutionary regime resembling a military dictatorship, and 
Iraq’s more clearly ‘progressive’ and revolutionary one. As Nasser stated in an interview with the 
editor of the Indian magazine, Blitz,  
 
… information which we obtained disclosed a basic Communist plan to take over Iraq and 
establish a Soviet State in that strategic Arab region. This would be followed by destruction 
of unity between Syria and Egypt. The final Communist aim was to establish a ‘Red’ fertile 
crescent composed of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Kuwait which would enable 
Communist influence to penetrate not only to the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aqaba but also 
to the Indian Ocean […] I unmasked their conspiracy against the Arab people. The 
Communists subsequently escaped to Baghdad, which has now become the headquarters of 
international Arab Communism.78 
 
Even before this rise in regional tensions, the Kremlin had frequently asked Nasser to 
recognise the role which Arab communists had played in the anti-imperialist struggle, and to allow for 
communist participation in government. Time and again, Nasser rejected Moscow’s ‘interference in 
domestic affairs’, and only through cunningly playing off the two principal Cold War powers against 
each other through his leading role in the non-alignment movement did he secure Soviet support for 
his ambitious Aswan High Dam project.79 To downplay Iraqi revolutionary developments which, 
because revolution is centred on class contentions is typically accredited to communism, Nasser 
reiterated that revolution had not taken place in the region (Seale 1960: 304). It would take place, 
according to Nasser, when all class forces were united in one ‘national front’, representing an alliance 
                                                           
78 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 April 1959 (Cairo Home Service, 18 April 1959). 
79 In a speech on 30 March 1959, Nasser said: ‘Those who talk of democracy today must re- member 
what happened to their country in 1917 when parliament was dismissed by force of arms. Now they forget their 
history and their chief stands up and attempts to stir up feelings against us. But no president of any foreign state 
can cause dissension among us and split our nation. We will not be subjected - either by West or East.' Retrieved 
from Nasser’s speeches’ archives [http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=747&lang=en] 
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among ‘the workers, the peasants, the intellectuals, the soldiers, and national capitalism’ that would 
replace the alliance between ‘feudalism and capitalism’.80 
Of course, the conservative monarchies, most notably Saudi Arabia, were also in a power 
struggle with Nasser during most of his tenure, threatened by his anti-status-quo pan-Arabist 
populism. Nasser’s policies seemed revolutionary in comparison to Saudi Arabia’s exclusionary 
structures. However, the struggle between Nasser’s Egypt and Saudi Arabia was over controlling 
‘Arab resources’ for differing capitalist projects. Their proxies battles in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and 
Iraq, represented two counterrevolutionary projects; one supported by co-opted and mobilised masses 
(Nasserism) and the other supported by the military and political power bought by concentrated 
hydrocarbon capital (Saudi Arabia). 
With the collapse of the UAR following a Ba’athist military coup in 1961, Nasser drafted a 
new constitution and launched his first five-year plan, which involved rapid nationalisation of 
substantial private capital and more comprehensive socialist policies. The following section expands 
on those policies, their impact on resource structures, and the continuation of counterrevolution and 
revolution. 
 
5. Counterrevolution and Revolution Between 1962 and 1967 
After the collapse of the UAR, Nasser seemed to fear a political challenge from local capital more 
than he did from foreign capital. The role played by the Syrian bourgeoisie in the failure of the UAR 
might have contributed to his increasing concern over the political ambitions of the bourgeoisie 
(Johnson 1972: 6-7). This was reflected in his economic policies which, from 1961 onwards, 
diminished the role of the private sector and resorted, instead, to foreign capital as a more reliable 
partner. Through the five-year plan of 1961, Egypt’s economy became focused on Import Substitution 
Industrialisation (ISI) – substituting foreign imports with domestic production as a means to reduce 
economic dependency.81 
A new Ministry of Industry was established to regulate all private enterprises and initiate a 
wave of nationalisations. This consolidated the power of the state over production by nationalising all 
banking, including Bank Misr and the National Bank of Egypt, insurance, and foreign trade, all 
utilities, marine transport, and airlines, and many hotels and department stores (ibid.). Military 
officers and technicians, as well as state bureaucrats managed what were now state-owned factories 
                                                           
80 Nasser’s speech on 21 May 1962, presenting the national charter at Cairo University 
[http://nasser.bibalex.org/Speeches/browser.aspx?SID=1015&lang=en]. 
81 Nasser boasts about Egypt’s industry in one of his speeches (unknown date, but likely after 1961): 
“Today we can be proud that we can and are producing everything, from needles to missiles. We manufacture 
buses, we manufacture ships, freezers, ovens, commercial vehicles, motorbikes, motorcycles, radios, televisions, 
knitting machines […]” See the documentary, Nasser: the time of siege - part 3, Al-Jazeera, 2017). 
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and enterprises (Bou Nassif 2013: 4-5). In sum, in this phase, the struggle between the state and the 
private bourgeoisie was largely settled in favour of the former (Wahba 1994: 85-86). Figure 5, below, 
illustrates these changes, particularly inside the polity. 
 
   Egypt’s Polity between 1961 and 1967 (Figure 5) 
 
 Contender (1) represents the corporatist regime that increasingly came to control the polity – 
mainly military and bureaucratic elites in political, administrative, and economic positions. The wave 
of nationalisations of Egyptian private capital in the early 1960s deprived the private sector’s 
bourgeoisie of routine access to strategic resources, and it is thus no longer represented inside the 
polity. The challengers outside the polity were weakened further, but are still represented despite their 
passive role. External actors 2, 3, and 4, represent the two principle Cold War powers and Saudi 
Arabia. 
Along with the wave of nationalisations, Nasser introduced new policies that increased the 
resources that were accessible by the masses, including urban rent control, universal healthcare and 
education. Again, these pro-labour policies were not strictly ‘revolutionary’. Though it provided 
increased access to resources for the masses, the broadening of the welfare system was meant to serve 
as another layer of protection for the state, to ensure the loyalty of an already subjugated population to 
the state – and the strongest on the ground – against a devious bourgeoisie. It did not allow the masses 
to participate in the political and economic life of the country, but eased their marginalisation through 
rewarding them with relatively better living standards. 
Ironically, Nasser’s ambitious economic plan led Egypt, again, towards dependency on 
foreign capital (Abdalla 1982: 87-97). Foreign capital, mostly in the form of loans, came to Egypt 
from the East and the West, from governments, private sources, and international financial institutions 
(ibid.). The largest of those loans came from the Soviet Union, with the lowest interests. Between 
1962 and 1967, the USSR provided Egypt with $419 million worth of loans, one-third of its total 
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foreign loans (ibid.: 88). These loans contributed immensely to the state’s economic plans. Most of 
the Soviet loans went into the construction of the Aswan High Dam. The High Dam increased Egypt's 
cultivated area by 20 to 25 per cent and provided immense quantities of cheap hydroelectric power for 
industrialisation (Mansfield 1973b: 679). Over this period, soft and heavy industries, from textile and 
sugar to steel, chemicals, and electronics, generated over 1 million new jobs with an annual growth 
rate of 6 per cent (Chalcraft 2016: 242). The country was producing most of its needs. However, 
Egypt’s new industries did not have the capacity to produce at a mass scale for export and was 
therefore restricted to the local consumer market. It was depleting foreign currency reserve to pay for 
the import of raw materials required for its industrial production, without the ability to export its 
produce. To cover the deficit, the government had to rely on loans, which both the US and the Soviet 
Union became reluctant to give as Egypt plunged further into debt.  
A military victory, however, might resurrect his national project and give him access to 
additional resources. The prolonged war in Yemen, in which 30,000 elite Egyptian troops participated 
on the side of the republican forces against royalists supported by Saudi Arabia, did not lead to a 
decisive victory for either sides (see Ferris 2013: 174-214). Rather than bringing home and 
demobilising his defeated forces, Nasser sought a more defining victory from an imminent 
confrontation with Israel, a battle upon which Nasser’s entire populist pan-Arab discourse rested. 
However, Egypt was dealt a humiliating blow, as Israel destroyed its military in less than six days, 
despite the involvement of Jordan and Syria. 
Nasser resigned and took full responsibility for the defeat. But the Egyptian masses flooded 
the streets and demanded that Nasser withdraws his resignation. This layer of protection, the loyal 
masses, which Nasser had carefully built up against his challengers, was not ready to be left again to 
its own fate. The Egyptian working class, peasants, students, and new urban middle classes were 
unable to imagine a better future after Nasser, given the decades of economic hardship that they had 
faced before his land reforms and welfare system (see Mansfield 1973b: 687-688). The irony is that, 
over the previous decade, Nasser himself had destroyed all possible pro-labour and labour contenders, 
and thus he was, indeed, all that remained to them. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Throughout the Nasser phase, the regime instrumentalised the convergence that had developed 
between bourgeois nationalists in pursuit of a capitalist state agenda, and the labour movement in 
previous decades which, as Chapter 4 argued, blurred the line between counterrevolution and 
revolution. Nasser was able to openly call for an alliance between national capitalists and the working 
class, and was applauded by an audience of hundreds of thousands of members of the working class. 
The regime benefitted from continuing to blur this line, and this succeeded in justifying his 
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‘neutralisation’ of revolutionary contenders: communists, socialists, independent trade unions, and 
even liberal and left-leaning opposition. This was done by granting the working class significant 
economic concessions, while, simultaneously, depriving it from any meaningful participation in 
political life. The working class served the state-led counterrevolutionary nationalist project, in return 
for economic concessions.  
Nasser allowed the Egyptian masses to access resources previously restricted to a privileged 
few, while at the same time ensuring the continuation of counterrevolution through the continuation of 
capitalist development, concentration of economic and political power and the co-optation and 
incorporation of unions. His defeat against Israel in 1967 and subsequent death in 1970 did not end 
the rule of the military elite. Instead, a new socio-economic strategy emerged that would gradually 
transform the polity structures of Egypt while, at the same time, reproducing both counterrevolution 
and revolution.  
The following chapter argues that counterrevolution was continued by Nasser’s successor, 
Anwar al-Sadat. Sadat reversed the Nasserist strategy, which ensured the continuation of 
counterrevolution. His regime gradually excluded the working class from accessing economic 
resources by rolling back Nasser’s welfare policies and re-introducing the private sector in the form of 
cartels controlled by the former private bourgeoisie. At the same time, he granted – albeit temporarily 
– some measure of political liberalisation. The military elite paid off their costly defeat in 1967 and 
the subsequent war in 1973 by increasing the extraction of surplus value from the working classes: 
prices and taxes were increased, the workweek was increased from 42 to 48 hours without 
compensation, forced savings were deducted from monthly wages, and paid holidays were cancelled 
(Posusney 1996: 219). But, at the same time, elections were held and some degree of participation in 
public, parliamentary and political life was allowed. 
 Revolution, on the other hand, began to re-emerge as the state gradually withdrew its 
economic support for the working class. The following chapter will survey the evolution of 










CHAPTER 6  
 
COUNTERREVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION IN POST-NASSER 
EGYPT: NEOLIBERAL AUTHORITARIANISM (1970-2011) 
 
Neo-liberalism is a success of the political imagination. Its achievement is a double one. It makes 
the window of political debate uncommonly narrow and at the same time promises from this 
window a prospect without limits. On the one hand, it frames public discussion within the elliptic 
language of neo-classical economics. The condition of the nation and its collective wellbeing are 
pictured only in terms of how it is adjusted in gross to the discipline of monetary and fiscal balance 
sheets. On the other, neglecting the actual concerns of any concrete local or collective community, 
it encourages the most exuberant dreams of private accumulation - and a chaotic reallocation of 
collective resources (Mitchell 1999: 455). 
 
1. Introduction  
This chapter examines the continuation of counterrevolution and revolution in Egypt after Nasser, 
from 1970 to the 2011 intensification. During this period Egypt had two presidents – Anwar al-Sadat 
(1970-1981), and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), both of whom came out of the military corps. This 
period saw the continuation of modern counterrevolution – i.e. capitalism, through a gradual process 
of neoliberalising resource access without withdrawing the state control over the then private sector. 
Whatever economic inclusion that Nasser introduced was gradually reversed, while introducing 
temporary and limited space for political participation. Independent labour movement gradually 
remerged, in response to the state’s attempts to reverse Nasser’s social support policies.  
This chapter will argue that, in this period, counterrevolution continued mostly through two 
main contenders: 1) the newly wedded state-private bourgeoisie and 2) the Muslim Brotherhood. The 
former contender restricted the returns of ‘market openness’ to itself, ‘cartelising’ the expanding 
private sector at the expense of the masses and suppressing revolution, through the use of both old and 
new tactics. The latter exploited the same counterrevolutionary economic system, both in Egypt and 
in the resourceful conservative Arab monarchies, to advance a far-right religious agenda and 
undermine leftist elements within the working class. As we shall see in this and the following chapter, 
the power struggle between those two bourgeois counterrevolutionary contenders defines the 
counterrevolutionary process in Egypt up until the present day.  
 118 
The change in counterrevolutionary contention, from state-owned capitalist economy to a 
hybrid state-private economy, was influenced by a number of local and international factors. The 
United States-Soviet détente, which began in 1972, gradually increased US dominance in Middle 
East, and, after the 1967 defeat against Israel (see Chapter 5), the Egyptian military could only 
continue its counterrevolution through tapping into the oil surplus of US allies in the Gulf (Guwaida 
1976: 105). In addition to Arab Gulf capital, Egypt was in dire need for foreign capital, which, by the 
1970s, became conditional upon a neoliberalisation agenda supported by the US and Europe. And, in 
the case of Egypt, it was also conditional upon serious peace efforts with Israel, which would 
eventually bring global recognition for Egypt’s market. Therefore, Nasser’s successor, Sadat, began a 
series of attempts to reverse Nasser’s economic and foreign policies, on the one hand de-regulating 
and privatising state enterprises and, on the other, withdrawing from the pan-Arab project and 
reconciling with Saudi Arabia, in the hopes of attracting regional and international capital.  
This reversal in state policy, which became known as ‘infitah’ (open-door policy), included 
cleansing the state appartus from alleged Nasserist and leftist elements, without harming the 
privileges of the state bourgeoisie as a class. The privileges of the state bourgeoisie, who, as the 
previous chapter has shown, were in control of the largely state-owned economy, were guaranteed 
through the process of privatisation itself. The state reconciled with the large landowners, allowing to 
reclaim some of their sequestered land (Kandil 2012: 160), as well as the private bourgeoisie who 
were side-lined by Nasser’s sequestration in the 1960s, and incentivised joint ventures between them 
and state enterprises. These joint ventures were then legally treated as private enterprises. In doing so, 
the state gradually wedded the state bourgeoisie with the international capitalist system, and thus 
consolidated pro-capital interests.  
The chapter will, in parallel to the discussion of counterrevolution, also trace the continuation 
of revolution after Nasser. While Nasser was successful in either co-opting revolutionary groups or 
dismantling them, after his death, revolution continued to evolve slowly in organised labour 
contentions and more passive, disorganised, and narrow forms of resistance to the outcomes of 
neoliberalisation, culminating eventually in the formation of political contenders which led the 
intensification of 2011.  
Finally, this chapter reflects on the intrinsic relationship between counterrevolution and 
revolution, by surveying how counterrevolutionary and revolutionary contenders were continuously 
responding to one another’s contentions, and how their forms of contention were influenced by each 
other’s. The state’s implementation of neo-liberal policies was shaped, at least partly, by labour 
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resistance;82 while labour responses were, themselves, shaped by the contentions of the state and its 
pro-capital alliance. 
This intrinsic relationship between revolution and counterrevolution was discussed in 
previous chapters and in relation to earlier periods of modern Egyptian history. So, for instance, 
Chapter 5 argued that the ‘contradictions’ of Nasserist policies reveal an intrinsic relationship between 
counterrevolution and revolution. The survival or maintenance of each has always relied on the 
interactive contentions of each with the other. In response to revolution, Nasser attempted to strike a 
balance between coercion and concessions. As this chapter will show, Nasser’s successors continued 
to employ coercion, but concessions were no longer needed. By reconciling with capitalist classes and 
US allies in the region, the masses were no longer needed as a ‘layer of protection’. Capital became 
an alternative ‘layer of protection’ for the regime, and the masses consequently ceased to serve this 
function.  
The first section will expand on this process of withdrawal from Pan-Arabism under Sadat, 
and its implications for Egypt’s polity structures, and processes of counterrevolution and revolution. 
The second section will focus on the first decade of President Mubarak’s tenure following Sadat’s 
assassination in 1981. Then, the third section explores the intensification of neoliberal 
counterrevolution in the 1990s and 2000s, which paved the way for the unprecedentedly powerful 
revolutionary intensification in 2011. 
 
2. Counterrevolution and Revolution Under Sadat 
After the military defeat in 1967, Egypt was no longer able to pursue additional regional resources by 
force. And with the US-Soviet rapprochement, Egypt was no longer able to exploit Cold War rivalries 
to its own advantage. Sadat and his entourage believed that the rapprochement gave the US the upper 
hand in Arab affairs, and 1967 forced the military to consider getting some access to resources 
through peaceful options.83 Instead of continued estrangement from, if not confrontation with, the US, 
reconciliation with US allies in the region, particularly with the Arab Gulf monarchies, would 
revitalise the Egyptian economy and military. As this section will later show, Sadat was also relying 
on the capital of segments of the conservative Egyptian bourgeoisie affiliated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood who had fled Nasser’s crackdown and moved to Arab Gulf states (Beinin 2005: 117-
120).  
                                                           
 82 Many attempts at repealing certain labour privileges were halted or delayed because of labour 
responses, or for fear of provoking one (Posusney 1992: 89-90). 
83 The Dialogue Paper, ‘waraqat al-hiwar’, which the parliament drafted in 1973, clearly states that the 
détente between the two superpowers had led the US to be more daring in its military, political, and economic 
support for Israel, and more open in its enmity towards the Arabs, which in turn would lead the US to block 
paths to a just political settlement (Waterbury 1983: 125).  
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It is also important to situate Sadat’s ‘infitah’ in a global shift towards ‘free markets’ which 
advanced capitalist elements began contending for across the world. Hit by recession in 1973, Fordist-
Kenesian economic policies in the US and the UK were gradually replaced (by the Reagan and 
Thatcher administrations in the US and the UK) with neoliberal structures of capital accumulation 
based on flexible specialisation (Beinin 2005: 114). The new policies were not interested in increasing 
productivity, but in securing favourable conditions for the financialisation of capital. This, of course, 
was accompanied by a neo-imperialist project which sought to open up Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America to foreign investment with the help of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
(see Piore and Sabel 1984; Harvey 1989; Brenner 2002).   
Infitah was preceded by what came to be known as the ‘Corrective Revolution’, where Sadat 
imprisoned or sidelined all high-ranking officers, bureaucrats, union leaders, and intellectuals whom 
he suspected of being Nasserists or leftists.84 Then, few months after Nasser’s death, Sadat introduced 
Law 65, which provided a five-year tax exemption for private enterprises, established free zones, and 
granted legal autonomy to joint ventures between foreign investors and the public sector (Waterbury 
1983: 130).  
Sadat did not immediately roll back all Nasser’s labour policies in the public sector; but he 
undermined the impact of these policies by diminishing the size of the public sector through 
privatisation, all the while extracting more resources from workers under the pretence of financing 
‘war efforts’. The liberation of Sinai in 1973 emboldened Sadat and gave him a stronger mandate to 
reverse Nassirist policies and to publicly reiterate that his era would be fundamentally different from 
Nasser’s. Additionally, the war accelerated reconciliation between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, 
manifested in the 1973 oil embargo which was, allegedly, imposed in response to US support for 
Israel.85 
 In 1974, the parliament passed a set of laws promoting infitah and continued to review the set 
of regulations on foreign investment.  The new legislation did not come at the expense of the state 
bourgeoisie. Although it slowly opened up the market for private sector competition, it gave legal 
leeway for the state bourgeoisie to enter the private sector. The gradual privatisation of the public 
sector did not marginalise the state bourgeoisie that managed it, but, on the contrary, turned them into 
private owners and partners with private capital. Law 43 of 1974 provided that any partnership 
                                                           
84  See Kandil (2012: 105-108), Aoude (1994), and Farah (1986: 27). This included a power struggle 
over succession between Sadat and other high-ranking officials, most notoriously with Ali Sabri (Hinnebusch 
1981: 444). 
85 Sadat claimed that, on the eve of the war, Egypt reached the ‘zero stage’, marhalat al-sefr, unable to 
pay ‘a penny towards out debt instalments falling due on January 1 [1974], nor could I have brought a grain of 
wheat in 1974. There wouldn’t have been bread for the people […] But as soon as the battle of October 6 was 
over, our Arab brethren came to our aid with $500 million … and this sum would have never come had we not 
taken effective action in the battle’. See Sadat’s article in al-Usbu’ al-‘Arabi, October 9, 1974, quoted in 
Waterbury 1983: 128).  
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between private capital and a public sector firm would automatically considered to be part of the 
private sector, even if the majority shares were held by the Egyptian public firm (Waterbury 1983: 
131). Thus, the law encouraged private-public partnerships, and the percentage of shares allowed for 
each was continuously contested throughout this period. 
The implications of this law for counterrevolution and revolution were immense. Because the 
private sector was not subject to the labour laws of the public sector, by labelling private-public 
ventures as private, the government exempted the public sector from regulations regarding worker 
representation on management boards, profit-sharing formulae, holidays and salary ceilings. Although 
the law also ended the public sector’s monopoly control of the economy, it did so while ensuring that 
the state bourgeoisie who were partnering with private capital would accumulate more profit and 
contend with less resourceful workers. 
Through the gradual ‘interpenetration’ of state bourgeoisie in the international capitalist 
system (Hanieh 2013: 136), the state became even more involved in facilitating capital accumulation 
and, thus, created an even more ‘intimate’ relationship between the state and capital (Naguib 2011: 5). 
As the state and capital became increasingly intertwined, revolution not only continued in organised 
labour contentions, but also in passive, as well as arbitrary forms of contentions which involved 
people from different social strata. Nonetheless, these contentions  slowly fostered revolution because 
the masses, in their various relations with production, could relate their idiosyncratic experiences of 
exclusion to one another (see Buroway 1984: 41-42). 
These contentions, which became increasingly frequent in this period, were driven by 
concerns relating to subsistence and basic needs, rather than being a positive demand for greater 
inclusion (see Abdallah 1995). In other words, the masses were continuously engaged in efforts to 
save what was left of the routine access to resources that had been granted to them by Nasser’s 
welfare policies. However, they lacked the the organisational basis to effectively press their demands 
since Nasser had dismantled independent labour organisations and subsumed the  politics of labour to 
that of the state. The corporatist union confederation, ETUF, continued its effort to subdue labour 
activity for the sake of state interests. Unions which were able to withstand state repression increased 
their activity as neoliberal policies gradually began taking a toll; but, again, this mostly focussed on 
negative demands, on saving what had been gained under Nasser.  
The state, on the other hand, used several old and new counterrevolutionary tactics to keep 
workers at bay. It continued to use violence and repression against emerging independent labour 
organisations, leftist and pro-labour parties, thanks to the multiple state intelligence and police 
institutions which arose out of secret cells formed by competing officers during the Nasser era (see 
Abdul-Magd 2016: 65-68). It also continued to absorb the pressure from workers by involving 
governmental or judicial bodies in industrial disputes, These protracted the review process and, even 
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when ruling in the workers’ favour, employers were allowed to delay their compliance and often did 
not comply at all (Posusney 1993: 103), though when the employees did not comply, they were 
imprisoned. They no longer were needed to function as a ‘layer of protection’ for the ruling military 
elite, now that capital had become the state.  
This naturally increased the tensions between the workers, wage-earning middle classes, and 
the state. This tension is manifested in the increasing resistance by the working class to pay for ‘war 
efforts’ (Posusney 1993: 101). For example, in September 1974, workers occupied the Harir Textile 
Factory in Helwan, protesting the funding of war efforts which, they declared, were no longer 
necessary after the liberation of Sinai. They won a nation-wide change in the war financing plan 
which had been applied to workers: deductions were reduced by almost 60 percent to 1.5 percent of 
salary and were also applied only to workers earning more than thirty pounds per month.86 The private 
sector witnessed the continuation of revolution too, despite the privileges granted to it. In the same 
year, a strike took place at the privately-owned Tanta Tobacco Company when the owner arbitrarily 
switched pay rates from monthly to daily, resulting in about a 30 percent decline in wages. 
 In 1975, some workers in larger factories began mobilising against the government's new 
economic policies. Other spontaneous demonstrations took place in public squares and transport 
stations, carrying similar demands. Chants recorded at these demonstrations reflect public frustration 
with declining living standards; for, although attendees came from different social strata they shared 
the experience of exclusion and agreed on its source: ‘Where is our breakfast, hero of the crossing?’ 
(in reference to Sadat’s 1973 war); and ‘In the days of defeat, the people could still eat’ (Posusney 
1993: 96). In the same year, a group of leftist intellectuals formed a new political organisation, 
Tagammu’ (meaning ‘the organisation’). They sided with the strikers and demonstrators, demanding 
political freedoms and labour rights (Lachine 1977: 5).   
 In the following year, Tagammu’ evolved into a political party. Fearing its emergence as a 
revolutionary contender, Sadat arrested over 200 of its members and accused it of being a cover for 
illegal communists (ibid.). Indeed, communists were closely coordinating via Tagammu’, and they 
themselves re-organised that year and founded the underground Egyptian Communist Party (ECP). 
The ECP brought together communists from different ideological strands. Its members mostly 
consisted of the old cadres from the 1940s and 1950s, and young militants who had emerged from 
post-1967 student movements.87 
                                                           
86 See al-'Ummal, February 3, 1975, p. 1 




In parallel, the number of demonstrations continued to increase, including a strike by bus 
drivers that paralysed parts of Cairo for several days (Posusney 1993: 96). The government tried to 
undermine public support for the striking bus drivers by accusing communists of being behind the 
strike and disrupting peoples’ lives. However, Sadat met with leaders of the drivers' union federation 
to discuss the workers' grievances, and their demands were met.88 The events that took place in 1977 
reflect this continuous relationship between counterrevolutionary and revolutionary contenders.  
 
2.1 Counterrevolution and Revolution Between 1977 and 1981 
In preparation for an IMF loan, Sadat announced a reduction of subsidies on a wide range of items in 
1977. Industrial workers across Egypt walked out of their jobs. Leftist students joined workers in their 
protests, which spread rapidly through the whole country. The chants at the 1977 demonstrations were 
similar to those from the earlier protests in the 1970s, and thus reflected a continuity in the collective 
opposition to their exclusion by the new regime. People chanted: ‘Nasser always said take care of the 
workers' and ‘It's not enough that they dress us in jute, now they've come to take our bread’ (see 
Hinnebusch 1985: 71, Baker 1978: 165). The government blamed ‘secret communist organisations’ 
for organising ‘riots’, and mobilised the police, security forces and the army on the streets to de-
intensify the revolutionary tide (De Smet 2016: 166). The leftist press was shut down, and virtually 
every leftist involved in the trade union movement was imprisoned (Posusney 1996: 237). Around 80 
people died, thousands were wounded, and 1500 were arrested.  
Yet Sadat was forced to retract the decision to lift subsidies and, furthermore, hold his first 
formal meeting with ETUF leaders since before the 1973 war. He agreed to the federation’s demands, 
not only for wage increases, but also for greater union input into management and governmental 
decision making (Posusney 1992: 90). In return, Sadat secured guarantees against the involvement by 
the unions in the formation of a labour party (ibid.). For this deal, Sadat used Nasser-style 
concessions, for similar counterrevolutionary ends: to narrow gains by labour, and ensure that labour 
would not be able to organise politically. In the same year, Sadat created the National Democratic 
Party (NDP) to replace Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union Party and to present a more ‘democratic’ façade 
for Sadat’s dictatorship (see Aoude 1994, Tucker 1978: 6). 
The case of Sadat’s union deal in 1977 is indicative of an evolving and learning 
counterrevolution. By getting guarantees against the formation of an independent labour contender, 
Sadat was clearing the way for a more gradual and more effective implementation of neoliberalisation 
                                                           
88 Their demands were met because they were narrow, mainly protesting the delay in bonus payment. 
See the Marxist journal, al-Tali'a, September issue, 1976. 
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(Bayat 1993: 76-78). He supported a gradual process of structural adjustment in negotiations with 
IMF officials and the US government by referring to the social unrest that had arisen in 1977. Much 
like Sadat, Washington’s foreign policy establishment tended to prioritise political stability over 
reform, as long as ‘business’ continued unabated (Sullivan 1992: 28).  
The only effective contender spared was the Muslim Brotherhood, which, in 
counterrevolutionary terms, did not threaten the existing polity structures. As the following section 
will argue, Sadat had personally known the Muslim Brotherhood leaders since the 1940s and did not 
mind their activity, since they brought to Egypt much-needed capital from the Gulf, which was used 
both to provide social support for the classes negatively affected by state welfare repeal, and to 
contribute to private investments. They were, in other words, a necessary supplement to Sadat’s 
neoliberal counterrevolution. 
 
2.2   The Brotherhood’s Counterrevolution 
Sadat systematically worked to reduce opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-
Muslimeen). The Muslim Brotherhood did not threaten to change counterrevolutionary resource 
structures – in this case, neoliberalism – but sought to be included in the polity in order to influence 
social and political norms. Since his early days with the Free Officers in the 1940s, Sadat was known 
to be apologetic towards the Brotherhood. In fact, he was the Free Officers’ point of contact with 
them (Beinin and Lockman 1987: 419).89 
When he came to power, his conservative values were in line with that of the Brotherhood. 
Sadat declared himself to be the ‘Pious President’, invoking Islamic values and advancing 
counterrevolutionary clerical elite to positions of influence (Zubaida 1992: 5-8). Consequently, seeing 
new economic and political opportunities in Sadat’s polity, the conservative religious segments of the 
bourgeoisie affiliated with the Brotherhood who fled Nasser to the oil-rich Arab Gulf returned, 
bringing with them petrodollars (Beinin 2005). This network of Brotherhood businessmen became 
active in the private sector through partnerships with the state bourgeoisie (ibid.). Politically, they 
were emboldened by an increasingly conservative Egyptian expat community that worked in 
conservative oil-producing monarchies and had been influenced by the forms of Islam and politics 
practiced there (ibid.: 115). 
Together with Sadat’s state bureaucrats, military officers, and Infitah nouveaux riches, the 
Brotherhood became an active promoter of neoliberal counterrevolution (Naguib 2009: 162-3). By 
                                                           
89 Unfortunately, the Egyptian government keeps historical documents on the relationship between the 
Brotherhood and the Free Officers, and on Sadat in particular, secret. The little we know about this part of his 
history is disclosed through the biographical accounts of high-ranking officials from this period.  
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1980, about 40 percent of all private economic ventures in Egypt were connected with the 
Brotherhood’s interests (ibid.). The private sector’s most profitable industries were controlled by 
eighteen families, eight of which had ties to the Brotherhood, with the rest coming from Sadat’s 
circles, and private and state bourgeoisie (ibid.). 
The Brotherhood’s business tycoons included Youssef Nada, founder of Al-Taqwa Bank; 
Hassan Malek, a large investor in the textile industry, electrical supplies and trade fairs; Khairat al-
Shater, a big investor in IT, pharmaceuticals and textiles,; Abdel-Rahman Saudi, owner of a 
supermarket chain and agricultural export company;  Safwan Thabet of the Juhayna group – the 
largest processor and distributor in Egypt of dairy products with investments in livestock and land 
reclamation; and Mohamed Mo’men of the Mo’men Group – the country’s largest fast-food chain, 
with branches across North Africa and the Gulf (Hanieh 2013: 171). These individuals controlled the 
MB’s decision-making processes through its so-called Guidance Bureau (ibid.). Thus the political 
project of the Muslim Brotherhood became closely connected to the business interests of these leading 
members which, politically and economically, constituted a counterrevolutionary project. 
Furthermore, the social support institutions of the Brotherhood were crucial in pacifying class 
segments harmed by neoliberalism. The basic social support that Nasser’s government had provided 
was provided now, more selectively and politically by the Brotherhood (see Clark 2004: 42-68). 
Using these social institutions, the Brotherhood was able to expand its support base and spread its 
conservative message. The surviving leftist groups were unable to match the resourcefulness of the 
Brotherhood campaigns, and thus the Islamic movements, al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya – the groups and 
organisations that had branched out of the Muslim Brotherhood – dominated efforts of political and 
social mobilisation in working class neighbourhoods and on university campuses (Beinin 2005: 119, 
Naguib 2009: 163-4).90  
But the honeymoon between Sadat and the Brotherhood ended with his visit to Israel in 1977 
and the peace talks which followed (Farah 1986: 126). The Palestinian cause had been a central issue 
for the Brotherhood since its establishment in 1928. Clerics and Islamist political figures reiterated in 
their speeches how liberal and military rulers alike had failed the cause from 1948 to 1967, presenting 
the Islamist parties as an alternative political movement with an uncompromising stance on this issue. 
‘Betraying Jerusalem’ was then a blasphemy. Most of the non-Islamist bourgeoisie realised the 
economic rewards of peace. The military elite, on the other hand, were persuaded not only by 
promises of hefty annual US aid which continues until today, but by an even greater role in the 
economy (Weinbaum 1986: 119-134, Bou Nassif 2013: 512-515).  
                                                           
90See Abdallah 1985: 226, where he discusses how a former secretary of the regime’s Arab Socialist 
Union, Mohamed Uthman Ismail, played a defining role in facilitating the activities of radical Islamist groups 
on campuses. 
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The challenge to peace, therefore, came mostly from the Islamist camp. Al-Gama’at al-
Islamiyya mobilised across the country against Camp David (peace) Accords, and several smaller 
leftist and Nasserist groups joined their protests. Sadat responded with force, banning Islamist groups 
and cracking down on Islamist assemblies (Marfleet 2016: 87). In September 1981 alone, the 
government arrested over 1,500 activists, including the most senior figure in the Brotherhood, Umar 
al-Tilmisani (Beinin 2005: 123-124). The contention between the Brotherhood and Sadat culminated 
in his assassination by a member of the Al-Jihad group, one of the Islamist movements he had 
sponsored for almost a decade (ibid.). 
 
3. Counterrevolution and Revolution under Mubarak (1981-1990) 
Alas, the Islamist counterrevolution never had a problem with the Egyptian state’s exclusionary 
resource structures. As discussed earlier, the Muslim Brotherhood benefitted from neoliberalism and 
co-existed with the state bourgeoisie. While they contested over mutually exclusive political projects, 
neoliberal counterrevolutionary mechanisms were an issue on which they never diverged. As soon as 
Hosni Mubarak took over as Egypt’s president in 1981, most of the Islamist prisoners were released. 
Despite maintaining the ban, the government allowed the Brotherhood to participate in political life 
and, in Mubarak’s parliamentary elections, placed its own candidates on lists of parties with official 
status – first the returning Wafd Party, and, later on, the Socialist Labour Party and the Liberal Party 
(Marfleet 2016: 88). In 1984, the Brotherhood had eight seats in parliament and, by 1987, it formed an 
Islamic Alliance campaigning under the appealing and effective banner, ‘Islam is the solution’, and 
winning 56 seats (ibid.). The emergency law that Mubarak put in place after the Sadat assassination 
gave him even more powers than his predecessor. He further expanded the NDP’s political reach to 
better serve his neoliberal agenda (Aoudé, 1994: 15). His business entourage became leading figures 
in the party and, subsequently, members of the parliament. 
As for the military, their privileged positions were in fact upgraded after peace ensued. The 
state founded the National Services Projects Organisations (NSPO), an economic body which 
established various business enterprises run by retired officers. These enterprises were granted 
privileges not enjoyed by any other company in the private or public sectors. They were exempt from 
all the laws and regulations applied to all other companies, unaccountable to any government body, 
and granted various subsidies and tax exemptions (Bou Nassif 2013: 526). Furthermore, the Armed 
Forces’ Land Projects Organisations (AFLPO) was formed to use public lands for military-led 
commercial investments under the pretence of ‘defending the nation’ (Abdul-Magd 2011). Army 
generals whose sole expertise is in military matters were retired and handed managing positions in 
key economic sectors, such as tourism in Luxor and Aswan, sugar manufacturing in Qena, fishing and 
tucking industries and Suez, and even the Opera House in Cairo (ibid.). Additionally, almost all 
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appointed governors and city mayors outside Cairo have been retired military men since then, and 
many ambassadors and employees of the diplomatic corps came from the military.91  
Under Mubarak, the workers’ experience of exclusion was felt increasingly in relation to the 
state, which reaffirmed its identity as a class rival. Most of their managers, employers, and governors 
were in one way or another related to the state, and embodied its corruption and patronage. Thus 
revolution continued through both, public demonstrations representing negative demands to the state 
and, less often, organised labour contentions.92 It also continued in weakened and ineffective leftist 
political activity, represented in organisations like Tagammu’ and the communists, whose leadership 
were gradually silenced or co-opted into the state in token labour-related posts. In parallel, the same 
intelligence and police agencies continued to repress any meaningful expression of discontent.  
But the revolutionary pressure was eased thanks to the oil boom in the Arab Gulf. Hundreds 
of thousands of Egyptians left for jobs in the Gulf oil states between 1977 and 1984. Migration bid up 
the cost of labour in the formal private sector. This in turn reduced economic woes and led to relative 
growth in nominal wages in the private sector. Per capita income doubled during the oil boom years 
between 1974-85 from USD 334 in 1974 to USD 700 in 1984 (Bromley and Bush 1994: 202). But the 
oil crisis that began in 1982-1983 forced many expatriates back to Egypt and reduced revenues from 
oil exports and Suez Canal traffic returns, putting further constraints on the state which had, by then, 
privatised some its sources of revenue and had begun to rely heavily on aid and loans (Handoussa 
1997).  
The government kept spending and, exponentially increasing the deficit in the balance of 
payments. From this point onwards, Mubarak escalated the deregulation of the market and 
incentivised the financialisation of capital, and increased the extraction of resources from the working 
class, who continued to be hit hardest by the failure of neoliberal policies to attract investments in 
productive sectors.  
In 1983, Mubarak raised the prices on subsidised items, and issued a new law that doubled 
workers’ contribution to health insurance and pensions (Beinin 1994: 260). In response, several 
factories were occupied and, in others, workers walked out. In Alexandria, more than ten thousand 
workers in two large textile factories refused their pay checks (Posusney 1993: 102). The same 
happened in Nasr Car Factory and several other large factories. Revolution forced the government to 
delay implementation of the law, hoping that the momentum would be exhausted. Then, the law was 
                                                           
91 Abdel Malek (1968) famously articulates this military-led counterrevolution, without referring to it 
as such. He argues that the infiltration of the military in all aspects of social and economic life made the 
Egyptian society a ‘military society’ 
92 As we have seen in earlier phases of Egyptian history, textile workers, especially at Kafr al-Dawwar, 
had more evolved revolutionary contentions because of their early confrontation with the state. 
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implemented gradually starting in September 1983. Two weeks later, Kafr al-Dawwar witnessed three 
days of strikes and riots reminiscent of 1977, as workers and residents of the town cut telephone lines, 
blocked transportation, and destroyed rail cartridges (Beinin 1994: 262). In Suez, workers struck for 
three days. In Nasr, around four thousand workers occupied Nasr Pipe Manufacturing Company plant 
demanding payment of overdue incentives and bonuses, and the resignation of the new management, 
which had changed overtime rules (Posusney 1993: 102). In the same year, thousands of workers 
occupied the Shubra Company for Engineering Products, claiming that mismanagement had led to a 
decline in their incentive pay.93 
1985 saw a new round of price hikes, especially on energy products, as Egypt once again into 
entered negotiations with the IMF for a loan? and undertook currency reform. In the same year, over a 
thousand workers at the large Misr Spinning and Weaving Plant refused their pay checks for three 
days because of declining wages. In May 1985 three thousand workers from the Sigad Textile Plant in 
Mahalla Kubra went on strike to, protest the failure of management to pay them their May Day bonus 
(Beinin 1994: 262-263).  
 In 1986, revolutionary contentions increased in private sector workplaces, as private sector 
companies responded to the expiration of infitah tax incentives. Private businesses began to scale back 
operations and/or cut workers' salaries (ibid.). In February hundreds of workers at Arabb, an electrical 
products joint venture, participated in a three-day sit in to protest declining compensation and 
incentives. Two months later, more than 600 workers from the Arab Wood Furniture Factory (Atico) 
occupied the headquarters of the ETUF when, after two months during which the management had 
failed to pay workers' salaries, they announced the closure of the factory. Despite a court ruling in 
their favour, workers never received any of the back pay that was due to them (Posusney 1993: 102).  
 A similar situation developed with the American-owned McDermott Company. The company 
had requested permission to suspend operations in July 1985 and, before receiving an answer, had 
begun to dismiss workers. Starting in November 1885, McDermott began deducting one-third of 
worker’s salaries; then, in In January 1986, they cut the wages of their remaining workers by 50 
percent in order to force them to quit. In the fall, workers began a series of protest actions aimed at 
company as well as government targets. This continued into 1987, when a court ruled that the 
company must rehire three hundred workers and sell assets to provide them with back pay. When the 
company refused to implement the ruling, the workers opened a new round of sit-ins (ibid.).94  
 
                                                           
93 See Al-Sha'b, April 27, 19. 
94 Al-Ahram al-iqtisadi, October 26, 1987. 
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 By the late 1980s, revolution had evolved remarkably, through solidarity networks that 
involved wage-earning middle class professionals, industrial workers, and students (Chalcraft 2016: 
412-415). A veteran activist during that period describes this evolution perfectly:  
 
During each of the strikes, we built up good support [for those in dispute]. We established links 
all over Egypt: on the railways, for example [during a strike in 1986], we set up support groups 
in several cities that raised money for the strikers and sent messages and delegations to them. 
The links between activists drew stronger, so that when a big struggle takes place, we could 
move quickly (Manfleet 2016: 41). 
 
Faced with revolution, the IMF loan deal, which Egypt began preparing for in 1985, was 
cancelled after six months from its start date in 1987, as Mubarak continuously struggled to 
implement the cuts required by the IMF as a condition for the loans. The economy was stagnating and 
the state was unable to provide minimal services; nor was it capable of imposing structural change. 
Instead, Mubarak continued sold off parts of the public sector to his cronies, and framed it as serious 
market liberalisation when negotiating with international financial institutions and the US. Much of 
the liberalisation that occurred in the 1980s did not amount to real market opening, but came as an 
outcome of ‘closed door bargains’ between those elites who, through commercial and marital 
connections, cartelised the private sector (see Sfakianakis 2004: 82-89).  
Marital connections  played a key role in establishing and maintaining positions of privilege.95 
Loubna Al-Sadat, Sadat’s eldest daughter, married the grandson of Ahmed Abdel Gaffar, former 
Minister of Agriculture under King Farouk. Gaffar’s daughter, Alia, married Mahmoud Mubarak, the 
direct cousin of Hosni Mubarak. Jihan Al-Sadat, Sadat’s second daughter, married Mahmoud Ahmed 
Uthman, the son of Uthman Ahmed. Uthman was the Managing Director of the Anglo-Egyptian oil 
company before and after its nationalisation, founder of ‘Arab Contractors’, and former Minister of 
Housing & Development.96 Uthman’s sister became Minister of Social Affairs and her son, Salah 
Hasaballah, became Minister of Housing under Mubarak. Her second son, Hani Sarie-Eldin, became 
Chairman of the Egyptian Market Authority and Head of Eldin & Partners law firm. Osman’s cousin, 
                                                           
95 For a detailed survey of the business associations and interest groups in Egypt’s private sector, see 
Bianchi 1985: 147-159. 
96 Uthman was also a student of the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder, Hassan al-Banna. He was a 
member of the Brotherhood until he graduated from college and, thereafter, continued to pay dues and support 
them. After the Brotherhood’s 1954 attempt to assassinate Nasser, Uthman persuaded Nasser that the 
Brotherhood would be less threatening to the regime if he provided them with lucrative employment in thes 
Saudi and Kuwaiti branches of his Arab Contractors Company ('Uthman 1981, 359, 363, 364; Beinin 2005: 
117). 
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became wealthy through business partnerships with Osman. His granddaughter, Mirvat Kadry, 
married Magdi Rassekh, Owner of a conglomerate which included Sodec Contractors, Bevery Hills, 
Ringo for Telecommunication and Nile Telecommunication. Their daughter, Heidi Rassekh, married 
Hosni Mubarak’s son, Alaa. As for Sadat’s youngest daughter, Noha, she married Hassan Mohieddin, 
whose father, Sayyed, became Minister of Agricultural Reform, Deputy Prime Minister, Head of 
Parliament, and then President Sadat’s assistant, and his mother Maha Mare’i, was the daughter of 
Sayed Bey Mare’i, large landowner and another Sadat assistant. His uncle, Zakaria Mohieddin, was a 
prominent pro-US member of the Free Officers. Hassan’s cousin, Mahmoud Mohieddin, became the 
Managing Director of the World Bank Group.  
Figures 3, below, represents Sadat’s family and its ties to other privileged families. Figure 
3.1, further below, shows the link between Uthman and Mubarak. 
(Figure 3) Sadat’s family tree 
(Figure 3.1) Uthman-Mubarak Link 
The same pattern can be found in Nasser’s family. His son, Khaled, married Dalia Fahmy. 
Dalia’s brother, Hadi, was Head of PetroJet and her other brother, Sameh, became Oil Minister. 
Nasser’s daughter, Hoda, married Hatem Sabry. Hatem became Head of Al-Araby Bank. His other 
daughter, Mona, married Ashraf Marwan, a wealthy businessman who later became Head of 
presidential information’s office during Sadat’s era. Their son, Ahmed Marwan, married Hania 
Moussa, the daughter of Amr Moussa, Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1991 and 2000, before 
becoming Secretary General of the Arab League.  
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Further details about these connections, and their more concrete implications for Egypt’s 
polity, cannot be explored within the limits of this thesis. But even depicted in this crude way, these 
patterns are revealing. Families of modern Egypt who have had wealth and/or power have tended to 
marry with each other and partner in business, much like aristocracies did in pre-modern times. They 
consolidated their privileges and used them as a basis for action in political and economic contentions. 
Most of the businessmen in these families were leading figures in the NDP, or participated, more 
directly, in the state diplomatic corps. This process of elite reproduction is but one manifestation of a 
continuing counterrevolution in Egypt, even though it might not directly produce a coherent political 
contender and often involves internal rivalries. 
 A more coherent counterrevolutionary challenger was the Muslim Brotherhood, whose 
Islamic banners overshadowed socialist and progressive banners in protests, campuses, and labour 
platforms, under the watchful eye of the state’s security apparatus. Under Mubarak, twenty-one 
syndicates representing doctors, dentists, pharmacists, lawyers, journalists, engineers and others,  with 
a combined membership of 2.5 million and dominated by Islamist figures, were established in less 
than a decade (Kandil 2014: 134). The Brotherhood-regime binary undermined class contentions, 
while real wages continued to fall. The economy was kept afloat by aid and debt relief schemes.97 By 
1990, the Egyptian regime was left with only three options: ‘finding new sources of external support, 
increasing the rate of exploitation of labour (absolute surplus extraction), or the further privatisation 
of public assets’ (De Smet 2016: 173). These options were combined in an Economic Reform and 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP), inspired by the neoliberal paradigm of the Washington 
consensus, and produced by the IMF and World Bank (Bush 2007: 1599). By accepting this 
programme, the Egyptian government received a massive capital injection in the banking sector – 5.5 
percent of the GDP – and an additional fiscal exemption of 10 percent of GDP (Mitchell 1999: 459). 
In return, the government was expected to cut state subsidies on consumer goods, privatise public 
companies, divest state-owned shares in joint-venture banks, liberalise markets and prices, freeze 
wages, commercialise agricultural lands, and implement a flat tax (see Sullivan 1992: 25-31).  
This vicious neoliberalisation plan became the ‘discursive instrumentality’ of an increasingly 
connected private sector and state bourgeoisie, who sought to restore the ‘rate of profit’ after a 
prolonged economic crisis (Abdelrahman 2014: 10). The following section elaborates this phase of 
Mubarak’s tenure, a phase in which counterrevolution continued through more aggressive neoliberal 
policies and culminated in the 2011 intensification. 
 
                                                           
 97 In the aftermath of 'Desert Storm', US and Arab states wrote-off almost half Egypt's external debt, 
cutting it from USD 53 billion in 1988 to USD 28 billion (See Bromley and Bush 1993: 202).  
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4. Counterrevolution and Revolution under Mubarak 1990-2011 
It is generally assumed that neoliberalism became a reality in Egypt in the 1990s, as the government 
began to implement, with remarkable speed, a programme of structural adjustment promoted by 
international financial institutions. The government undertook this programme after it was hit by a 
financial crisis that has often been blamed on failing public sector enterprises and government 
overspending. But the crisis began in the private sector. Egypt’s financial crisis was the result, first 
and foremost, of the financial deregulations of the 1980s. During the 1980s, the Brotherhood’s 
capitalists, using private foreign currency transfers from expatriate workers in the Gulf, accumulated 
great wealth through global currency speculation. More than one hundred unregulated money 
management firms, most of which were ‘Islamic investment banks’, were formed to transfer and 
invest these funds (see Sadowski 1991: 220-232). Much of this capital investment, invested in local 
tourism, real estate, and manufacturing, brought returns that kept ahead of inflation. The public and 
private sector commercial banks, which were much more regulated, could not compete with these 
Islamic investment banks and so were increasingly starved of hard currency (Mitchell 1999: 459). By 
1989, 26 percent of private and investment loans were in default, more than half of which belonged to 
just 3 percent of defaulters (ibid.). Many big defaulters were able to delay legal action, while others 
fled the country to avoid the courts (Mohieldin, 1995: 20-21). The largest default came in July 1991, 
with the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International.  
To save the ailing banks, the government sought to fulfil the conditions for an IMF loan. 
After the government allowed the currency to collapse and cut public investment projects, it 
transferred to the banks, in the form of treasury bills, funds worth 5.5 percent of GDP (Mitchell 1999: 
456). It also raised interest rates to make local banks more internationally competitive, and gradually 
raised energy prices to 'world' levels (Hinnebusch 1993: 160). Additionally, it reduced its budget, 
tightened the money supply, and cut subsidies to public sector enterprises which the government then 
either privatised or shut down (Mitchell 1999: 457). Between 1990 and 1999, half of Egypt’s public 
companies were privatised or shut down (Richards and Waterbury 2013: 251). 
The primary executor of the 1990s privatisation process was the newly established Ministry 
of Investments. The Ministry sold shares of state-owned companies on the Cairo stock market after 
deliberately putting them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis private enterprises in order to reduce 
their price for private investors. State bureaucrats and military figures in Mubarak’s regime, some of 
whom had not previously been involved in business, either became stakeholders and investors in the 
expanding private sector, or realised huge profits by using their positions to favour  cronies in the 
subcontracting sector (Mitchell 2002: 280-281, al-Khafaji 2004: 247). The privatisation of Coca Cola 
factory in 1993 is a case in point. Mohamed Nosseir bought Coca Cola ‘with little competition’ in 
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1993 and sold it two years later at more than triple the initial selling price (Sfakianakis 2004: 89). 
Nosseir’s wife happens to be the daughter of Abdel Latif Baghdadi, a Free Officer who became 
Defence Minister in 1953, Foreign Affairs Minister in 1954, Speaker of National Assembly in 1956, 
Communications Minister in 1957, Vice President of the United Arab Republic between 1958 and 
1961, and Vice President of Egypt between 1962-1964.  
Nosseir not only occupied a position of privilege under Mubarak, he was one of Egypt’s 
richest and most privileged business tycoons as a result of the  system of patronage and favouritism 
that had operated in Egypt since Nasser.  In 1964, when his father-in-law was Nasser’s Vice 
President, Nosseir was given generous state funds to introduce computerised operations to Al-Ahram 
newspaper. Making good use of the resources available to him, he left Al-Ahram five years later, and 
founded a computer and communications business, ALKAN, which, over the following thirty years, 
grew into a holding group that operated at least thirteen subsidiaries ranging from pharmaceuticals (in 
partnership with Eli Lilly), to networking, telecoms (Egypt’s Vodafone), textiles and digital mapping 
projects in eleven countries.  
Another illuminating case is the sale of San Stefano seafront. A powerful group of 
businessmen headed by Talaat Mostafa – a business tycoon in Alexandria who also happened to be a 
member of parliament in from 1995 to 2000,98 Ahmed El-Maghrabi – owner of a chain of hotels under 
El-Maghrabi Corp. former Housing Minister, and Ahmed’s direct cousin, Yassin Mansour – owner of 
a multi-billion-dollars family-run conglomerate called Mansour Group, teamed up with Saudi Prince 
Walid Bin Talal to successfully push the government to give away land at the seafront so that they 
could build a seven stories high resort (Sfakianakis 2004: 90).99 Yassin’s brother, Mohamed Mansour, 
became Minister of Transport under Mubarak. His wife, Awatef Hassan, is the daughter of Mansour 
Hassan, Sadat’s top aide and Minister of Information in 1979.  
The government moved to empower a small minority of retired generals and  of the agrarian 
bourgeoisie as a means of securing allies for the rapid realisation of IMF conditions (Hanieh 2013: 
88-89). In pursuit of this objective, it abrogated Nasser’s Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 and granted 
to former landowning families the right to reclaim sequestered lands. As was the case during the 
colonial era, the economic interests of large landowners were tied to those of foreign capital, leading 
                                                           
98 On 23 June, 2017, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi pardoned 502 prisoners before Eid al-Fitr holiday. Talaat 
Mostapha’s son, Heshaam, was among those pardoned. Heshaam is former chairman of his father’s Talaat 
Mostafa Group, one of Egypt’s largest real-estate developers. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison for hiring 
a hitman to kill Lebanese pop star Suzanne Tamim in 2008. See Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
egypt-politics-pardons-idUSKBN19E1JX 
99 Yassin’s father, Lotfi, has left behind to a conglomerate worth USD 6 billion with 60,000 employees 
starting from cotton business in 1952. His sons are the biggest dealer of General Motors automobiles in the 
world, selling around 76,000 vehicles a year. The Mansours also hold the Caterpillar dealership for Egypt and 
six other African countries. They also manufacture and distribute Imperial Tobacco products and own Egypt’s 
McDonald’s franchise, along with several other retail chains. 
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to the formation of a new agrarian bourgeoisie (Bush 2007: 1604). Disorganised forms of contentions 
by landless or small landed farmers were violently repressed, resulting in over a hundred deaths, and 
hundreds of injuries and arrests.100 By the mid-1990s, half of the rural population lived in poverty, an 
increase in poverty of 10 percent since 1990 (Mitchell 1999: 463).  
Retired officers acquired public land through the Armed Forces’ Land Projects Organisations 
(AFLPO), sought quick returns and high rates of profit, and thus turned to real estate and financial 
services, which lacked serious regulations or oversight. This led to an arbitrary and uncontrolled 
expansion of Cairo, with military contractors setting up thousands of acres of apartments on the city's 
eastern perimeter to create new suburban enclaves for the officer elite (ibid.: 456). 
The exclusionary mechanisms of resource allocation and distribution that had  developed over 
decades of successive counterrevolutionary governments, became even more exclusionary in the 
1990s. In a typically counterrevolutionary manner, the government acted to implement structural 
adjustments that advanced the interests, not of the Egyptian masses, but of capital and its owners. So, 
for instance, the dismantling of the public sector severed its backward and forward linkages to private 
enterprise, and shifted resources to private capital which had proved unwilling to finance productive 
industries (Hinnebusch 1993: 162).  
The longer Mubarak remained in power, the more he needed to reward the armed forces in 
order to thwart a coup (Bou Nassif 2013). This tension further increased when Mubarak began 
grooming his civilian son, Gamal, to inherit the presidency. To appease the armed forces, he handed 
them more seats in the bureaucracy and increased their economic privileges. But the government, 
populated by civilian technocrats, maintained a civilian face in order to mask the military’s de-facto 
rule  over Egypt’s economic and political life (Abdul-Magd 2016: 153). Gamal fortified his position 
by surrounding himself with business cronies and taking over his father’s ruling party, the NDP. By 
2004, Gamal’s business friends populated the cabinet, leading to what the public sarcastically 
described as a ‘government of businessmen’ (Abul-Magd 2016: 154, Cook 2012: 176).   
By the turn of the century, the ‘army’s tentacles’, in Marshall and Stacher’s eloquent 
description, entered every key area of economic activity, had become Egypt’s ‘Military Incorporated’ 
(Springborg 2011: 397). Officers were involved in arms production, construction, shipbuilding, oil 
and gas, railway engineering, IT, docks and container services, finance, real estate, steel, cement, 
automobiles, home appliances, canned food, supermarkets, hotels, wedding halls, parking lots, 
domestic cleaning services, transportations and shipping companies (see Abdul-Magd 2012, 2013, 
Abdelrahman 2014: 22-23). Several institutions formed under Sadat and Mubarak facilitated this: 
                                                           
100 For a more detailed survey of disputes between landlords, tenants, and farmers, see the Land Center 
for Human Rights (LCHR) reports archive, available here: http://www.lchr-eg.org/archive/indexe.htm 
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National Services Projects Organisations (NSPO), the AFLPO, the Ministry of Military Production, 
and the Arab Organisation of Industrialisation.  
The military was also involved in investment projects across the Middle East. Before the 2011 
intensification, Egypt received a third of all private equity investment coming from the Gulf. Gulf 
capital infiltrated key sectors of the Egyptian economy, including areas of industrial production, such 
as textiles, that, for decades, had been under public ownership (Hanieh 2013: 138).  Gulf capital 
became ‘tightly integrated with local Egyptian elites’ (ibid.: 168). Senior officers and retired officers 
were positioned where ‘authority and capital merged’ (Abdul-Magd 2013: 2). Thus the bourgeois 
power struggle which had persisted between the Muslim Brotherhood and the state bourgeoisie since 
the 1970s became manifest in a competition over Gulf capital. Other rivalries among the state 
bourgeoisie and their institutions also persisted. But they all had a stake in Egypt’s capitalism and 
supported the survival of its resource structures at the expense of the increasingly impoverished 
Egyptian masses. The families, friends, and entourage of the state bourgeoisie became wealthier and 
more powerful as a result of their relations with the state, while the masses increasingly suffered the 
deprivations resulting from land loss, weakened labour laws, unemployment, underemployment, job 
insecurity and deteriorating living conditions.  
Yet, international financial institutions showered Egypt with praise and presented it as a 
success story for neo-liberalism.101 Indeed, economic indicators revealed that Egypt had experienced a 
rapid increase in economic growth. But, as many scholars have already attested, economic indicators 
do not tell the whole story.102 Indeed, growth was sustained, because the corporatist structures of the 
military provided efficient channels for capital accumulation and allocation, without the need for 
distribution. In a story familiar across the world, promises of wealth ‘trickling down’ proved hollow.  
Most people lacked job security, if they had meaningful jobs at all. Labour informality spread even in 
urban areas; and various social support mechanisms were eroded as a result of neo-liberal policies 
(Wahba 2006: 823-830, Barsoum 2015). By 2010, an estimated three million Egyptians were 
employed under arrangements that gave employers the option to dismiss them at any moment.103 
In order to ensure the success of counterrevolution, new labour laws in 2003 were enacted 
which practically criminalised industrial action (Marfleet 2016: 46). However, despite these laws, the 
                                                           
101 The IMF praised Egypt for having being ‘resilient to the crisis’ of 2008’ because ‘sustained and 
wide-ranging reforms since 2004 had bolstered the economy’s durability and provided breathing space for 
appropriate policy responses’. see IMF report (2010), retrieved from: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/cr1094.pdf 
102 See, among others, Achcar (2013), Hanieh (2013), Roccu (2012), Tripp (2013), that explain the 
disparities created by neo-liberalism in Egypt, and the misleading economic indicators.  
103 See Sallam (2011: 20-25). One widespread practice involves requiring new employees sign a 
‘resignation letter’ which could then be invoked whenever the employer wants (Marfleet 2016: 45).  
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number of strikers, occupations and protests increased in 2004 (Alexander and Bassiouny 2014: 108). 
In 2006, following the refusal of management to pay an agreed bonus, over 20,000 workers 
participated in a strike at Misr Spinning and Weaving in Mehalla al-Kubra, one in which solidarity 
among different networks were more extensive than had previously been seen. The success of this 
strike inspired similar action across the textile sector, which, as this thesis has shown, has seen the 
most evolved revolutionary contentions due to its resources and early confrontation with 
counterrevolution. Other sectors followed suit, including in mining, manufacturing, transport, and 
among teachers and low-level public servants (ibid.). By the end of 2007, every sector of the economy 
had been affected by over 600 episodes of collective action, representing the most intensified 
manifestation of revolution in Egypt’s modern history (Marfleet 2016: 47).  
By then, the state’s budget had been used to support various law enforcement and repressive 
apparatuses whose main purpose was to protect private property and its owners, and ensure a friendly 
business environment. This was the job of some two million Egyptians who were, in some way or 
another, affiliated with the security industry, which included the State Security Investigations Sector 
(SSIS, or, known in Arabic as Amn al-Dawla), Public Security, Municipal Police, Special Police 
Forces, General Security Forces, Tourism and Antiquities Police, and other departments for criminal 
investigation, intelligence, and prison guards (Kandil 2012: 194). The General Security Forces alone 
had 450,000 conscripts, which nearly rivalled the number of Egyptian military troops (ibid.). The 
number of ‘ordinary’ police forces alone grew from 150,000 in 1974 to more than 1 million in 2002 
(ibid.). The informal police, which Egyptians call baltageyya, consisted of‘a million and a half hired 
thugs or informers without uniforms or ranks, often people with a criminal record who had cut deals 
with the authorities’ (De Smet 2016: 178). The baltageyya did the government’s dirty work on the 
streets, which included beating up, terrorising and abusing protestors, voters and activists, and 
breaking into protests (see Khalil 2012: 39, Amar 2012: 83-90). 
As is typical of revolution, its forms of contention evolve continuously in response to the 
evolution of counterrevolution – and the opposite is also true. The security state presided over by 
Mubarak made it increasingly difficult to organise in traditional ways. Instead, this period’s revolution 
was manifested not only in organised labour contentions, but in much broader class alliances 
represented by expanding solidarity networks. These networks emerged organically out of local 
struggles, as students supported workers, and lawyers and other professionals also pushed for political 
and economic rights. However, under a police state, there was very little space that they could find in 
which to interact 
Some of these networks took the more formal, and ‘legal‘, shape of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs). An example, is the Center for Trade Union and Workers Services (CTUWS) 
which was founded by one of the former union leaders at Helwan, Kemal Abbas, to provide advice 
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and consultation for workers, as well as resources for mobilisation. Leftist activists founded the El-
Nadim Center for the Management and Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and, a year later, 
established the Office of Legal Aid for Human Rights (Marfleet 2016: 42). These centres facilitated 
links between activists, students, and industrial workplaces.  
The far-reaching impact of these networks on workers’ effectiveness was first manifested in 
collective actions undertaken in response to regional developments and, in particular, the Palestinian 
Intifada in 2000 and the occupation of Iraq in 2003. In both instances, the government permitted 
networks of activists to mobilise, seeing this as a way to deflect public rage towards the situation 
confronting their ‘Arab brothers’. Since the banners raised in these actions were not directly related to 
Egypt per se,  confrontation with the state was kept to a minimum.  
In response to the Palestinian intifada, ten leading human rights NGOs established the 
Egyptian Popular Committee in Solidary with the Intifada (ibid.: 48). By acting under the banner of 
the Palestinian cause, activists were able to mobilise unions, schools, and local neighbourhoods 
against Israeli brutality and ‘Arab acquiescence’ (ibid.). As the organisation continued to expand, and 
its demands evolved from ones centred on Palestine to ones focussed on Egypt, this led to clashes 
with the police. Regional developments, in Palestine in particular, brought with it collective nostalgia 
for the ‘moral duty’ towards Arab causes that had characterised Nasser’s Egypt. By 2002, protestors 
in Tahrir Square were chanting, ‘revolution, revolution till victory, from Egypt to Palestine’, and, 
more explicitly at a protest in Cairo University, ‘Hosni Mubarak is just like [Ariel] Sharon’ (El-
Hamalawy 2011, quoted in Marfleet 2016: 48).  
A year later, 30,000 people occupied Tahrir Square, in solidarity with Iraq and against the 
US-led invasion. Leila, a member of the EPCSI who organised this protest, described the moment 
vividly as ‘a moment of anger about war but also of happiness that at last we’d shown ourselves – and 
we’d survived’ (quoted in Marfleet 2016: 49). Building on those same networks, the Egyptian 
Movement for Change, widely known by its slogan kefaya (enough), was formed. It brought together 
young and old activists, including professionals who were previously active in leftist and communist 
parties, as well as younger tech-savvy activists. Described as a secular organisation, Kefaya was 
widely diverse, uniting communist, nationalist, and Islamist members in ‘the most significant model 
of modern political parties in the Arab world’ (Al-Sayied 2004). It united the rejuvenated al-Wafd 
party, al-Tajammu, al-Nasseriyyeen (Nasserists), al-‘oumal party (Labour), al-Karama Party (centrist 
party), al-Wasat (a moderate Islamist party), the Muslim Brotherhood, Gathering for Democratic 
Change, National Coalition for Reform and Change, and Popular Campaign for Change (Oweidat 
2008: 11). It was the first contender to call for ambitious changes in the polity, going as far as regime 
change (Sha’ban 2006: 10, Howeidy 2005). With such a coalition, Kefaya was, for the first time, able 
to organise explicitly anti-Mubarak protests (ibid.).   
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Those diverse groups found common grounds through common experiences of exclusion. 
Their leaders had been jailed for their political views and had remained politically active since the 
1970s (ibid.). Moreover, its cross-ideological activity is representative of earlier processes of the 
development of solidarity networks in response to mutual repression. Rabab El-Mahdi described the 
activity of Kefaya as consisting of ‘a cycle of contestation, in which each phase of activity was related 
to earlier actions and to the responses of the state’ (El-Mahdi 2009: 96).  
These contentions, and the way in which their forms changed in response to each other, 
reaffirm the intrinsic relationship between revolution and counterrevolution. They also show how the 
continuity of revolution was guaranteed by the persistence of exclusionary resource structures and of 
traditional and non-traditional forms of resistance to it.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter explored the continuity and relationship between counterrevolution and revolution 
between 1970 and 2011. In this period, Egypt witnessed gradual neo-liberalisation. The process 
involved reversing Nasser’s land reform, welfare and labour policies; and privatising much of the 
public sector in a manner that, in partnership with private capital, disproportionately enriched a 
handful of families and military personnel,. In parallel to this process, this chapter examined the 
passive and intensive manifestation of revolution, and situated its evolution, and its new and re-
emerging contenders, in relation to the evolution and contenders of counterrevolution.  It identified 
this continuous labour activity as representing a traditional manifestation of revolution. Despite their 
slow start after Nasser, workers reorganised to face increasingly hostile working conditions, and 
evolved gradually in contentions against the state, which, by then, had come to perfectly embody 
capitalist interests.  
Additionally, this chapter briefly discussed the emergence of non-traditional and hybrid 
revolutionary contentions, represented in cross-class solidarity networks. These networks brought 
together students, lawyers, industrial workers, and other professionals. These networks evolved 
through organic experiences, responding to incidents of repression or confrontation with agents of the 
state apparatus. Their contentions, particularly between 2000 and 2011, produced organised political 
movements, labour organisations, NGOs, and parties, which, as the following chapter will show, 
intensified their contentions in 2011.  
The following chapter will survey those contenders on the eve of the intensification of 2011, 
connecting them to a history of struggles illustrated in this and previous chapters. It will also attest to 
the continuity of counterrevolution, which did not emerge suddenly in response to 2011 but, rather, as 
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this chapter has shown, evolved with two key contenders, the state – its bourgeoisie protected by the 
security apparatus, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, the following chapter will zoom in on 
how counterrevolution and revolution manifest themselves in contentions over the inclusion and 
exclusion of women and minorities. These questions, among others, are contested openly and more 
clearly when revolution and counterrevolution intensify. The following chapter will show that, by 
looking at both processes in the context of marginalised and excluded segments of society, we can 




































This chapter zooms in on the intensification of counterrevolutionary and revolutionary processes 
which began in 2011 and gradually came to an end by 2014. In this short and eventful period, Egypt 
saw Mubarak replaced by two presidents, both of whom represented counterrevolutionary contenders 
which, as Chapter 6 demonstrated, had evolved over decades. The first president to replace Mubarak. 
Mohamed Morsi, came from the Muslim Brotherhood, and the second and current one, Abdel Fattah 
El-Sisi, came from the armed forces. Building on previous chapters, this chapter will highlight the 
continuity of, and relationship between, counterrevolution and revolution during this period of 
intensification, and how it led to the emergence of the Brotherhood and the armed forces as the only 
effective contenders for power. During the revolutionary intensification, those counterrevolutionary 
contenders worked together in a power-sharing arrangement that technically side-lined revolutionary 
forces, first under Morsi, and then under Sisi.  
As Chapter 2 argued, episodes of intensification can tell us more about counterrevolution and 
revolution because, during those episodes, a massive amount of resources are mobilised for 
widespread contentions affecting all aspects of social, economic and political life. Therefore, along 
with studying key contenders – the military, the Brotherhood, the labour movement, and opposition 
groups and parties, this chapter will illustrate the nature of the contentions which were waged through 
considering the contentions that emerged over the exclusion and inclusion of women and Copts. 
These contentions  provide vivid examples of the intrinsic relationship between counterrevolution and 
revolution. As for counterrevolutionary and revolutionary continuity, this chapter will show how, 
even after the political arena was reduced to counterrevolutionary challengers, revolutionary 
contentions continued, albeit in less effective forms. 
The first section will discuss the counterrevolutionary and revolutionary contentions on the eve of 
the 2011 intensification, laying out key contenders and their positions vis-à-vis Mubarak’s polity. The 
second section will survey in greater detail the 18-day revolutionary intensification that began on 
January 25, reflecting on how it differed from ‘passive revolutionary’ times. The third section covers 
the military-led transitional period that followed Mubarak’s resignation. It will show how 
counterrevolution intensified from that period onwards by focussing on the most illuminating 
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examples of counterrevolutionary contentions. The fourth section covers Morsi’s short-lived 
presidency, highlighting the continuation of counterrevolutionary and revolutionary intensification 
and the main manifestations of each. The fifth section addresses the final phase of 
counterrevolutionary intensification, in which the military retook power and gradually ‘stabilised’ the 
polity, punished revolutionary contenders and, more blatantly than ever, using the institutions of the 
state to serve the interests of the military and the private sector bourgeoisie. 
 
2. Prelude to 2011 Intensification 
Prior to the opportunities which arose with the ‘Arab Spring’, the Egyptian regime was challenged by 
three key forces: 1) Kefaya and other liberal-leftist Cairo-based opposition groups, 2) the labour 
movement, and 3) the Muslim Brotherhood. By the mid-2000s, these three forces were capitalising on 
a ‘culture of protest’ which was spreading across Egypt and the region in response to the Palestinian 
cause and the Iraq invasion. As the previous chapter observed, Kefaya was the ‘youngest’ amongst 
these three challengers. It had emerged from the cross-class, cross-religious, and cross-ideological 
solidarity that had developed mainly during protests on Arab causes, and in responses to repression 
against strikers. Members of the various groups that were active in protests supporting the Palestinian 
cause during the Intifada in 2002 and, a year later, condemning the invasion of Iraq, shared a disdain 
for Mubarak’s regime, seeing it as symbolising the failure and complicity of Arab regimes with US 
imperialism. 
Kefaya explicitly opposed Mubarak’s attempt to bequeath his presidency to his son, Gamal, 
who had already begun to consolidate his power within the executive with the appointment of his 
cronies as government ministers. Therefore, in revolutionary terms, the ‘change’ that Kefaya sought 
was one which mostly represented middle class aims: the promotion of political access and fairer 
market rules, and reduction of corruption and patrimonialism. As this chapter will demonstrate, 
labour-oriented groups, NGOs, and informal unions began to emerge in tandem with those of Kefaya.  
Together, they produced what Alexander and Bassiouny, borrowing from Rosa Luxemburg, have 
described as a process of ‘reciprocal action between political and social struggles’ against a police 
state which had criminalised both ‘economic’ strikes and ‘political’ protests (Alexander and 
Bassiouny 2014: 100, Luxemburg 1964). This amalgamation of protest action, dispersed yet 
overlapping, was logistically difficult to fully repress. 
In addition to Kefaya, labour-oriented groups, NGOs, and informal unions, a series of 
opposition groups emerged. Some groups sought to expand freedoms in specific areas of society as, 
for instance, Journalists for Change, Doctors for Change, Workers for Change and Youth for 
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Change.104 Other groups emerged which advanced specifically socialist agendas, such as the Egyptian 
Socialist Democratic Party (ESDP), the Socialist Popular Alliance (el-Tahaluf el-eshtiraqi el-sha’abi), 
the Revolutionary Socialists, and smaller anarchist and libertarian groups (see Galian 2015). 
However, the counterrevolutionary Muslim Brotherhood remained the best resourced and best 
organised opposition force among them all. Although its younger members were represented among 
the ranks of the Kefaya, the Brotherhood continued to organise separate protests.  
In 2005, Kefaya organised protests on an almost weekly basis, and Mubarak’s beltageyya 
responded with a combination of violent and non-violent tactics to intimidate and contain the 
movement (see El-Mahdi 2009: 1015-1020). Mubarak also amended the constitution to minimise the 
risk of real electoral opposition, something which Kefaya aimed to create. That year, the combination 
of repression and of manipulation of the electoral process saw Mubarak be re-elected to a fifth term as 
president.  Despite their defeat, Kefaya’s activists were accumulating lessons. As Hany Anan, one of 
Kefaya's founding members, put it: ‘We are showing Egyptians that we can challenge the ruler, we 
can tell him we don't want you, that's enough, you go, and we can do this in public and still go back to 
our homes, maybe with some wounds or some bruises, but we still go home’.105 For the parliamentary 
elections that same year, Kefaya coordinated with other liberal and leftist factions in what came to be 
known as the National Front for Change, but failed to make a significant breakthrough. The big 
winners among the opposition groups were the Muslim Brotherhood, whose candidates won 88 seats, 
compared to 388 for the ruling NDP.106 
Though some workers participated in Kefaya’s activities, the best resourced and most 
effective revolutionary force was the organised textile workers in Mahalla and Shubra. As previous 
chapters have shown, these workers were vanguards of revolution, and their actions often succeeded 
in initiating waves of strikes across the industry and the country. Although they had been part of the 
revolutionary process that had continued over the course of decades, the mobilisation of Mahalla 
workers in 2006 marked a significant turning point by catalysing a series of contentions which, along 
with external factors, brought about the 2011 intensification.  
Mahalla workers made significant gains when, beginning in 2006,  students and women from 
urban communities, and NGOs joined them in a series of strikes to protest privatisation and the 
management’s delay in paying bonuses (Beinin and Hamalawy 2007, Alexander and Bassouiny 2014: 
101-102).  Within four days of the beginning of strike action, workers won a 45-day bonus and a 
promise that the factory would not be privatised. The next year, when they went on strike again, to the 
                                                           
104 See Amira Howeidy 2005, ‘A Chronology of Dissent’, Al-Ahram Weekly, and Shaden Shehab 
(2005), ‘That's Enough’, Al-Ahram Weekly. 
105 See Heba Saleh, ‘Re-Birth of Egyptian Politics’, 5 September, 2005, BBC News. Retrieved from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4216750.stm 
106 The Brotherhood’s candidates continued to run as independents because of the official ban on the 
party.  
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dismay of the ETUF, their clearly more evolved organisation and ‘cohesion’ won for them an increase 
in bonuses and a minimum wage (Alexander and Bassouiny 2014: 119). These victories inspired 
actions by workers in both, the private and public sector, such as by the cement workers in Tura and 
Helwan, the Cairo subway drivers, bakers, and others (Beinin and Hamalawy 2007).  
Building on these successes, the Mahalla workers began raising demands that encompassed 
those of workers at the national level as, for instance, staging protests for a raise of the minimum 
wage to the internationally recognised poverty line of $2 a day for a family of four (Alexander and 
Bassouiny 2014: 120). The broader demands produced solidarity among a wider network of groups. 
Cairo-based activists who had been at the centre of ‘political’ campaigns like Kefaya, called, via 
Facebook, for a general strike on 6 April 2008, the day scheduled for Mahalla strike action.  
However, despite the solidarity that had been forged between activists and workers, the 
activists who called for a general strike lacked the ability to mobilise for national action. The regime 
quelled the Mahalla strike action with brute force, injuring dozens and arresting hundreds more.  The 
response was an organic and independent intensification of activism in Mahalla that was 
unprecedented in Egypt. Residents blocked the railway line to Cairo and burned down large portraits 
of Mubarak. Students from nearby university campuses protested in solidarity with the workers. 
Smaller, symbolic protests which erupted in Cairo were immediately crushed. The ETUF, which 
represented the regime in negotiations with strike leaders, blackmailed and exerted pressure on 
leaders to get them to call off the action.107  
Yet, April 6 proved to be a lesson, not only for the striking workers, but also for the liberal 
and leftist youth who formed the April 6 Youth Movement in  recognition of the events of this 
important day. Labour-related action continued to increase in frequency and size. Between 2007 and 
2010, there was over 500 labour-related collective actions, compared with approximately 200 that had 
taken place between 2004 and 2006, and 100 that had occurred over the course of the previous five 
years (Alexander and Bassouiny 2014: 109). Over this period – 2004 to 2010, around two million 
workers participated in strike action (Beinin 2012b: 11-12). Beginning in 2008, organised workers 
brought their demands to the doors of the parliament, staging sit-ins and traditional protests, and often 
blocking the way to the building – in a sense, forcing themselves onto the polity. On the eve of the 
intensification, several informal labour groups were active, and at least three independent unions had 
been  established to represent real-estate tax collectors, teachers, and health technicians (Ramadan and 
Adly 2015).  
   
                                                           
107 By then, all the general union presidents were members of the ruling NDP. 
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Mubarak’s regime had ceased to hide behind a façade of democracy, or to try to absorb public 
pressure in shadow political institutions. The blatantly rigged parliamentary elections in 2010 had 
made clear to opposition groups that the regime was no longer willing to absorb new elite or give 
concessions to the main parties. Instead, Mubarak wanted to clear the way for his son’s ascendance to 
power.108 His regime was sustaining structures of exclusion by policing the masses.  
The brutality of the regime became more and more exposed through the actions of local 
police officers who terrorised neighbourhoods in their violent interventions against assemblies 
(Abdelrahman 2014: 19). Even the Copts, who the regime had relegated to the margins of political life 
in order, the regime claimed, to protect them from sectarian violence, eventually became disillusioned 
with the regime.  
Kefaya and other secular parties provided a space for those Coptic activists opposed to 
Mubarak’s policies to implicitly challenge the president’s partnership with the church (Brownlee 
2013: 12, Tadros 2011: 26-31). The regime’s security agents were at least partly responsible for 
several violent incidents in which dozens of Copts were killed. Accusations of regime responsibility 
for such actions were made more openly after consecutive attacks in 2010 and 2011. On 6 January 
2010, a drive-by shooter murdered six Copts returning from a Christmas mass in the southern 
governorate of Qena. In November of the same year, a police officer shot and killed a Coptic man in 
Giza during a dispute over the construction of a church originally licensed as a community centre 
(Brownlee 2013: 12). Thirty minutes into 2011, a massive explosion tore through midnight mass at 
the Church of the Two Saints in Alexandria, killing 23 and injuring many more. not only had security 
officers failed to intercept the bomber, they also stood by afterwards as Christians and Muslims 
scuffled in the neighbourhood. One Coptic lawyer even accused the Minister of Interior of 
orchestrating the bombing so that Copts would back Mubarak out of fear of further sectarian strife.109 
This accusation would become more common as counterrevolution intensified.  
These consecutive tragedies debunked the regime’s claim to be protecting the Coptic 
minority, and, as a consequence, Copts and, in particular, Coptic youths, joined the opposition against 
Mubarak and, in the process, created a ‘Coptic civil society that was autonomous from the Coptic 
Orthodox Church’ (Tadros 2011: 26-31). 
These contentions culminated in a large protest held on 25 January 2011 in response to the 
torture and killing of Khaled Said by police officer. This event, which coincided with the Tunisian 
intensification, galvanised Egypt’s youth. In this context, and inspired by events in Tunisia, the 
                                                           
108 The NDP secured 209 out of 211 seats in the first round, forcing the Brotherhood to boycott the 
second round.  
109 See ‘Prosecution Investigates Interior Minister’s Alleged Involvement in Church Attack,’ Daily 
News Egypt, February 7, 2011. 
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various challengers to Mubarak’s regime coordinated to advance an all-encompassing and mutually 
exclusive demand: ‘The people want to topple the regime’. Revolution evolves, from narrow and 
dispersed demands for political and economic rights, to the broader all-encompassing demand for 
regime change. The following section unpicks the intensified counterrevolution and revolution in the 
events that followed the January 25 protest highlighting, in the process, how it connects to earlier 
passive contentions. 
 
3. 18 Days of Revolutionary Intensification (January 25-February 11) 
January 25 was an unprecedented event in the history of Egypt: on that day, an amalgamation of 
contenders – youth organisations, independent labour organisations, leftist and liberal parties, women 
associations, NGOs, Islamists, and even football fans associations – organised a coordinated 
collective action that effectively challenged the existing regime.  
It started with the call by leading members of the April 6 Youth Movement for a protest 
against corruption and police brutality on January 25, National Police Day. Members of the April 6 
Movement reached out to labour activists in Mahalla al-Kubra (Clarke 2014: 389). After reaching out 
to other youth groups, including young members of the Muslim Brotherhood, they eventually formed 
a committee of thirty individuals representing six youth groups and movements. Over a period of 
twenty days, this committee met frequently in the offices of NGOs, particularly the Egyptian Center 
for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR), and formed sub-committees responsible for specific tasks, 
such as event advertisement, national reach-out, slogans and chants, printing banners and pamphlets, 
as well as, of course, social media activity (ibid.: 388). Social media was, at the time, a strategic new 
resource with untapped potential. Activists experimented with it, and its impact was greater than they 
foresaw. Major protests were organised even outside Cairo, particularly in cities that had well-
organized youth groups, like Alexandria, Mansoura, and Ismailia, and in cities where the labour 
movement was well-represented, like Mahalla al-Kubra and Suez (ibid.).  
Capitalising on the successes of January 25, the committee decided to stage another protest, a 
‘Day of Rage’, three days later. They formed local committees for Cairo’s neighbourhoods. These 
compiled a list of over thirty mosques and churches around Greater Cairo that would serve as ‘safe’ 
assembly points from which protestors would march into Tahrir Square. Pressured by its pragmatic 
and youth wings and, given the large turnout on January 25, the Brotherhood could not afford to be 
left out, and so cautiously endorsed the protest.  
January 28 turned out to be a great success for the opposition. Hundreds of thousands of 
people joined in a nation-wide protest movement. Every other noon prayer in mosques demonstrated 
the organisational capabilities of the Muslim Brotherhood by concluding with a call to protest. To bild 
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on this momentum, the youth committee decided to occupy Tahrir Square and remain there until 
Mubarak stepped down. Activists quickly formed revolutionary committees to organise collective 
initiatives and allocate donations and resources, neighbourhood watch groups to protect residents 
from the regime’s thugs, and civilian security checkpoints to protect those participating in the sit-in. 
Generous donations were pouring into Tahrir every day, dand were istributed in egalitarian ways 
among protestors through revolutionary committees.  
 Two days after the ‘Day of Rage’, leading figures in the independent labour movement 
announced, in a press conference in Tahrir Square, the formation of the Egyptian Federation of 
Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), which represented a formal breach of the corporatist ETUF’s 
legal monopoly of trade union organisation. EFITU was the first revolutionary institution to emerge 
from the intensification, and it expanded exponentially as hundreds of new unions in the private and 
public sector joined (Beinin 2011: 189). The retirees’ association, with 8.5 million members, was  
granted permission to reorganise itself as a professional syndicate and subsequently joined the EFITU, 
as well (ibid.). Lawyers, journalists, bus drivers, public and private sector industrial workers were all 
mobilised either as individuals in cross-class political groups, or in unions. Labour-oriented NGOs, 
like the ECESR mentioned earlier, were also key actors during this intensification, taking the lead in 
organising legal battles against the government and large employers, and protecting the rights of 
detained workers and protestors who were frequently sent to military courts.110  
 Women were also active in the intensification from the start, often contending against 
prevailing gender and sexual roles. Asmaa Mahfouz was a leading figure in the April 6 Movement; 
and her famous plea on the eve of the protest cunningly invoked existing gender roles as a means of 
encouraging men to step up to the occasion. In the video posted on her blog, which has been 
accredited for convincing thousands to join, Mahfouz appealed to men by saying,  
if you think you are a man, join me on the 25th of January. Whoever says that women should 
not go to protests because they will get beaten and humiliated, and that it is wrong, let him have 
some honour and manhood and come with me on the 25th of January. It is sitting at home that 
is humiliating. If you have honour and dignity as a man in this country, then you should join 
me. You should join me and protect me and other girls in the protest.111  
 
                                                           
110 The most active and effective NGOs during this time were the Egyptian Center for Economic and 
Social Rights, the Coordinating Committee for Trade Union and Workers Rights and Liberties, and the Center 
for Trade Union and Workers Services (see Beinin 2012b) 
111 Asra’a’s video retrieved from YouTube here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgjIgMdsEuk 
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Old and new women-oriented NGOs and initiatives intensified their efforts during the protests 
to protect women from harassment and abuse.112 One of Egypt’s most prominent revolutionary 
activists, Ahdaf Soueif, noted that, during the revolutionary intensification in January 2011, ‘women 
were suddenly free to walk alone, to talk to strangers, to cover or uncover, to smoke to laugh to cry to 
sleep. And the job of every single male present [in Tahrir Square] was to facilitate, to protect, to help. 
The Ethics of the Square, we called it’.113  
The diversity of the protestors inspired political and social debates which, for many, were 
their first experience in a relatively safe setting. Salma, a member of the April 6 Movement, 
enthusiastically described a long night of debate with ‘six strangers, five of them men’ in one of 
Tahrir Square’s tents, ‘we spent the night discussing whether communism is necessarily atheistic, and 
what is common between communism and religion. We were far from agreeing. Halfway through, I 
knew we won’t agree. But I was thrilled to have the debate anyway, to be able to speak freely and be 
listened to’.114 Islamists, liberals, leftists, communists, feminists and unaffiliated citizens who had, in 
different ways, been affected by counterrevolution were together calling for Mubarak to step down. 
One of the liberal English-educated protestors, Aida, said that ‘usually the Ikhwan are our biggest 
fear. But everyone inside the [Tahrir] square now is different. After the government turned it into a 
life or death situation, it didn’t matter who you are and what you’re doing, because everyone knows 
that you’re here. And if you’re here, you’re willing to die’.115  
The first 18 days of the intensification saw incredible moments of solidarity among different 
groups and communities, and the success of protestors in forming local committees to run their sit-ins 
and day-to-day activities. For hundreds of thousands of Egyptians, and particularly the educated and 
under-employed middle class youth, the square was the first real experience at self-governance and 
mass inclusion. Similarly organic democratic experiments in working class neighbourhoods and 
workplaces provided evidence, for participants and viewers alike, that the people, despite their 
differences, are capable of democracy if they are given the chance to practice and learn.  
The mobilised Muslim and Coptic youth also proved that they could co-exist without the 
‘protection’ of a police state and if given the chance to organise society on fairer terms. An infatuated 
Western media showed pictures of Muslims kneeling in prayer, encircled by Christians protecting 
                                                           
112 The Egyptian Centre of Women’s Rights (founded in 1996), Harass Map (founded in 2005, after 
women’s experiences in the solidarity protests, and had 700 volunteers around Cairo during the intensification), 
Imprint Movement (2012), I Saw Harassment (2012), Stop Street Harassment groups (2011), I Wish Campaign 
(2011), Operation Anti Sexual Harassment (OpAntiSH founded in 2011), Sexual Harassment Action Group 
(2011), and Tahrir Bodyguard (2011), among many other smaller initiatives. 
113 See Soueif, 2011, ‘Image of unknown woman beaten by Egypt's military echoes around world’. The 
Guardian. Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/dec/18/egypt-military-beating-
female-protester-tahrir-square 
114 Personal interview, 9 February 2015. 
115 See ‘The Square’, 2013. 
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them from the incursions of pro-regime thugs, and vice versa, during the celebration of Sunday mass 
(Tadros 2011: 27). In fact, there was not a single attack on a church during the eighteen days of 
revolutionary intensification across the country, despite the withdrawal of police guards (ibid.).  
But this episode of intensification had come rather too early for the revolutionary youth. Their 
coordination had not matured sufficiently over the curse of the previous decade, and they had yet to 
articulate a viable and coherent revolutionary programme that could replace neoliberal 
authoritarianism. Mubarak had ‘eradicated politics’, so that independent leftist and labour-oriented 
groups were limited in size and in their ability to mobilise support and, thus, achieved only a slow 
evolution prior to the intensification (Marfleet 2016: 191). As Amir, a former member of the socialist 
Tagammu’ party puts it, ‘The [Mubarak] dictatorship voided politics, isolating those who might have 
made a difference. As a result, when the revolution came, there was no critical mass on the left which 
could related directly to the workers’ movement’ (ibid.).  
However, it was evident that the labour movement represented a considerably evolved 
contender, having effectively produced independent unions and intensified industrial action which 
acted to ‘cleanse’  workplaces from fraudulent bosses and thuggish managers, as well as to confront 
police and military officials, and corrupt bureaucrats of the state-run unions (Alexander and 
Bassiouny 2014: 298-299). Millions of workers who joined new unions participated in numerous 
protests and rallies in major industrial cities. Although the tech-savvy activists were made to represent 
he image of the protests in the media, the ‘mass’ in the street was largely that of an increasingly 
politicised working class. It is no surprise, then, that a nation-wide strike action compelled the 
resignation of Mubarak the next day (Aoude 2013: 248, El-Mahdi 2011: 388).116  
Eighteen days into the intensification, Mubarak was removed and a military governing body, 
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), representing the various branches of the armed 
forces, took over the  transition to elections. However, the transition left the last government 
appointed by Mubarak largely intact.117 The following section discusses the promises made to the 
people by the military contender  to ‘return to civilian rule through a democratic process’ while 
continuing to dictate the counterrevolutionary terms for the process.   
 
                                                           
116 Socialist activist Hossam el-Hamalawy states, ‘What pushed matters in our favor and pushed Hosni 
Mubarak to realize that he had to leave power, were the beginning of labor strikes on the Wednesday and 
Thursday [February 9-10, 2011] prior to the Friday he stepped down. The entry of the working class as an 
independent social force with its independent general strikes … [is] what ended the regime of Hosni’ (quoted in 
Haddad 2011). 
117 Mubarak was hoping to ensure a submissive parliament towards Gamal Mubarak’s succession to 
power. But, in the process, he disenfranchised hank-ranking military generals who were eyeing a political career 
after Mubarak. By 2011, Egypt has never had a civilian president. All three presidents came from the armed 
forces. 
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4. SCAF Counterrevolutionary Intensification (February 2011-June 2012) 
In this period, SCAF led a counterrevolutionary intensification that was not too dissimilar to that led 
by Nasser after the 1952 coup.  It sought, first, to preserve the economic system and the exclusive 
access granted to its beneficiaries. Second, it sought to revive parliamentary politics so as to make this 
appear to be a revolutionary gain, while depriving revolutionaries from real representation and 
ensuring  that the military would remain a loyal majority, and restricting the parliament’s legislative 
powers by, among other things, dictating the topics it could discuss. Third, it worked to exhaust the 
momentum of the labour movement by stalling on its promises and pending reforms, and through 
detention, intimidation and co-optation of labour leaders. Fourth, it sought to restore conservative 
gender norms by reasserting, through both violent and non-violent means, patriarchal control over 
women’s bodies. Fifth, it instrumentalised sectarian fears to present the military, over the dead bodies 
of Copts, as a saviour and guarantor of the middle and business classes.  
In general, the majority of the public was temporarily persuaded that, with Mubarak’s 
resignation, the revolution had ‘succeeded’. Decades of power-knitted military nationalism, from 
Nasser to Mubarak, popularised in the distorted accounts embedded in history books and educational 
curricula, and in advertisements, media messages and government propaganda, concealed the history 
of military-led counterrevolution, and reduced the regime to the Mubarak family and the ruling NDP 
party. After Mubarak’s resignation, the message propagated by SCAF and the mainstream media was 
that of a nation that had been victorious thanks to the unity of the people and the army: as they 
repeatedly emphasised, ‘the army and the people are one hand’ [el-geish wel sha’ab eed wahda] 
(Khalil 2012: 251).  
Despite the intensification of counterrevolution, which this section will elaborate on, 
revolution continued mostly through the independent labour movement led by EFITU, and through 
alliances among opposition groups still working to advance demands for a more inclusionary polity, 
and for social justice and freedoms. The Popular Democratic Alliance, the Democratic Labour Party, 
the Socialist Revolutionary Party and the Egyptian Communist Party joined with the Egyptian 
Socialist Party to form an Alliance of Socialist Forces. The Alliance of Socialist Forces then joined a 
broader alliance, ‘The Revolution Continues’, consisting of about 150 member organisations, 
including the Socialist Party, the Egyptian Current Party (Muslim Brotherhood youth defectors and 
some April 6 Youth Movement members), the Egypt Freedom Party (liberal-leftists), the Egyptian 
Alliance Party (liberal), and the Revolutionary Youth Coalition, and other peasant organisations, 
independent unions and multiple community associations (Aoude 2013: 249, Beinin 2012a: 343).118  
                                                           
118 Peasants capitalised on the revolutionary intensification and hundreds of thousands of them joined 
local organisations and broader opposition alliances (El-Nour 2015: 203-204) 
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Islamist parties and right-wing groups who had previously coordinated with revolutionaries 
against Mubarak, including the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, and the Wafd, refused to join the 
opposition and, instead, pursued counterrevolutionary interests (Amin 2011: 14-15). They began 
negotiating with the SCAF over the transition and the new constitution. As SCAF member General 
Mamdouh Shahin said, the military approval of any transition would be conditioned upon ‘some kind 
of insurance’ in the new constitution that the military would not be ‘under the whim’ of a civilian 
president and would not be subject to scrutiny (Martini and Taylor 2011: 128). In a typical 
manifestation of counterrevolution, the military and the Brotherhood agreed on an informal power-
sharing arrangement which would sustain existing exclusionary structures favourable to both. On the 
one hand, SCAF promised early parliamentary elections in which the Brotherhood could participate 
and, with certainty, win, given the length of its established presence in society compared to that of 
budding revolutionary parties. On the other hand, the Brotherhood reassured the military that it would 
not challenge its economic and political privileges.119 Furthermore, SCAF released from Khayrat Al-
Shatir from prison, known as the most powerful and wealthiest businessman in the Muslim 
Brotherhood who, under Mubarak, was charged with money laundering and his multi-million-dollar 
enterprises were confiscated. Al-Shatir revived his economic empire and, with its surplus, helped fund 
the Brotherhood’s electoral campaign (Abul-Magd 2016: 204). 
The military and the Brotherhood both agreed that early elections would be better for Egypt 
because it would make possible a quick transition to a civilian government. In fact, early elections 
gave the Brotherhood the advantage over all other challengers, as other challengers had had 
insufficient time to organise as mass parties. Moreover, the existing single-member district electoral 
law significantly undermined the chances of smaller and new progressive parties winning seats 
because it advantaged those candidates who focused on winning resources for their local region rather 
than, as would have been the case with proportional representation, fostering party identification with 
national campaigns.  
As the previous Chapter discussed, most governors happen to be retired officers who had 
been appointed by Mubarak, now by the SCAF. Given their local authority, they play a decisive role 
in single-member district elections. Additionally, the military was allowed to continue acquiring seats 
reserved for what the electoral law calls ‘farmers’ and ‘workers’. This provision of the law, 
                                                           
119 Former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco, Marc Ginsberg, refers to this MB-SCAF deal as the ‘unholy 
alliance’ (2011). Before the 2011 parliamentary elections, an emissary of the SCAF met in private with 
representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic groups to establish ‘local political action 
committee’ bank accounts in order to ‘funnel an underground supply chain of financial and commodity support 
to local Islamist political organizations throughout Egypt outside the prying eyes of Cairo-based media’. 
Hundreds of local Islamist political organisation chapters have bought votes ‘courtesy of military provided 
financial and food hand-outs’ (see Ginsberg 2011, Huffington Post). 
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introduced by Nasser, was supposed to guarantee parliamentary representation for workers. However, 
since then, retired military officers and internal security personnel have successfully sought to qualify 
for it as either farmers or workers (Sayigh 2012: 22-23). Upon taking office, the officers-turned-
parliamentarians typically join the parliament’s Defence and National Security Committee, which is 
the only body in the Egyptian government that even nominally supervises the military. In doing so, 
they further mitigate what little civilian oversight exists over the activities of the military. 
With this arrangement in place, protestors affiliated with the Brotherhood were called off the 
streets in March, ending the fragile anti-Mubarak alliance between the Brotherhood youth and the 
revolutionaries.120 From this point forward, the Brotherhood helped prepare for early elections and 
worked to turn the public against revolution. For example, on 8 April, when the military used live 
bullets against protestors in Tahrir demanding a civilian-led transition of power, a SCAF 
representative claimed that the bullets came from ‘counterrevolutionary snipers’ seeking to create 
tensions between the people and the army. The Muslim Brotherhood’s leader at the time, Mohammed 
Badei, supported the SCAF conspiracy theory and condemned attempts ‘to bring about division 
between the people and its military’ (Martini and Taylor 2011: 133). The Brotherhood also staged 
counter-protests whenever a mobilisation contended against the SCAF-led process. The Brotherhood 
mobilised against the ‘Day of Rage’ organised by youth groups in May, referring to the protest as ‘a 
day of subversion’. They called on the Day of Rage protestors to go home and ‘appreciate the role of 
the military in protecting the revolution rather than criticising it’ (ibid.).  
Foreign states, both Arab and Western, but primarily the US, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 
supported the military in its efforts to bring calm to Egypt (Aoude 2013: 248). The Obama 
administration was concerned with the impact that a prolonged revolutionary intensification could 
have, not only on US interests in the Middle East, but also on the global economy. In May 2011, the 
White House Press Secretary stated that the US was ‘concerned about capital that might leave and 
obviously to monitor to see what impact [...] these actions might ultimately have on the global 
economic recovery’ (Collins and Rothe 2014: 13).  
 In June, a US State Department spokesperson said that ‘the Egyptian military really set itself 
apart as sort of a paragon of professionalism during the events of Tahrir Square […] and it is 
incumbent on them now to carry that spirit forward in a transparent manner to adhere to rule of law’ 
(ibid.:14). By then, the US had already conducted a dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood and, early 
                                                           
120 Even before Mubarak stepped down, the Brotherhood began hinting their readiness for a 
compromise that can end the revolutionary intensification. In a statement on February 6, halfway through the 
intensification, the Brotherhood announced that was ready ‘to participate in a dialogue round in order to 
understand how serious the officials are in dealing with the demands of the people’ (see Al-Jazeera, ‘Timeline: 
Egypt’s Revolution’; 14 February 2011. Retrieved from: 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html). 
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on, it appeared that the US would not be opposed to their assuming political power.121   
In counterrevolutionary terms, the military and the Brotherhood agreed to share exclusionary 
economic structures – by continuing with neoliberal policies, and exclusionary political structures – 
by sharing institutional power in an authoritarian state. The two contenders cartelised entire sectors of 
the economy in ways that avoided competition and tension between them. After the financial crisis in 
the late 1980s (see Chapter 6), Mubarak had restricted the Brotherhood’s financial activity and, as a 
consequence, their capital was forced into the retail and services sectors as, for instance, Al-Shatir’s 
gigantic grocery chains, restaurants, and clothes – especially imports from Brotherhood-friendly 
Turkish market, furniture and other basic imported goods. On the other hand, the military continued to 
be more focused on heavy industry and construction (Abul-Magd 2016: 214). 
The two contenders had more in common on social matters despite the use, historically, of a 
power-constructed secular-Islamist binary in Egyptian politics and media. The possibility of a rightist 
civilian president promoting the Brotherhood’s conservative religious agenda was not only  
compatible with the Egyptian military agenda but, in many ways, overlapped with it. This overlap is 
best represented in the contentions that took place in this period over the position of the Coptic 
minority and the role of women in Egyptian politics and society. 
During this period, sectarian violence increased; and, when Copts mobilised to condemn it, 
the military participated in violence against them. Between March and May 2011, at least four Coptic 
churches were attacked across the country, and the resulting clashes left dozens dead and hundreds 
injured (Bassouini 2016: 207). Yet, the SCAF warned that Egypt's security and economic problems 
were ‘the result of […] internal and external enemies of the state’ seeking to ‘create disunity between 
the army and the people and internal divisions within the Armed Forces itself’ (Martini and Taylor 
2011: 130). In October 2011, the state, represented by the Governor of Aswan, blamed the Copts for 
the destruction and burning of the Mar Girgis church, suggesting that ‘they had to be punished’ for the 
church’s building permit violation (Bassouini 2016: 207). When the Copts attempted to protest the 
incident and the governor’s response in Maspero district of Cairo, they were massacred by the 
military in broad daylight.122 
The active involvement of women in revolutionary intensification destabilised conservative 
                                                           
121 Nasser’s confidant, Mohammad Hassanein Heikal, claimed that the SCAF were under US pressure 




122 27 Coptic protestors died, as armoured personnel carriers drove through them indiscriminately 
shooting live bullets. Despite the presence of hundreds of videos and images proving the complicity of military 
officers, no one was held accountable. 
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gender roles which had been constructed over the course of decades of patriarchal contentions by 
various counterrevolutionaries. Sexual harassment and verbal and physical attacks by the baltageyya 
were typical of the way Mubarak dealt with women protestors, and were designed to instil fear in 
women and keep them away from politics.123 In most cases, women who participated in protests did 
not transgress patriarchal norms. In the period of intensification that began in 2011, many women 
often engaged in pious activities and traditions exhibiting, whenever necessary, the ‘authentic’ 
conservative image of the Egyptian woman as a loyal mother and sister while, at the same time, 
engaging in protest and resistance. However, in the counterrevolutionary intensification led by the 
institutionally-patriarchal military, the inclusion of women in politics was presented as being 
incompatible with being a ‘good woman’. 
 In this period, the SCAF counterrevolutionary intensification concerned itself with ‘restoring 
order’ among Egyptian women, women whose bodies and behaviour had historically been ‘sites of 
social control and moral engineering’ to serve patriarchal privileges (Hafez 2014: 22). The urgency 
with which the military acted on this issue reflects its importance for counterrevolution. Days after 
Mubarak’s resignation, the military was sent into Tahrir and forcibly dismantled tents, and chased 
down and detained protestors. Among the detained were eighteen women who were taken to a 
military detention centre, ‘beaten, given electric shocks, subjected to strip searches while being 
photographed by male soldiers, forced to submit to ‘virginity checks’, and threatened with prostitution 
charges’.124  
Rather than denying the tests, the military used the story to convey a gendered message. As a 
senior general told the CNN, ‘The girls who were detained were not like your daughter or mine. These 
were girls who had camped out in tents with male protesters in Tahrir Square, and we found in the 
tents Molotov cocktails and drugs’.125 He defended the tests by claiming that they were meant to 
prevent these women from later accusing officers of rape. That same month, on International 
Women’s Day, a women-only rally demanding rights and a greater role ‘in building a new Egypt’ was 
obstructed by groups of men who harassed the protestors and told them to go home.126  
                                                           
123 See Radwan (2011). May 25, 2005, or ‘Black Wednesday’, was a particularly violent day for 
Egyptian women, when thugs violently beaten, abused and arrested many of them during a protest against the 
amendment of Article 76 of the Constitution, which was intended to restrict the election of new presidents to 
office (Hafez 2014: 23).  
124 See Amnesty International report, 23 March 2011. ‘Egyptian Women Protestors Forced to Take 
‘Virginity Tests’’. Retrieved from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2011/03/egyptian-women-
protesters-forced-take-e28098virginity-testse28099/ 
125 See CNN, ‘Egyptian general admits ”virginity checks” conducted on protesters’; 31 march 2011. 
retrieved here: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/05/30/egypt.virginity.tests/index.html 
126 See The Guardian, ‘Tahrir Square women's march marred by rival protest’, 8 march 2011. 
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Throughout this period, SCAF continued to deny the use of violence against women 
protestors, often referred to them as troublemakers and terrorists, and contrasted them with loyal 
obedient citizens. But one case of violence, known as ‘the girl with the blue bra’, became a 
particularly resonant symbol of police brutality. Videos and images of a veiled woman being dragged 
by her limp arms, brutally beaten by a security officer with his boot, and stripped down to her bra, 
instantly discredited the military’s story. SCAF denied the story, and the state media began a 
campaign to distort the debate and discredit the girl, in a desperate attempt to contain public rage. In a 
televised statement on the incident, Major General Adel Emara repeated to CNN the claim about 
virginity tests, saying that girls who were out in Tahrir were not ‘like yours or mine’, meaning that 
they were not ‘the children of good people’ (Hafez 2014: 25). He declared that these girls had been 
caught in ‘compromising positions with young men’ in the square and dismissed them as ‘immoral 
and sexually promiscuous’ (ibid.). This statement was followed by a defamatory media campaign to 
highlight the depravity and immorality of those participating in the protests. 
But Egyptians saw that the girl in no way represented a departure from the image of the 
‘authentic’ Egyptian woman: she was veiled before being stripped; and she was unconscious and, 
hence, completely passive even while being beaten. It was difficult to accuse her of doing anything 
wrong, other than protesting.127 This blue bra became a symbol for those working to advance 
women’s empowerment and emancipation. Protestors held blue bras, and women wore shirts with 
blue bras printed on them. But public reaction did not overstep the limits of SCAF rules. By 
December 2011, youth groups and new revolutionary parties were largely exhausted with the 
military’s relentless show of force; and public opinion, particularly the opinions of the pacified middle 
class, was turning against them and prioritising stability. Between March and October 2011, around 
7,000 activists, journalists, and protestors were tried in closed military courts, and thousands more 
were waiting for trial in ‘administrative detentions’ (Martini and Taylor 2011: 127).128 SCAF used a 
long-standing law that criminalised ‘insulting’ Egypt’s armed forces’ to summon journalists to appear 
before military tribunals for, among other things, reporting that military police fired on protesters and 
subjected female demonstrators to virginity tests. The ambiguity of what constituted ‘insulting the 
military’ gave the military broad authority to target media and opposition figures who were 
challenging it (Martini and Taylor 2011: 136). 
NGOs that survived the crackdown were neutralised or had to revise their agenda in order to 
                                                           
127 State media worked relentlessly to influence the public debate on the issue, ridiculing the girl and 
spreading conspiracy theories similar to those that Egyptians saw during Mubarak’s time. One male TV 
presenter of a famous daily talk show said, ‘she was wearing a bikini and not a bra. Why, my dear, were you 
wearing a bikini to Tahrir? Did you think you were going for a swim?’ (quoted in Hafez 2014: 24).  
128 For more on Egypt’s detention laws and how the SCAF have used them against protestors, see the 
report published by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (May, 2016). Retrieved from: 
https://eipr.org/sites/default/files/reports/pdf/endless_imprisonment_0.pdf 
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stay in business. Football fans associations who were active during the revolutionary intensification 
were systematically targeted in new laws that limited their mobility and legal rights. In the most 
notorious case, that of Ultras Ahlawy, the military carried out a a massacre in Port Said Stadium on 
February 1, 2012, leaving 72 dead and a thousand injured (Abdalla 2015: 136).  
Given its experience and resources, the labour movement was better able to survive the 
counterrevolutionary intensification. Industrial action continued throughout this period, albeit with 
lesser intensity due to the SCAF’s active efforts to undermine it. These efforts included, first, the 
reliance on veteran ETUF members to impede the expansion of EFITU into large workplaces like 
Mahalla and Helwan, although the state-controlled union federation was in fact dissolved in early 
2011 (Marfleet 2016: 190). Former ETUF treasurer, Isma'il Ibrahim Fathi, was appointed Minister of 
Manpower and Migration in the transitional government, which EFITU considered a theatrical clean-
up of the ‘old regime’ (Beinin 2011: 194). Moreover, while the SCAF had negotiated a new law on 
trade union freedoms, they never passed it (Ramadan and Adly 2015); instead, under the 2011 SCAF-
enacted Law 34,  industrial action remained a criminal offense, despite its increasing frequency 
(Beinin 2012a: 342).  
Throughout the transitional period, the military continued to justify its intensive 
counterrevolutionary contentions with a military nationalist narrative which depicted the military as 
acting as a ‘saviour of the country’, protecting the country from sectarian bloodshed and foreign 
conspiracies and protecting Egyptian women, while continuing to contribute to sectarianism and to 
reproducing patriarchal norms and gender roles. It subjugated the opposition through intimidation, 
mass detention, and brute force, and paved the way for a Brotherhood presidential victory. 
In the parliamentary elections held from November 2011 to January 2012, the Brotherhood’s 
Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) took 44% of the seats and the Salafist Al-Noor Party took 25% of the 
seats, together dominating 69% of the parliament, with only a handful of seats going to the opposition.  
In June of 2012, the Brotherhood’s candidate Mohammad Morsi won the presidential elections, 
officially concluding the SCAF-led ‘transitional period’. Socialist Popular Alliance candidate Abu al-
'Izz al-Hariri and human rights activists Khaled Ali won a total of less than 1 percent of the votes; 
while Karama Party leader Hamdin Sabbahi, received a surprising 20.7 percent of the votes due to the 
support of ETIFU (Beinin 2012b: 43).  
The following section will discuss how the counterrevolutionary intensification continued 
through the same forms of contentions that we saw under SCAF, but with a more explicitly 
religious exclusionary regime.  
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5. The Brotherhood’s Counterrevolutionary Intensification (June 2012-July 2013) 
As mentioned in the previous section, the counterrevolutionary arrangement which granted the 
Brotherhood political power did not undermine existing resource structures. In counterrevolutionary 
terms, this period saw the continuation of the same intensive contentions of the SCAF period, which 
mainly preserved the neoliberal economic system and its exclusive beneficiaries, the military and 
private-sector bourgeoisie, depriving revolutionaries from effective representation in the drafting of 
the new constitution, exhausting the momentum of the labour movement by stalling on its promises 
and pending reforms; through detention, intimidation and co-optation; restoring conservative religious 
gender norms by reasserting patriarchal control over women’s bodies through violent and non-violent 
means, and instrumentalising sectarianism in the pursuit of more power. This counterrevolutionary 
intensification also represented a continuation of Mubarak’s regime, albeit with a new ruling 
contender: one ruling party, a neoliberal economy, and a system of patron-client relations involving a 
select business elite (Abul-Magd 2016: 214). 
The Brotherhood's agenda was always compatible with neoliberalism (see Chapter 6). It 
benefitted from and promoted the integration of Egypt into the global capitalist market, while 
promoting accumulation within an Islamist hegemony. For the Brotherhood’s businessmen, capital 
accumulation was a blessing from God, rather than an outcome of privileged access to capitalist 
structures. Their most successful businesses bore names from the Quran: the largest grocery store in 
Al-Shatir, an upper class Cairo neighbourhood, was named Zad, a Qur’anic word meaning ‘food 
provision’. At the end of the day, Prophet Muhammad himself had been, at some point, a tradesman. 
The Brotherhood often repeated his famous saying that ‘nine-tenths of livelihood is in trade (Abul-
Magd 2016: 216). 
By the time he took power, President Morsi was in dire need of an injection of capital to 
‘empower his capitalist market strategy, satisfy the rich businessmen in the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
inner core,’ and power an economic recovery that would ‘satisfy the electorate’ (Hinnebusch 2014: 
18). Consequently, Morsi’s term was characterised by conflicting aims: on the one hand, the regime 
had to appease the US and Western investors, international financial organisations, and capitalist 
classes in Egypt; and, on the other, it had to reassure supporters of its commitment to a hard-line 
stance on populist issues such as Israel, imperialism, secularism, etc. (Tadros 2012).  
Despite conflicting public statements, Morsi’s economic policies were consistently pro-
capital, and largely in line with those of his predecessors. The main difference between Mubarak and 
Morsi is that the latter had a sense of urgency. The new regime was under great pressure to stabilise 
the polity and revive the economy. It asked for loans and aid from the IMF, the US, and conservative 
Gulf monarchies; and it drew up an economic plan compatible with IMF conditions. The government 
raised energy prices, increased sales tax, and devalued the Egyptian pound.  
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In a visit to Cairo to discuss Egypt’s loan request, IMF Chief Christine Lagarde said that the 
IMF was ‘very impressed’ by the new government’s strategy, and began working on a 4.8 billion 
dollars loan requested by Egypt.129 In the same month, the Finance Minister, Mumtaz al-Said, 
requested a 500-million-dollar grant from the US to support the government budget. Washington 
responded generously, with one billion dollars in debt relief and two billion dollars in private-sector 
investment (Martini and Taylor 2011: 135). By December, almost every other key figure in Obama’s 
administration had visited Cairo, including John Kerry, William Burns, Anne Patterson and Michael 
Posner (Tadros 2012). In July 2012, Saudi Arabia transferred to Egypt one and a half billion dollars 
for direct budget support, approved 430 million dollars in project aid, and gave the Egyptian 
government access to a 750 million dollars line of credit to import oil products. 130  
However, Qatar, with its historic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood‘s leadership, had a clear 
advantage over regional and international capital in Egypt. These ties extended back to when 
Brotherhood members fled to Qatar in the face of Nasser’s persecution (Roberts 2014).131 Since then, 
Doha has hosted the Brotherhood figures responsible for overseeing a vast network of Islamist 
organisations across the region. Egypt’s sizeable market offers Qatar an ideal opportunity to invest its 
enormous surpluses from oil and gas revenues. Seizing this opportunity, Qatar established several 
joint ventures, particularly in Egypt’s financial sector, and provided more than eight million dollars in 
aid to support the Egypian economy (Ulrichsen 2014: 15). Furthermore, upon visiting Cairo, Qatari 
Emir Hamad Bin Jassem announced a total investment of eighteen billion dollars over five years, 
commenting that there would be ‘no limits’ to Qatari investments (ibid.). Eight billion would be 
invested in an integrated power plant, natural gas, and iron steel project in Port Said, while the 
remaining ten billion would finance the construction of a tourism marina complex on the 
Mediterranean coastline.132 
But given that the country was still in the process of drafting a constitution, the limits of 
Morsi’s powers were defined by the true holder of power, the military. The military was chiefly 
concerned with the Brotherhood’s political ambitions, and with Qatari-Brotherhood ventures in 
                                                           
129 See IMF report 22 august, 2012. IMF survey: IMF to discuss new loan program with Egypt, says 
Lagarde. retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/socar082212a 
130  See BBC News, 22 August 2012. Egypt requests $4.8bn loan from visiting IMF chief. Retrieved 
from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19340871 
131 One of the most exemplifying cases is that of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a leading MB scholar who left 
Egypt for Qatar in 1961. There, he ran a religious institute and subsequently established and became dean of the 
College of Sharia at Qatar University. Today, al-Qaradawi is widely considered to be one of the most influential 
and renowned intellectuals of the MB. The broadcast of his popular show “Sharia and Life” broadcast on 
Qatar’s satellite TV channel Al-Jazeera in mid-1990s served his popularity on a regional scale (see Roberts 
2014) 
132 See ‘Qatar Seeks to Invest—and Secure Its Footing—in the New Egypt’, in Gulf States Newsletter. 
September 27, 2012. 
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capital-intensive sectors that had been cartelised by the generals. The Brotherhood sought to coup-
proof their nascent regime by expanding the military’s economic privileges, while, at the same time, 
attempting to grab more power than the military was willing to concede.  
Soon after Morsi’s presidential victory, SCAF dissolved the Brotherhood-dominated lower 
house of parliament, the People’s Assembly, and granted itself legislative powers. In return, Morsi 
ordered he most senior generals in the military to retire, including Field Marshal Tantawi who had led 
the transitional period. In Tantawi’s place, Morsi appointed as Head of Egyptian Armed Forces none 
other than Field Marshal Abdel Fattah El-Sisi who would later lead the coup against him. Although 
Morsi’s move did not undermine the authority of the military per se, it did represent the 
Brotherhood’s attempt to shape a new hierarchy.133  
In November 2012, constitutional delegates of the liberal youth, the left, and the Copts were 
forced out of the 100-member assembly that was charged with drafting the new constitution, making 
clear that the Islamists were seeking an exclusionary constitution. The remaining constitutional 
delegates from the Brotherhood, the Salafists, and other Islamist movements continued to craft a 
document which intensified the religious language which characterised Sadat’s 1971 constitution and 
which omitted mechanisms for protecting politically vulnerable constituencies, such as Christians, 
women, and journalists (Brownlee 2013: 17). The new constitution included overtly sectarian 
language which threatened to marginalise not only Copts, but non-Sunni Muslims as well. Article 2 
set the ‘principles of sharia as the principal source of legislation’, and Article 4 codified a role for al-
Azhar, the primary Islamic religious establishment, to ensure that laws complied with sharia (ibid.). 
At the same time, the new constitution guaranteed a continuation of the same privileges for 
the military. Article 197 removed the military budget from state oversight and public scrutiny, and 
placed authority for overseeing military spending and earning in the hands of the National Defence 
Committee which, as the previous section discussed, has always been populated by officers-turned 
parliamentarians. The same law ensured that the future parliament would be obliged to consult this 
committee before issuing any new laws relevant to the armed forces (Abul-Magd 2016: 208). Article 
195 stipulated that the Minister of Defence was to be chosen from among the ranking officers, and 
Article 198 allowed military trials of civilians who ‘harm the armed forces’, though without defining 
such crimes.134 In addition, the upper house of the parliament – the Shura Council – issued a law that 
                                                           
133 The retired generals were awarded medals and applauded by the MB for their role in the transition 
and in other historical moments. 
134 See Amnesty International Report, ‘Egypt’s new constitution limits fundamental freedoms and 





increased military retirement pensions by 15-20 percent annually,135 allowed the military to acquire 
more land for commercial purposes, and created interest-free ‘Islamic’ loans to lower rank officers 
(ibid.: 210-211).   
When the Constitutional Court threatened to revise the draft constitution, Morsi granted 
himself complete judicial and legislative power and immunity from judicial oversight, and barred the 
courts from dissolving the constitutional assembly. He illegally dismissed Egypt’s prosecutor general 
and replaced him with a political ally. In response, protests engulfed all of the main cities of Egypt 
and continued until a month later when Morsi rescinded his constitutional amendments.  
However,  a referendum on the newly drafted constitution was set for December 2012, and 
was overwhelmingly confirmed. The new electoral law drafted by the Shura Council, redrew electoral 
districts to distribute non-Islamist votes across districts so as to minimise the chances of non-Islamist 
candidates in elections, and removed the quotas previously placed for women and Copts. Another law 
restricted the right to peaceful assembly, requiring that a request to hold a protest be submitted to the 
police three days in advance. As for labour, rather than issuing a law that allowed for independent 
unions and syndicates, and despite a draft to this effect having been submitted in 2011, Morsi only 
acted to amend the old law regarding state-sponsored unions and syndicates, and only in order to 
replace former regime members with Muslim Brotherhood ones. 
Figure 5, below, presents a simplified depiction of the Egyptian polity during this period. 
Contenders 1 and 2 represent the military and the Brotherhood, as well as their affiliated business and 
bureaucratic elites. Their power-sharing arrangement was supported by regional and international 
capital, represented by external actors 5 and 6. Contender 4 represents the organised labour movement 
and other organised peasant associations, while the smaller challengers are liberal, socialist, 
communist, and rightist parties. 
                                                           
135 This was the second raise in two years, since SCAF had already used its legislative power in the 
transitional period to increase military pensions by 15 percent (Abul-Magd 2016: 210). 
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    (Figure 5) The Egyptian Polity during the first half of Morsi’s Rule 
 
The authoritarian tendencies of the new regime polarised the country. Protests and strikes 
against Morsi and his policies increased. Between July and December 2011, the period following 
Morsi’s inauguration, there was an average of 452 monthly protests or strikes, compared to an average 
of 185 during the SCAF period. Strikes and sit-ins accounted for 30% of all protest activities. Over 
36% of these protests were primarily concerned with economic demands.136   
The role of women in these protests continued to stir counterrevolutionary and revolutionary 
contentions. Violence and harassment against women participating in public protests increased 
dramatically in this period, particularly during a large protest on the second anniversary of the ‘25 
January Revolution’. Many activists accused the Brotherhood of orchestrating large-scale sexual 
assaults against women during protests, by sending in ‘gangs of men’ who surrounded women, ripped 
away their clothes, and grabbed and violated their bodies.137  
Members of the Shura Council blamed women ‘who insist on demonstrating with men in 
unsecure areas’ for the violence they experienced;138 and the Egyptian government opposed a UN 
declaration on violence against women at the UN in March 2013, arguing that its content contradicted 
                                                           
136 These numbers are based on a report published by ECESR, retrieved from the Daily News Egypt:  
https://dailynewsegypt.com/2013/04/28/labour-strikes-and-protests-double-under-morsi/ 
137 See interviews with Egyptian women activists on sexual assault during this period here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0DkdYPs_qfE, and testimonies of survivors here: 
http://nazra.org/en/2013/01/testimony-survival-gang-rape-tahrir-square-vicinity 
138 See Al-Ahram, ‘Shura MPs fault protestors for Tahrir Square rapes, sexual harassment’; 11 February 
2013. Retrieved from: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/64552/Egypt/0/Shura-MPs-fault-protesters-
for-Tahrir-Square-rapes.aspx/ 
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‘established principles of Islam’, undermined ‘Islamic ethics’, ‘destroy[ed] the family’, led to the 
‘complete disintegration of society, and would certainly be the final step in the intellectual and 
cultural invasion of Muslim countries’ (quoted in Pratt 2013).  
Anti-Brotherhood mobilisations were not strictly revolutionary. In fact, the most resourced 
contenders were capitalist liberal and secular parties; neoliberal, secular, and Coptic businessmen; and 
old regime figures. The struggle of these contenders with the Brotherhood was over their position in 
the existing system, which the Brotherhood had compromised through the ‘brotherhooding’ 
(akhwanat) of both the state bureaucracy and private business.139 They came together in an opposition 
alliance, ‘National Salvation Front’ (NSF), led by the prominent liberal Egyptian diplomat Mohamad 
El-Baradei. By early 2013, the intensification of counterrevolution largely focussed on this power 
struggle between the Brotherhood and the NSF, overshadowing the continued revolution by organised 
workers, leftists, youth and human rights groups. The binary of pro- and anti-Brotherhood did not 
promise a more inclusionary economic system or more meaningful political participation for the 
working class, but simply sought to replace, within the same economic system, one 
counterrevolutionary political project with another. This binary represents a process of 
counterrevolution that fractured and co-opted popular initiative. As De Smet eloquently puts it, 
‘vertical relations of hegemony between fractions of capital and subaltern clients cut through still-
developing horizontal ties between workers and the revolutionary youth’ (2016: 215).  
Figure 5.1, below, shows how the pro- and anti-Brotherhood binary changed the political 
setting in Egypt between November 2012 when the new constitution was being drafted, and July 2013 
when the military ousted Morsi. The power-sharing arrangement between the military (1), the 
Brotherhood (2), supported by international (5) and regional capital (6) remained unchanged. But, as 
the following section will show, the military coordinated with the National Salvation Front and the 
new Tamarrod movement, together designated as challenger (3), in preparation for the military coup. 
The labour movement (4) and other smaller revolutionary groups were left out of the new (1)-(3) 
arrangement. 
 
                                                           
139 see Abul-Magd (2016: 214-215). The term became popular in the media as a description of how the 
Brotherhood recruited its own members into the state apparatus. See, for example, ‘Umar Abdl al-Aziz, Mustafa 
al-Marsafawi, and Ayat al-Habbal, in ‘Amaliyyat Akhwanat al-Dawla fi 8 shuhur min hukm Morsi’ (The project 
of Brotherhooding the state during the 8 months of Morsi’s rule), al-Masry al-Youm, 14 February 2013. 
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(Figure 5.1) The Egyptian Polity in the second half of Morsi’s Rul 
 
6. Military-led Counterrevolutionary Intensification (July 2013-?) 
After two days of mass protests, the military ousted Morsi on July 3, 2013. Since then, it has been the 
main counterrevolutionary contender, controlling all aspects of the Egyptian polity. This military coup 
was, again, a continuation of military-led counterrevolution that had begun decades earlier. It sought 
to preserve the political prerogatives and economic privileges of the military regime under the 
pretence of defending the nation, and to further expand their privileges through guaranteeing legal 
immunity for any of its actions, past or future. Additionally, the SCAF wished to preserve the de-facto 
inclusion of the officers in the state bureaucracy and the state-owned portion of the Egyptian economy 
and, increasingly, preservation of the opportunities this provided for ‘extension into the private or 
hybrid public-private sectors’ (Sayigh 2012: 23). The Obama administration welcomed this military 
move. The Egyptian military is a trusted partner who has been receiving an annual aid package of 1.3 
billion dollars from the US for complying with the peace treaty with Israel. The Egyptian military, the 
White House, and the anti-Brotherhood Saudi and Emirati royals came to share increasing concerns 
over Morsi’s policies.140 
                                                           
140 Former Secretary of State John Kerry told The New York Times Cairo bureau chief, David 
Kirkpatrick, General Sisi told him when he was still Minister of Defence under Morsi that he will not ‘let my 
country go down the drain’, and that he was prepared to intervene. Kerry added that he was partly relieved. 
James Mattis, then a Marine general in charge of Central Command, often argued that the Muslim Brotherhood 
was just a different shade of Al Qaeda, even though the Brotherhood had said for decades that it opposed 
violence and favoured elections, while Al Qaeda, in turn, denounced the Brothers as naïve patsies for the West. 
Mattis said that, ‘They [the Brotherhood and Al Qaeda] are all swimming in the same sea’, and blamed Morsi’s 
own ‘imperious leadership’ for his downfall. See Kirpatrick’s article in NY Times, ‘The White House and the 
Strongman;; 27 July 2018. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/sunday-review/obama-egypt-
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Soon after the coup, it became evident that it was not a sudden event. Instead, it had been 
prepared for over several months. This involved a Coptic business tycoon, Naguib Sawiris, as well as 
the Emiratis, Egyptian military intelligence and the Interior Ministry in an effort to co-opt cross-class 
revolutionary protests by secretly sponsoring a military nationalist mass movement, ‘Tamarrod’ 
(rebellion), which gave the impression of being a grassroots ‘genuine revolution’ against Morsi.141 142 
The petition was led by a group of nationalist-Nasserite youth, and their well-sponsored movement 
reached every corner of the country. People stopped their cars to sign it; others took it onto buses and 
into shops for signatures, and drove for hours into rural villages to involve rural communities. It also 
was resourceful in its use of media coverage and support, whether private TV channels owned by 
Sawiris and others, or channels controlled by the military intelligence. Given it’s resourcefulness, 
Tamarrod co-opted other grassroots petitions. It consolidated the ‘opposition’ to Morsi’s regime, and, 
in doing so, gave the military a bigger say in the transition (see Ketchley 2017: 111-112).   
While counterrevolution was evolving in such innovative ways, revolution continued, albeit 
without a clear political direction. Between January and May 2013, the Egyptian Centre for Economic 
and Social Rights recorded over 2,400 protests and strikes.143 The effectiveness of these contentions 
forced a delay in the implementation of an IMF loan (Hanieh 2013: 170). In February 2013, 1,200 
dockworkers at Ain Sukhna port went on a 16-day strike to demand job security (Lynch and 
Marroushi 2013). In March, drivers of microbuses mobilised for the first time as an organised 
workforce over availability of diesel fuel. In Mahalla al-Kubra, drivers parked buses in squared and 
on railway lines, bringing city traffic to a halt.144 In April, the largest stoppage in the railway sector 
for over 30 years took place, when 73,00 workers demanded wage increase and holidays. When the 
military threatened to take over the railway system, one striking driver commented, ‘neither the 
military nor the police are capable of driving or operating these trains […] we even operate the 
military trains for the Armed Forces’ (quoted in Chabel 2012). By 2013, ETIFU had two million 
members and 300 unions, actively involved in protests and strikes (Charbel 2012) 
But the revolutionaries were divided amongst themselves and so unable to present a viable 
and coherent ‘third way’ as an alternative to the existing counterrevolutionary binary. The same 
                                                           
coup-trump.html  
141  Tamarod members have admitted in press interviews after the 2013 coup that they were connected 
to the military and the Interior Ministry. See Reuters, 20 February 2014. Retrieved from: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-politics-tamarud/activists-who-backed-mursis-fall-turn-against-
military-idUSBREA1J1E420140220 
142 Naguib Sawiris stated openly to The Financial Times (FT) that he sponsored the movement. See his 
interview with FT here: https://www.ft.com/content/d5aa3aac-c70e-11e4-9e34-00144feab7de 
143 See Daily News, 28 April 2013. Retrieved from: https://dailynewsegypt.com/2013/04/28/labour-
strikes-and-protests-double-under-morsi/ 
144 See Daily News, 17 March, 2013. Retrieved from: https://dailynewsegypt.com/2013/03/17/mahalla-
drivers-shut-down-city-roads/ 
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revolutionary limitations discussed in the previous section, when the counterrevolutionary 
arrangement between the Brotherhood and the military was being implemented, were still present in 
this period. In repetition of February 2011 and July 1952, the military mobilised the same war 
propaganda as previously, holding itself up as the saviour of the nation, working to protect it from 
bloodshed. The military removed Morsi, suspended the 2012 constitution, and installed an interim 
government that included significant representation from the anti-Brotherhood NSF alliance.  
When the Brotherhood attempted to protest against the coup, they were massacred by the 
military in Raba’a Square.145 Thereafter, the military, led by a pragmatic business-oriented general-
turned president, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, intensified counterrevolution by forcefully restoring the pre-
2011 status-quo, silencing all forms of dissent, and imprisoning tens of thousands of youth activists, 
leftists, Islamists, journalists, and unaffiliated protestors for having committed revolutionary 
‘misdeeds’. The Tamarrod youth were presented as the ‘genuine’ image of the revolutionary youth, 
and were given seats in the parliament and positions in the bureaucracy.  
 However, Sisi did not form a ruling party to replace Mubarak’s NDP, which had been 
dissolved in 2011; nor did he offer a platform during his 2014 presidential campaign. Instead, he 
relied on the military establishment to secure his ascendance to power by preventing any challenge 
from emerging. His programme was centred around ‘stability’, addressing the economic interests of 
the old regime’s oligarchs, the neoliberal bourgeoisie, the various military branches and state 
bourgeoisie, as well as of the weary middle class (Kandil 2012: 233, Alexander and Bassiouny 2014: 
208). As for the masses, revolution was de-intensified over two stages. First, revolutionary elements 
were given a role in drafting the constitution which, in the end, did not lead to any meaningful 
transformation in resource structures;146 then, they were suppressed and detained en mass. Sisi first 
used the NSF alliance as a civilian face for his coup, appointing its key figures as ministers in order to 
appease the working classes and reduce the labour strikes that had continued unabated since 2011.  
 Much like his predecessor, Sisi sought the support of conservative Gulf states, except for 
Qatar, which was considered to be  conspiring against Egypt via the Brotherhood regime (Ulrichsen 
2017: 4-5). Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular granted billions of dollars 
to Egypt in an effort to stabilise the economy. But, given that the military produced everything, most 
of the capital injected into Egypt’s market went directly to businesses owned by the military. After the 
Emiratis donated $4.9 billion for infrastructural projects in Egypt, the head of the military engineers, 
General Tahir Abdallah, claimed that the Emiratis said, ‘We will support the Egyptian people but 
                                                           
145 See Human Rights Watch Report (August 2014) on the massacre. Retrieved from: 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt. 
146 Leftist and liberal members of the constitutional committee fought, to no avail, for the elimination 
of many military privileges, including the disclosure of military budget and the trials of civilians in military 
courts.  
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through the army. If the people want a hospital, the armed forces will build it.147 The armed forces 
engineering unit was involved in most infrastructural projects. 
The expansion of the Suez Canal was undertaken by a partnership of Dar Egypt, a consulting 
and contracting firm, and the Egyptian military (Marshall 2015: 14). The funds for this rather costly 
and unnecessary expansion were collected through a national fundraising campaign, the ‘Long Live 
Egypt Fund’, which was promoted everywhere by Suez-related propaganda. The campaign received 
nine billion dollars ‘from Egyptians only’. Egypt’s capital centres, including billionaires like Sawiris, 
and banks, celebrities, the military National Service Projects Organisation, and other members of the 
upper middle class, provided the lions share in the Suez funding campaign, signalling the return to 
business as usual in partnership with the military (ibid.).  
However, the military no longer accepted political competition from businessmen, 
particularly those affiliated with the old regime. It actively sought to prevent business magnates, such 
as Sawiris, Ahmad Ezz and others affiliated with Mubarak, from participating in parliamentary 
elections, and forced them out of the parties they had founded while, at the same time, ensuring their 
business interests (Adly 2017: 17). When, on Twitter, someone tweeted that the military took over 
Sawiris’s party, the capitalist-liberal ‘Free Egyptians Party’ which he had established in 2011, Sawiris 
replied, ‘well said’.148 When questioned about its management of the country, Sisi reiterated a rusty 
nationalist discourse based on the military ‘victory’ in the 1973 war against Israel, coupled with 
menacing references to ‘hidden hands’ and ‘foreign conspiracies’ facing the nation.  
 Figure 6, below, shows how the military coup and its subsequent policies changed the 
Egyptian polity. The military, along with the non-Islamist bourgeoisie, are represented in contender 
(1), monopolising access to the polity in partnerships with international capital (6) and Saudi-Emirati 
capital (6), while Qatar (8) is left out of the Egyptian market after the Brotherhood (5) is pushed out 
of the polity. The other liberal, leftist, and rightist parties are used by the military to draft a new 
constitution and stabilize the polity, before being pushed into the margins again. They are represented 
in the small circles, along with a much bigger mass of workers (4) who were, in turn, dispersed and 
de-intensified in a typical and gradual counterrevolutionary process of co-optation and repression.  
                                                           








   (Figure 6) The Political Setting after 2013 Coup 
 
 Without any real oversight or competition, the Egyptian military has controlled the polity, and 
the government has become a bureaucratic middleman whose main task has been to accelerate the 
funnelling of capital to military enterprises. A 2014 decree expanded the ability of ministers to sign 
no-bid contracts which, in effect, facilitates the channelling of huge chunks of public investment to 
military firms and their partners. The military received nearly 770 million dollars in contracts over the 
first 10 months following Morsi,
 
and over one billion dollars in no-bid government contracts over the 
course of three months in the fall of 2014.  
The success and ‘prosperity’ of military enterprises has been presented to the public as a 
success of the economy as a whole. Indeed, the military owns business enterprises that ‘invest in 
almost everything and produce almost anything’ (Abul-Magd 2016: 228). It bakes subsidised bread 
and runs hotels with luxurious wedding halls. It operates gas stations, shipping firms, and parking lots. 
It constructs roads and collects fees for them. As Sisi once asserted, ‘nothing is for free. Egyptians 
should get used to paying for the service they get. If you want good roads, you have to pay for 
them’.149 Its officers’ retirement continues to grant them free access to jobs in the state bureaucracy 
and state-run businesses, controlling public transportation, water and sewerage services, land 
allocation, internet lines, housing projects, governorate and administrative positions, and often direct 
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and allocate those strategic resources to favour their own entourage and families.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has roughly covered the period between 2011 and 2013, when revolution and 
counterrevolution intensified. It showed how revolution intensified through the contentions of a broad 
alliance of labour, youth, leftist and progressive parties. By co-ordinating their contentions, they 
gained access to pooled resources and were able to raise mutually exclusive demands to those raised 
by the Mubarak regime. In a regional moment of intensification, they took the initiative and the 
masses flocked into the streets, significantly disrupting economic activity throughout the country. 
This chapter then traced the intensification of counterrevolution through the power-sharing 
arrangement that was established between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood and that kept the 
revolutionaries out of the polity. It then explored how counterrevolution continued in largely the same 
forms of contention after the Brotherhood assumed power in 2012 and after the coup that ousted the 
Brotherhood in 2013. 
 Since 2013, the military’s promises relating to economic recovery have continued to prove 
hollow. Unemployment continue to rise and living standards decline as Sisi marches on with austerity 
measures and relentless implementation of IMF and World Bank pro-capital conditions. In December 
2015, the World Bank agreed a three billion dollar loan which accompanied a series of cuts in 
subsidies and in public sector wages. In March 2016, civil servants came out to protest in their 
thousands, blocking the entrances to public institutions. The government resorted to the same old 
divisive tactics of using the state-run unions against independent unions, and gradually dissolved 
independent unions (Marfleet 2016: 201). The Deputy Chairman of ETUF who had been, by then, 
resurrected, stated that ‘some workers have exploited the chaos that followed the January revolution 
to create fake entities’, and that ‘all employees should operate exclusively through the official 
federation’ (quoted in Hassan 2016).  
Despite the ‘success’ of counterrevolution in de-intensifying revolution, revolution continues 
in passive and dispersed contentions. Smaller scale confrontations with the owners of capital and with 
the military and its agents continue; and, as this chapter has shown, when contingent factors overlap, 
revolution can intensify again. Neither processes ended in 2013, because the existing exclusionary 
structures are governed by continuous counterrevolutionary policies, and the existing excluded masses 
are responding to their exclusion with continuous revolutionary demands, even if their demands have, 







This thesis has shown the importance of paying closer attention to counterrevolution when 
studying revolution and its ‘outcomes’. It has presented preliminary groundwork for a new 
theorisation of counterrevolution and revolution, and applied it on the case of Egypt. The new 
theorisation stems from a concern over the recurring theoretical shortcoming in dealing with 
outcomes of ‘revolution’. This thesis has shown that, by studying revolution and 
counterrevolution in relation to one another, and as processes that extend well beyond the 
events to which they are usually reduced, we can better understand their outbursts and their 
outcomes. 
 First, by reviewing existing theories of revolution, this thesis has shown that this 
shortcoming is a common feature of most theories of revolution. This review has highlighted 
the superficial use of the concept of counterrevolution, if at all, in these theories, and argued 
that this use or absence of counterrevolution increases the risk of misunderstanding the 
outcomes of empirical case studies, because it does not admit the parallel 
counterrevolutionary process which contributes to those outcomes. Even Skotpol, for 
instance, whose theory of revolution is a stellar contribution, misunderstood the outcomes of 
the Iranian ‘revolution’ when its ‘outbreak’ and outcomes did not match her theory, and 
resorted, instead, to culturalist and essentialist explanations to why things turned out to be 
different. Such explanations are often used on more recent cases in the Middle East, where 
exceptionalist arguments are re-invoked to explain the disappointing outcomes. Then, the 
thesis has surveyed literature on counterrevolution, and deduced that most literature on 
counterrevolution do not develop a concept of counterrevolution. Instead, it studies what it 
assumes to be ‘counterrevolutionary’ without developing the concept itself. It then finds 
inspiration in the few exceptions which deal rigorously with the concept, affirming a 
relational approach to the study of counterrevolution and revolution. 
 
This theorisation not only complements literature on the ‘Arab Spring’ outcomes, but also 
hopes to be applicable to past and future cases elsewhere – hence refuting the exceptionalist 
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assumptions towards the Middle East, and the exceptionalist assumptions towards the 
phenomenon of revolution more broadly.  
 
1.  Theoretical Contribution 
This thesis has laid out a new theorisation of counterrevolution and revolution as continuous 
processes involving contentions over access to resources. In order to study them, we have to 
find out who has control over resources and their distribution in a given territory, and explore 
group demands (contentions) to have more access, or to give less access to others. As long as 
control over resources is concentrated in some form (state form), there 1will always be 
contentions over resource access, even if most contentions will be ineffective and unnoticed. 
These ineffective and unnoticed contentions are not isolated from revolution, but instead 
define the relations of individuals and groups with the central authority that dictates their 
access. Without these contentions, it is unlikely that individuals can recognise their shared 
experiences and assemble in larger groups, and, sometimes, produce intensive, televised 
outrbusts against established governments. Therefore, these contentions are not isolated from 
revolution, but, instead, are its ingredients. They are part of the same phenomenon.  
The same can be said about counterrevolution. The small-scale contentions which 
seek to exclude others from access to resources are part of the counterrevolution which also, 
for example, culminates in a military coup. If we are to see this connection between those 
‘non-movements’, as Bayat describes them, and the ‘volcanic’ outbursts to which revolution 
and counterrevolution are reduced to, then, we can say that revolution and counterrevolution 
are continuous processes.  
This continuity is not strictly local. It is connected to the modern international system 
which perpetuates exclusionary structures. In today’s neoliberalised world, every state has 
varying degree of control and power over resources within its territories, depending on its 
relationship with international capital. Multinational corporations and international financial 
organisations have an increasingly greater say in resource allocation of states. In tandem, 
revolution now involves contentions over the role of these supra-national organisations in the 
local resource distribution – such as protests against austerity and IMF deals. This is why 
revolution and counterrevolution are inter-related and evolutionary. The ability to learn from 
the past and from the other is an evolutionary characteristic which ensures survival. There are 
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always contentions for a more inclusionary distribution of resources because there is always 
exclusion, and these demands are presented based on the perceived exclusion in that moment.  
The same can be said about counterrevolution. The ways in which exclusionary 
structures are preserved depend on learning from past struggles and learning about present 
revolutionary contentions. Neither phenomena is static or separable either from the other or 
from its past experiences. They are inter-related insofar as their contentions are centred 
around the same issue – resources, and they are evolving through learning from each other’s 
contentions over resources, as well as from their own experiences. This does not necessarily 
mean that they are consistently becoming more powerful and effective. But their ability to 
survive each other’s contentions and continue even in passive forms is an evolutionary 
characteristic. 
 Building on this theoretical argument, this thesis has theorised counterrevolution and 
revolution as processes of continuous political and social contention in which the 
mobilisation of changing alliances contend for a more inclusionary polity in the case of 
revolution, and an exclusionary polity in the case of counterrevolution. These processes are 
represented mostly in ineffective and dispersed contentions – which this thesis has termed 
‘passive’, and, less often, in effective, organised, and wide-scale contentions – referred to as 
‘intensified’ contentions. The latter includes the ‘volcanic’ outbursts which usually define 
‘revolution’ and ‘counterrevolution’. The intensification of both depends on contingent 
overlap of several material and ideational factors, which cannot be calculated or quantified. 
However, what this thesis has shown is that those episodes of intensification do not end either 
processes, but inevitably reproduce both. As such, the outcomes of those episodes neither 
define counterrevolution and revolution, nor concludes them. They are, however, ‘defining’, 
in the sense that these episodes often affect resource structures to varying extent, and 
subsequently the resources accessible by contending groups. This thesis has studied those 
outcomes of intensification in Egypt to show precisely how defining they are for the 
continuity of counterrevolution and revolution. 
The new theorisation was examined in Egypt through a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, concerned with covering as much as possible of the long historical 
processes which define both phenomena and unravel as much contentions as possible. This 
has been done by dividing the entire modern history of the Egyptian polity based on the most 
significant changes that its resource structures have witnessed. The ‘significance’ is measured 
based on two variations which sum up resource access: political participation and economic 
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inclusion. Political participation relates to the changes in the scope of political competition, 
and the extent to which existing polity structures allow for and facilitate such competition. 
The second variation, economic inclusion, denotes the extent to which subaltern classes are 
involved in economic activity. After demarcating timeframes based on those two variables, 
the thesis has been able to unravel counterrevolutionary and revolutionary contentions within 
each timeframe, assessing, in the process, how both continued through, and despite, the 
significant changes in the polity. In each timeframe, this thesis has 1) drawn the polity and its 
main contenders, 2) assigned the most illuminating and relevant contentions to 
counterrevolution and revolution,  and  3) compared these findings with the previous 
timeframe to see how the Egyptian polity has changed and what that means for 
counterrevolution and revolution. The spatiality of the study has taken into account the 
extension of counterrevolution and revolution beyond the polity. It gives sustained 
consideration to the intersection between the national, regional, and international resource 
structures that is increasingly manifested in today’s globalised world. 
 
2. Findings 
Using this methodology, this thesis has found that, in the case of Egypt, counterrevolution, in 
its modern sense, has been continuously manifested throughout the domain under study. In 
the first timeframe (1804-1952), modern counterrevolution began under Khedive Muhammad 
Ali, who concentrated land in the hands of a small minority of large landowners, excluded the 
majority of peasants from access to and control of land, through increased tax burdens, forced 
corvée labour, and conscription, excluded small and medium tradesmen and craftsmen from 
meaningful economic activity, and introduced structural privileges (capitulations) for 
European businesses and capital in Egypt. The large landowning class continued to 
accumulate wealth through the export of their agricultural produce to European markets. 
Peasants became landless or land poor. Some moved into the cities looking for jobs in the 
small pockets of industries, and gradually formed an urban working class.  
When Britain invaded Egypt, the large landowners co-opted emerging working class 
organisations for its own bourgeois nationalist agenda, and gained parliamentary power in a 
triangular power-sharing arrangement with the palace and Britain. When modern revolution 
intensified in the late 1940s and early 1950s through militant groups and labour strike action, 
the military bourgeoisie saved the state from a revolutionary takeover in what came to be 
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known, misleadingly, as the ‘July 23 revolution’ in 1952. In the second timeframe, this thesis 
has traced a continuity of counterrevolution, albeit this time with a military oligarchy driving 
the wheels of capitalist production, in a ‘national socialist’ model not too dissimilar to that of 
Europe. It repressed and eventually dismantled effective labour and pro-labour groups, 
including communists and independent unions, and accelerated capital development, first 
through state partnerships with private capital, then through partnerships with foreign capital.  
When the military was defeated and its economic plan failed in late 1960s, the world 
economy was seeing a rapid turn towards neoliberalisation. Then, counterrevolution 
continued through a reconciliation with the old bourgeoisie and regional capital, and the 
revival of capitalist conservative forces (1970-2011). The pan-Arab ambition was replaced 
with integration in Arab capitalist markets. Egypt was rewarded for the reverse in foreign 
policy, receiving a share of oil revenue surplus to recover. In this third timeframe, the 
military and its state bureaucrats, who were managing the largely state-owned economy, 
partnered with the reinvigorated private bourgeoisie and gradually privatised state resources 
without losing their privileged access. Therefore, the military elite, on the one hand, 
controlled the polity and, on the other, had a stake in the private sector. Counterrevolution 
continued in hybrid state-private ventures that accumulated wealth for a newly wedded state-
private bourgeoisie.  
The reconciliation with regional capital, primarily Saudi Arabia, bolstered the 
conservative counterrevolutionary forces in Egypt. Most notoriously, the Muslim 
Brotherhood businessmen, who fled the national socialist system, returned from the Arab 
Gulf and cartelised entire sectors in the economy using their petrodollars, without stepping 
onto military cartels. Counterrevolution, therefore, continued without interruption through the 
continuation of capitalist development with its rewards restricted to a small minority of state 
bureaucrats, military officers and generals, traditional large landowners, old and new private 
sector bourgeoisie – which then included the Islamists.  
This thesis also found that revolution was continuous throughout this history. It began 
with the peasants who lost their lands for large landowners in the early and mid- 19th century. 
They resisted counterrevolution through largely ineffective and dispersed attempts of 
obstructing production. Meanwhile, revolution continued through the contentions of skilled 
foreign workers who laboured in Egypt’s nascent industries. With their union experience, 
they began the first signs of working class organisation at the turn of the century, from which 
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the growing Egyptian urban workforce learned. This thesis has demonstrated that, despite the 
bourgeois co-optation of Egyptian working class in the interwar period, there were 
continuous revolutionary demands and attempts to liberate the working class from the grip of 
the nationalist bourgeoisie. These attempts were fruitful during the socialist and communist 
upsurge after World War II, which saw the first revolutionary intensification against the 
triangular power-sharing arrangement.  
Despite the dismantling and co-optation of the main revolutionary contenders in the 
second timeframe by the new military regime (1952-1970), this thesis unearthed cases that 
prove the continuity of revolution. Revolution continued more saliently when the working 
class began confronting the withdrawal of its earlier gains – the reversal of Nasser’s social 
support policies. The military regime began ‘opening up’ to private and international capital 
in the third timeframe (1970-2011), and attempted to neoliberalise the economy, imminently 
increasing its confrontation with the working class. A conjuncture of local, regional and 
international developments triggered an episode of intensification in 2011, which, as this 
thesis has shown, is the culmination of this continuity and evolution of revolutionary 
contenders.  
This thesis has also presented preliminary findings on the evolution and inter-
relatedness of counterrevolution and revolution. In every timeframe, it linked the contentions 
for resource access to exclusionary contentions, showing how they respond to one another. In 
the first timeframe, it has discussed the convergence of bourgeois nationalism and 
revolutionary labour, exhibiting how the former’s co-optation of the latter influenced the 
evolution of revolution. It has also used the example of Nasser’s ‘contradictory’ policies, in 
the second timeframe, to make a similar point. It has argued that Nasser’s welfare policies 
were not the outcome of a revolutionary regime. They were the outcome of evolving 
counterrevolution. Nasserist counterrevolution learned, through revolution, and through the 
flaws of the liberal oligarchs, that the survival and expansion of capitalist development, led 
by the state in this period, required concessions for revolution, setting out a balance of class 
forces that can fuel the wheels of production.  
 
3. Limitations 
Undoubtedly, there is much more to explore on the topic of this thesis. A more detailed 
account of each phase can present more imposing findings, and a more developed method can 
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help unearth more efficiently the manifestations of counterrevolution and revolution. This 
study is a ‘first cut’, so to speak, which teases the theoretical potentials of studying  
counterrevolution more rigorously in relation to revolution. Through its application of this 
preliminary theorisation on Egypt, it hopes to underscore the possibilities of improving our 
understanding of why things ‘go wrong’ after ‘revolution’, and avoid the use of 
‘counterrevolutionary’ without prior theorisation of ‘counterrevolution’. 
This thesis also hopes to contribute to the literature that rejects the study of social 
change based on teleological assumptions of a universal democratic end point of 
development, as well as literature that obsess about the survival of the state. This relational 
study of counterrevolution and revolution seeks to overcome the sterile authoritarian-
democratic dichotomy which Western liberal scholarship often adopts, with the belief that 
revolution is able to imagine a viable and more distributive alternative to the modern state. 
Revolution does not win with the introduction of voting ballots, or with the avoidance 
of ‘civil war’ through an elite bargain. It is a continuous and extensive struggle of 
structurally-marginalised and excluded groups, communities, races, genders, and social 
classes for more inclusive and fairer resource structures. It is the continuous questioning of 
capital accumulation and the advancement of demands for redistribution. Despite the political 
labelling of countries as ‘democratic’ or ‘undemocratic’, and the scholarly claims that 
Western liberal democracies ‘ended history’, counterrevolution has continued in many 
contentions, most notoriously in the increasing concentration of resources in the hands of a 
small number of large corporate contenders. 
A revealing historical example outside the contemporary Arab case would be the 
revolutionary intensification in Europe and the United States in the 1960s, when long-
marginalised groups, including working class segments, successfully mobilised against 
structural exclusion, institutionalising important inclusive gains. Alas, the revolutionary 
triumph in Europe and the United States at the time was promptly undercut by 
counterrevolutionary intensification reflected, for instance, in the symbolic euphemism of 
‘moderating democracy’. In a report on the governmentality of democracies to the Trilateral 
Commission,150 entitled ‘The Crisis of Democracy’, liberal intellectuals, Michel Crozier, 
Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, concluded that ‘Some of the problems of 
                                                           
150 According to the report, the Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 ‘by private citizens of 
Western Europe, Japan, and North America to foster closer cooperation among these three regions on common 
problems’.  
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governance in the United States today stem from the excess of democracy – an ‘excess of 
democracy’ in much the same sense which David Donald used the term to refer to the 
consequences of the Jacksonian revolution which helped to precipitate civil war. Needed, 
instead, is a greater degree of moderation in democracy’ (1973: 113). Indeed, the 1970s 
heralded an era of neoliberalisation and financialisation that reversed most of the labour gains 
of the previous decade. 
Historically, polities have oscillated between ‘partly democratic and much less 
democratic forms of rule’ (Tilly 2007: 2). This ‘oscillation’, Tilly argues, did not at any 
moment in history lead to the definitive triumph of democracy. Instead, regimes across the 
world ‘moved in both directions’, between authoritarianism and more democratic governance 
(ibid: 3). This struggle between the ‘excess’ and ‘moderation’ of democracy, the oscillation 
between authoritarianism and democracy, is illustrative of revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary politics: of a continuous back-and-forth that is suggestive of a 
relationship between both processes.  The re-emergence and intensification of 
counterrevolution across the world today is testimony to the absence of stable democratic 
regimes that ‘ended history’.  
Revolution and counterrevolution continue across the world in sometime-passive 
sometime-intensified struggles around class, racial and gender disparities, LGBTQ rights, the 
exclusion of entire communities from access to certain resources, refugee rights, corporate 
tax exemption and corporatisation of resources, re-emergence of exclusionary far-right 
movements, the increased access to private data by corporations and government agencies, 
environmental policy, patronage, austerity, privatisation, religious extremism, anti-Semitism, 
Islamophobia, etc. 
 Given the limited time and space, and the lack of ‘access’ to fieldwork in Egypt, this 
thesis has not grappled with all these manifestations of counterrevolution, though most, if not 
all, are connected to the episode of intensification that began in the Arab world in 2011 and 
was carried into the rest of the world mainly in anti-austerity mobilisations and in different 
degrees of intensity. Instead, this thesis has had limited focus on the more traditional and 
more defining labour-specific contentions, and has only addressed gender and minority-
related contentions in the last timeframe – during 2011 intensification. This does not 
compromise the findings, because, it suffices to show that the traditional contentions 
continue, evolve, and relate. Nonetheless, this thesis does not exhibit the whole picture of 
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counterrevolutionary (and revolutionary) politics, which are far-reaching and significant 
beyond the bounded televised events. 
  
4. Moving Forward 
There is much more to examine in the international relations of counterrevolution. It is no 
coincidence that the political and economic elite across the world rolled up their sleeves in 
the wake of the revolutionary intensification in the Arab world, and has been, since, using all 
divisive means at their disposal to preserve the neoliberal order. The rise of the far-right in 
Europe today is not dissimilar to the rise of the far-right in Europe during the revolutionary 
intensification in the inter-war period. It has de-intensified class mobilisation against 
neoliberal policies, and disoriented the collective experience of exclusion most starkingly felt 
in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. It has redirected the debate, with the malevolent 
help of mainstream and liberal media, towards the most vulnerable segments of society. 
It is also no coincidence that protests across the world increased in the period of 
intensification in the Arab world, addressing similar structures of neoliberal exclusion. The 
ruling elite has learned from this period. The new communication and media resources, i.e. 
social media, which revolutionaries in the Arab world were the first to utilise in full capacity 
in 2011, have now become just another resource controlled by the state, saturated with 
systemic propaganda and distortion, and, in the Arab world, used to monitor and arrest 
whoever is still daring enough to criticise counterrevolution. Tahrir Square was turned into a 
green space, and Occupy Wall Street, which was inspired by Tahrir sit-ins, was replaced with 
tax-relieved Wall Street.  
 By building on this thesis, we might be able to get a more nuanced picture of the 
warm ties between a US president serving the interests of the corporate elite and an Egyptian 
president serving the interests of a corporatised private sector. Given that the concept of 
counterrevolution is scarcely and insufficiently addressed in academia, this thesis could only 
cover limited grounds, in the hopes of exhibiting the importance of this concept and the 
potentials it holds for several disciplines that, in some way or another, repeatedly grapple 
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